The Buncefield Oil Depot Explosion and How this Explosion is Classed to the Environment - Case Study Example

Name: xxxxxxxxxxx Course: xxxxxxxxxxx Institution: xxxxxxxxxxx Title: Air quality Date: xxxxxxxxxxx @ 2010 Buncefield oil depot explosion Abstract The Buncefield oil depot explosion is considered as the largest explosion to have occurred in the United Kingdom since the Flixborough disaster in 1974. The cause of this explosion can be attributed to spills of fuel from storage tanks that eventually led to high strength fuel –air explosion. The explosion left huge stocks of refined oil product such as aviation turbine, petrol, diesel and gas oil on fire for four consecutive days. The fires produced pollutants and large plumes of particulates that could be seen through satellite images or viewed many kilometres away. It was alleged that this explosion brought about potential hazardous impacts to the air quality, the environment and the health of the public. This paper seeks to discuss the potential effects caused to the air quality and human health as a result of the Buncefield oil depot explosion. The discussions in this paper will be in reference to relevant data retrieved from air quality networks. Moreover, this paper will illustrate how the Buncefield oil depot explosion occurred and how this explosion is classed as a Major Accident to the Environment (MATTE). In addition, this paper will explore how such incidence can be prevented in future. Air Quality Introduction The Buncefield oil depot explosion occurred next to Hemel Hempstead north of London. The explosion left huge stocks of refined oil product such as aviation turbine, petrol, diesel and gas oil on fire for four consecutive days. The fires produced pollutants and large plumes of particulates that could be seen through satellite images or viewed many kilometres away. According to the conducted Air Quality Assessments, it was estimated that PM10 particles not less that 8, 000 tonnes were released into the air. These figures of PM10 particles are equivalent to almost 6% of the particles emissions released annually in the United Kingdom. Evidently, there were extremely high levels of emissions that caused harm to the air quality thus posing hazardous effects to the human health (Lenoir &Davenport 1993). The incident and its subsequent impacts Subsequent to the Buncefield oil depot explosion, a number of inquiries were set up to investigate the cause of the disaster and to recommend measures to be put in place to avoid another disaster like the Buncefield incident. This paper incorporated the findings from the United Kingdom governmental inquiry that was conducted jointly by the Environment agency and the Health and Safety Commission. This is mainly because the findings in this data network provide a comprehensive outlook on the occurrence of the fires and the explosions of the Buncefield oil storage on December 11, 2005. Moreover, this data network provided a critical analysis on the adverse effects that the Buncefield explosion might have caused to the air quality and human health. The findings of this report sums up the events of the explosion, the actual cause of the disaster and environmental impacts of the explosion (BNA 2006). The findings of this report revealed that the Buncefield transfer depot and oil storage is generally a huge tank farm occupied by three main companies namely the Chevron Limited, Hertfordshire Oil Storage limited and the Total UK Limited. The Buncefield depot is part of the national system of petroleum refinery, storage and pipeline. The report on the December 11, 2005 incident reveals that the first explosion which was also the largest occurred near one tank which eventually caught fire and the explosions became overwhelming leading to fierce fire balls in the large storage tanks. Efforts to put out the razing fires that began from the fuel-air explosion were futile since the fire was of an unusually massive strength when measured in the Richter scale. This was the biggest explosion in the United Kingdom since the Flixborough disaster. The fire fighters had put out the fire by the afternoon of 13th December, two days later but one tank re-ignited in the evening and was ignored to burn down on its own rather than to be out (Smith & Petley 2008). The effects of the blast were manifested in broken windows of buildings, blown out or dented front doors and the moving of the strong warehouse wall for close to a mile from its original location. The flames and smoke were also visible miles away. A number of neighboring office blocks were severely hit by the explosion which could have been more deadly the incident had occurred in week day when the offices throng with people. The windows, front and back doors of these offices were blown away. Cars in nearby streets-both the parked cars and the ones in motion caught fire and buildings were evacuated owing to the dangers of recurrent explosions and the poisonous smoke plus the unstable conditions of the buildings themselves. Several injuries were also reported with a few critically injured who were rushed to hospital. Some patients experienced breathing difficulty which was apparently not too severe to cause fatality (Smith & Petley 2008). A few months after the