Opinions on Syria: Incidents and Conceptual Metaphors - Essay Example

29 October Opinions on Syria: Incidents and Conceptual Metaphors On August 21, several videos circulated on the Internet which showed dying children and overwhelmed hospitals in the suburbs of Damascus. From here, the world watched as the Syria crisis became a highly-debated issue because of the possibility of a United States-led military intervention through an airstrike in Syria. Bashar al-Assad, President of Syria, denied the accusations that he used chemical weapons in Damascus. Ten days after the August gas bombings, U.S. President Barack Obama asked for Congress to authorize military action, but because of division at home and the intervention of Russia, the missile attacks did not occur (Cowell par.6). On September 2013, the United Nations weapons inspectors concluded that chemical weapons were used in Damascus last August, but they did not specify the identity/identities of the attackers (Cowell par.1). The essay will discuss the discourse on Syria, specifically the inciting incidents, sketchy information, and conceptual metaphors and buzzwords, using eight editorial and opinion pieces from The New York Times, The Huffington Post, U.S. News and World Report, and The New Yorker. In “The Time Has Come for U.S. Airstrikes in Syria” of The Wall Street Journal, Joseph Lieberman calls for the U.S. to conduct airstrikes in Syria using the metaphors of “killing machine,” “spill over,” and “game changer” to highlight the advantages of his position for Syria, the Middle East, and the U.S. Lieberman mentions facts, specifically the number of Syrians affected, where the chemical weapons attack is the inciting incident of the conflict. He includes the dead and refugees in the factual information he used: “With over 70,000 dead, more than a million refugees…[were affected]” (Lieberman par.3). Lieberman uses the facts to underscore the need for U.S. intervention. Furthermore, it is interesting how Lieberman mentions sketchy information, and yet he advances assured analysis on the resolution of the Syrian conflict. He states that “Syria may have used chemical weapons against the rebel opposition” (Lieberman par.1), and yet he stresses that “Syria is already a moral and strategic calamity that is growing worse by the day” (Lieberman par.2). Apparently, Lieberman is more interested on action than analysis of the truth behind Syria’s alleged use of chemical weapons. Moreover, Lieberman uses the metaphor of “killing machine” to incite fear among Americans and to influence them to support U.S. airstrikes in Syria. He says: “Assad's killing machine is tearing Syria to pieces” (par.4). By using the metaphor of “killing machine,” Lieberman has turned Assad into an inhumane leader whose actions are already presented as the cause of “sectarian civil war that could rage for years” (par.4). Lieberman creates a terrifying image of a killing machine that slaughters Syrians brutally because he wants to use fear to make people accept the validity of his position, which is to have the U.S. strike Syria. This image and his position can appeal to Syrians who want an immediate intervention, thereby winning their support, and to help Americans see the moral incentive of attacking Syria. In addition, Lieberman uses the metaphors of “spill over” and “game changer” to discuss the impacts of different kinds of U.S. intervention in Syria. He states: “a radicalized and balkanized Syria is also certain to spill over, threatening the stability and security of other states in the region,” where he adds the impact of the conflict on “U.S. allies in Jordan, Turkey, Iraq, Lebanon and Israel” (par.5). By mentioning these allies after the metaphor “spill over,” Lieberman seems to be calling the attention of Jordan, Turkey, Iraq, Lebanon and Israel, where they should also think about what will happen if the U.S. did not attack Syria. Finally, Lieberman uses the metaphor “game changer” in the first and last paragraphs of his opinion article. Lieberman notes that “President Obama declared” that “if [Syria’s use of chemical weapons against its rebels are] confirmed, [it] would be a ‘game changer’” (par.1). Lieberman uses “game changer” where Syria becomes the main cause of the change in the game. At the end of the article, Lieberman uses the metaphor “game changer” from a different perspective. He states: “Rather than waiting for proof that Assad has used his chemical weapons, the United States should introduce its own game-changer to the conflict: strong, decisive leadership” (Lieberman par.16). He switches the ownership of the game from Syria to the U.S., where he influences the government to assert its superpower status, while he convinces the American public that the U.S. is the game changer, not Russia or Syria. As a whole, Lieberman uses the metaphors of “killing machine,” “spill over,” and “game changer” to emphasize the advantages of his position for Syria, the Middle East, and the U.S. Kimberly Strassel criticizes Obama’s politics in “The Politics of the Obama Delay on Syria” in The Wall Street Journal using the metaphors “box” and the mathematical metaphors, “calculus” and “political calculation” to argue her primary position that Obama’s politics is the primary reason of his indecision, not the GOP or Congress. Strassel presents sketchy information regarding Obama’s political intentions regarding the Syrian conflict. She states that “Americans do not want to think that the president is making grave decisions about military action and U.S. standing on the basis of political calculation” (Strassel par.10). She does not yet underline that Obama has merely political reasons in approaching Syria. Later on, she adds: “Yet