incident, there were reports of contamination of the water. Three valley water companies admitted it had detected toxins in the water in form of the chemicals used in fire fighting which had apparently found its way into the water through an ground water bore hole near the site of the disaster. However the fears were allied since none of the contaminated water from the well entered the public water supply since a nearby well and pumping stations were closed after the incident as a precautionary measure. There was increasing concern about the soil in the disaster area which many believed was chemically contaminated. The Buncefield oil depot explosion was declared as a Major Accident to the Environment (MATTE). This is mainly due to the potential environmental impacts that the explosion might have caused (Coleman et al 2006). Potential air quality impacts of the explosion Air quality evaluations involved a number of measurement networks in Southern England. The evaluations carried out on-site revealed that there was no wide spread increase of air pollution concentrations at the ground level. Generally, local monitoring networks in the southeast of England measured low levels of air pollution in the event of the explosion. In the course of the fires daily forecasting of the air quality were conducted and national monitoring of the air quality. The Netcen estimated the overall air pollutants emitted to the atmosphere as a result of the fire caused during and after the explosion. The measurements and calculation by Netcen were useful in that they allow an improved plume modeling and enable one to understand the potential impacts caused to the air quality as a result of the pollutants released in the course of the fires. Information from the Heathrow Air watch data network proved to be effective in assessing the potential air quality impacts caused as a result of the Buncefield oil depot explosion. This data network gives options to enter queries and access to air quality data. The database has measured concentration data and estimations presented in tables from the key monitoring stations. In addition this data archive comprises of estimations on the amount of pollution produced by a wide range of activities as depicted in the National Atmospheric Emissions Inventory (NAEI) (Apostol 2008). The overall amounts of fuel in the Buncefield oil depot were estimated from the data acquired from Total and the UK Petroleum Industry association (UKPIA). Nevertheless, the complete data on the exact quantities of fuel at the Buncefield terminal is not available. The figures presented are provisional and may require revision in order to obtain more definitive data. The table below depicts the types of fuel and the estimates of the total tonnage stored in the Buncefield oil depot. The initial measurements of the total volume of fuel in the oil depot were 82359 tonnes which is equivalent to 105 million liters. Measurements of the total tonnes of fuel in the Buncefield oil depot Terminal Fuel Volume, million liters Liters per tonnes Tonnes HOSL Petrol 35 1362 25698 HOSL Petrol 1.7 1361 1267 HOSL Burning 18 1248 14423 HOSL Aviation turbine fuel 0 - 0 HOSL DERV(diesel) 15.8 1203 13113 HOSL Gas oil 6.5 1187 5476 BPA Aviation turbine fuel 28 1251 22382 Total estimates 105 82359 According to the UK National Atmospheric Emission Inventory (NAEI) and other sources published in the aftermath of the explosions, there are four scenarios of the air pollutants emitted during the Buncefield explosion (Coleman et al 2006). These scenarios include, High estimate(100% fuel loss on site presumed 60% of fuel from HOSL AND 60% of fuel from BPA lost Medium estimate(75% fuel loss on site presumed Low estimate(50% fuel loss on site presumed Basically, these scenarios depict a picture of the various likely outcomes in regard to the fire, including the worst case scenarios and more realistic scenarios. The selected pollutants comprise of proposed standards and are greenhouse gases regarded as quite relevant to the health of the general public. In reference to the information from several data networks the pollutants emitted were measured as follows, Particulate matter with an aerodynamic diameter mean of 2.5um (PM2) - assumed air quality pollutant. Particulate matter with an aerodynamic diameter mean of 10um ( PM0)-Strategy air quality pollutant. Green house gas-Carbon dioxide(CO) Nitrogen dioxide (NO) - A UK2 Strategy air quality pollutant. Dioxins-organic pollutant Benzene- Strategy air quality pollutant Carbon monoxide(CO) -Strategy air quality pollutant Benzo pyrene (B[a] P) - Polycyclic Aromatic Hydrocarbon (PAH) indicator and strategy air quality pollutant. Non-methane volatile organic compounds (NMVOC) - ground level ozone precursor (Coleman et al 2006). For each scenario the estimates were concluded by multiplying the pollutant emission factor and the quantity of the burnt fuel. The emission factors were applied to the oil fires burning openly. The pollutants and the emission factors are summarized in the table below, Summary of pollutant emission factors (Coleman et al 2006). The emission measurement indicates that PM2.5, B[a] P and PM10 portrayed the greatest relative quantity of corresponding national emissions. The estimated PM2.5 and PM10 ranged between 4% to 8.5% of the annual emission in the United Kingdom. On the other hand, the BP emissions ranged between 5% and 10%. Emissions from dioxins and NO2 formed a range of 0. 003% and 6% of the annual emissions in the United Kingdom (Coleman et al 2006). The table below represents the overall quantity of air pollutants that came as a result of the Buncefield oil depot explosion. Estimates of the overall air pollutants emitted as a result of the Buncefield oil depot explosion Pollutants Scenario UK Total Scenario% 1 2 3 4 Units 1 2 3 4 C 39.2 28.7 43.1 57.5 Tonnes 152324 0.026 0.019 0.028 0.038 Benzene 58.3 42.8 64.2 85.6 Tonnes 13.6 0.4290 0.3149 0.4723 0.6298 PM10 8249.5 6054.8 9082.2 12109.6 Tonnes 141 5.8507 4.2942 6.4413 8.5884 PM2.5 4949.7 3632.9 5449.3 7265.7 Tonnes 86.9 5.6958 4.1805 6.2708 8.3610 NOx 37.2 27.3 40.9 54.6 Tonnes 1570 0.0024 0.0017 0.0026 0.0035 CO2 0.144 0.105 0.158 0.211 Tonnes NMVOC 101.0 74.2 111.2 148.3 Tonnes 1089 0.0093 0.0068 0.0102 0.0136 B[a]P 285.4 209.5 314.3 419.0 Kg 4034 7.0761 5.1936 7.7903 10.3871 CO 1712.7 1257.0 1885.6 2514.1 Tonnes 2786 0.0619 0.0454 0.0681 0.0908 (Coleman et al 2006). Impacts of the explosion to Public Health In the event of the explosion a number of Health Protection Agencies conducted rapid assessments on any potential health effects. A variety of approaches were incorporated based on experiences of past incidences such as the Flixborough disaster. Experiences drawn from major incidences in other localities played a great role in addressing public anxieties and evaluating the health impacts of the affected population. Subsequent to these assessments a follow up of the information gathered in regard to the potential health impacts was conducted. Thereafter, decisions that consider the plight of the public and the best ways to address the emerging risks were implemented (Apostol 2008). Due to the location and scale of the explosion concerns were raised by the public concerning the impacts that explosion might have caused to the health of populates in the Buncefield area. The findings of the concluded assessments pointed out that there were no major health impacts or risks posed to the public as a result of the Buncefield explosion. Nevertheless, a number of reports on the aftermath of the incident allegedly indicate that the populates in the surrounding areas were exposed to certain risks. Victims attended at the Hemel Hempstead healthcare on the day of the explosion complained of sprains, cuts and respiratory issues such as shortness of breath, sore throats, asthma attacks and coughing. It was established that the explosion also exposed the public to psychological distress. Other findings verified that the level of the exposure perceived varied within the different surroundings of the incident (HPA 2006). The table below portrays the estimates of received complaints from populates in the surrounding areas of the explosion. Percentage of populates 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% Health complaints Injuries Shortness of breath Head aches Anxieties Smoke inhalation Few months down the line it was speculated that the explosion might have caused water contamination in the surrounding water reserves. For instance in May 2006 the Three Valleys Water detected toxic bioaccumulative and florosurfactant in a bore hole at the Buncefield site. These toxic substances are used as fire fighting foams and can cause great harm to the human body if consumed. Nonetheless, it was confirmed that no water from the outlets whereby toxic bioaccumulative and florosurfactant were detected entered the public water supply. As a safety and health precaution the pumping station remained closed in the aftermath of the Buncefield explosion (HPA 2006). Recommendations of averting future incidences The Major Incident Investigation Board (MIIB) and a number of health protection agencies provided the required specifications in regard to risk assessments so as to prevent incidences such as the Buncefield oil depot explosion from occurring again. A key lesson learnt from this explosion was that there is need for advanced and intense measurement capabilities that address the potential impacts of such explosion to the air quality, the environment and the health of the public. It is apparent that the Buncefield explosion was a major emergency that had mere health impacts however the explosion might have brought severe impacts to the environment and the air quality (Lakha 2006). According to the Major Incident Investigation Board (MIIB) there exist three work streams that clearly portray the lessons that can be learnt from the Buncefield incident. These work streams include the operation and design of oil storage sites, emergency response to incidences and recommendations to the planning authorities. Operation and design of oil storage sites In order to avert incidences such as the Buncefield explosion from occurring in future there is need to identify more safety measures so as to ensure that fuel spills from storage tanks do not occur. Moreover, mechanisms of dealing with fuel spills should be devised so as to prevent the spilt fuel from forming a flammable vapor and poisonous air and environment pollutants. It is therefore recommended as a preventive measure that the fuel industry should assess and advance its safety measures in regard to handling great quantities of fuel and imposing safety measures to its storage sites. Safety standards should be upheld in the operating oil storage sites and fuel distribution channels. The design of oil storage sites should also adhere to safety standards so as to prevent oil spills from storage tanks and avert incidences such as the Buncefield explosion from occurring in future. Emergency responses to incidences As a result of the Buncefield incident invaluable lessons were learn on the appropriate emergency responses to such incidences. Evidently, the response from the health protection agencies was rapid and commendable in the event of the explosion. Nevertheless, technical and operational advancements are necessary so as to heighten the effectiveness of emergency responses during such incidences. Technically, organizations involved in emergency responses should be equipped with appropriate tools of risk assessments and addressing the various manifestations of tragedy. On the other hand, the staff in organizations involved in emergency responses should receive optimum training in emergency responses to incidences. Moreover, the staff should be trained on how to handle victims of oil explosions in a manner that enhances their safety and recuperation. Recommendations to the planning authorities The control and management of major tragedies and accidents are jointly enforced by a number of competent authorities such as the Environment agency and the Health protective agencies. These agencies play an imperative role in ensuring that the implemented emergency responses are effective in addressing issues emerging from incidences. It is therefore necessary for these authorities to uphold apposite policies in regard to the control and management of major tragedies and accidents (Griffin 2008). Conclusion The Buncefield oil depot explosion occurred next to Hemel Hempstead north of London. Huge stocks of refined oil product such as aviation turbine, petrol, diesel and gas oil were left burning for four consecutive days. Subsequent this explosion, several inquiries were set up to investigate the cause of the disaster and to recommend measures to be put in place to avoid such disasters from occurring in future. Through these inquiries it was established that the Buncefield oil depot explosion brought about hazardous impacts to the air quality, the environment and the health of the public. Air quality assessments involved a number of measurement networks in Southern England. The evaluations carried out on-site revealed that there was no wide spread increase of air pollution concentrations at the ground level. The overall amounts of fuel in the Buncefield oil depot were estimated from the data acquired from Total and the UK Petroleum Industry association (UKPIA). The initial measurements of the total volume of fuel in the oil depot were 82359 tonnes which is equivalent to 105 million liters. The emission measurement depicts that PM2.5, B[a] P and PM10 portrayed the greatest relative quantity of corresponding national emissions. The estimated PM2.5 and PM10 ranged between 4% to 8.5% of the annual emission in the United Kingdom. The BP emissions ranged between 5% and 10%. Emissions from dioxins and NO2 formed a range of 0. 003% and 6% of the annual emissions in the United Kingdom. Allegedly, the explosion also posed potential impacts to the public health. Findings from several inquiries established hat there were no major health impacts or risks posed to the public as a result of the Buncefield explosion. However, several reports depicted that the populates in the surrounding areas were exposed to certain risks. Victims attended at the Hemel Hempstead healthcare on the day of the explosion complained of sprains, cuts and respiratory issues such as shortness of breath, sore throats, asthma attacks and coughing. Furthermore, it was established that the explosion also exposed the public to psychological distress (BNA 2006). In order to avert such incidences from occurring, it is imperative that the operation and design of oil storage sites should adhere to safety regulations and standards. There is also need for technical and operational advancements in regard to emergency responses to incidences. In addition, authorities involved in implementing emergency responses during incidences should uphold policies and standards that promote effective control and management of major tragedies and accidents (Griffin 2008). Bibliography Apostol, I, 2008, Risk Assessment as a Basis for the Forecast and Prevention of Catastrophes, IOS Press, UK. Bureau of National Affairs (BNA), 2006, International environment reporter: Current report, Volume 29, Bureau of National Affairs Press, UK. Coleman, P, et al, 2006, Initial review of air quality aspects of the Buncefield Oil Depot explosion, Retrieved on January 14, 2010, Griffin, A, 2008, New Strategies for Reputation Management: Gaining Control of Issues, Crises and Corporate Social Responsibility, Kogan Page Publishers, New York. Health protection agency (HPA), 2006, The Public Health Impact of the Buncefield Oil Depot Fire. 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