Mr. Obama has treated Syria as a political problem from the start…” (par.10). By saying this, Strassel creates uncertainty on the true interests of Obama’s indecision, which supports her position regarding Obama’s real interests at heart. In addition, Strassel employs the metaphor “box” to signify her characterization of Obama as a politician. She says: “The commander in chief is in a box” (Strassel par.2), where after his indecision fails, Obama decides “to lay responsibility for any action, or failure of action, on Congress” (Strassel par.3). Strassel uses the metaphor “box” by suggesting that Obama makes decision from a figuratively closed perspective that serves his political interest, and if he does go out of his box, he ensures that he has Congress to blame for his decisions. Aside from the metaphor of the “box,” Strassel uses the mathematical metaphors, “calculus” and “political calculation.” She describes Obama’s “crude calculus” (par.4) and connects it “political calculation” (Strassel par.10) and how “the president again lectures Congress to rise above the ‘partisan’ politics that he has, with great calculation, dumped on them” (Strassel par.10). Strassel uses “calculus” and “political calculation” to show her readers that Obama does not want a peaceful resolution by being wary of supporting airstrikes in Syria, and instead, Obama’s indecision is a product of his political computations for his political benefits and risks. Thus, Strassel carefully chooses metaphors that support her position that the U.S. cannot expect anything resolute from Obama himself because it does not fit his “box” or political “calculations.” Nicholas D. Kristof of The New York Times argues for the use of airstrikes in Syria in “The Right Questions on Syria” by emphasizing statistics on dying Syrians, providing sketchy information regarding the effectiveness of an airstrike, and using the metaphors “Western doves,” “military toolbox,” and “slaughter.” Kristof mentions the statistics of Syrians dying: “Syrians will continue to be killed at a rate of 5,000 every month” (par.3). He uses factual information to underscore the urgency of U.S. intervention in Syria, where he says that he is “dismayed that so many liberals…seem willing to let an average of 165 Syrians be killed daily rather than contemplate missile strikes that just might, at the margins, make a modest difference” (Kristof par.5). He evokes the image of hundreds of dying innocent Syrians to call America to action because airstrikes might help decrease these numbers of deaths. In addition, Kristof uses sketchy information on the potential effects of an airstrike in Syria. He says: “Let’s be humble enough to acknowledge that we can’t be sure of the answer and that Syria will be bloody whatever we do” (Kristof par.10). He presents sketchy information because he wants to be credible to his audience, where he does not claim for 100% effectiveness, and instead, he argues for America to do the humane thing that can at least do something for so many Syrians dying every day. Furthermore, Kristof uses the metaphors “Western doves,” “military toolbox,” and “slaughter” to build pathos or emotional appeals in proving his position. He says that “The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights…is exasperated at Western doves who think they are taking a moral stance” (par.6). The use of Western doves is a sarcastic tool because Kristof is saying that to be a pacifist is not the moral approach to the immoral happenings in Syria. Kristof further mentions the apprehension to use “military toolbox” which results to “greater” costs because of “humanitarian and strategic risks of inaction” (par.11). By saying “military toolbox,” Kristof suggests that its use has a proper context and the Syrian conditions demand the use of the toolbox as moral, especially considering the strategic and humanitarian costs involved. Apart from the “military toolbox,” Kristof uses the metaphor of “slaughter” twice (par.8, par.16). He links the contradiction of being “pro-peace” to being “pro-Assad and resigning oneself to the continued slaughter of civilians’ (Kristof par.8). He underlines that peace is not an option in the existence of wide-scale slaughter. Kristof asserts that the “[m]issile strikes on Assad’s military airports might also degrade his ability to slaughter civilians” (par.16). By integrating military strike and “slaughter” in one sentence, he strengthens his position that the former can reduce the latter. Kristof uses statistics, sketchy information, and metaphors of “Western doves,” “military toolbox,” and “slaughter” to demonstrate that it is wrong to not help Syria because it is immoral for the U.S. to let them die without doing anything proactive in ending it. Azeem Ibrahim, in The Huffington Post Opinion article, “Syria's Agony in Numbers: The Growing Refugee Crisis,” argues that the international community, especially the West, is not responding enough to the “refugee” dimension of the Syrian crisis, using factual information on refugee numbers, sketchy information on the number of people dead from the chemical weapons attack, and buzzwords of “refugee problem,” “children,” “slow” and “watch.” Ibrahim highlights the facts about the refugees in Syria. He states: “The numbers of registered refugees as of August 2013 are as follows: 110,000 in Egypt, 168,000 in Iraq, 515,000 in Jordan, 716,000 in Lebanon and 460,000 in Turkey” (Ibrahim par.7). The statistics underscore that the refugees are so numerous that they already affected five nearby countries. Furthermore, Ibrahim uses sketchy information on the number of people dead from the chemical weapons attack to highlight his position. He says that the “numbers [are] ranging from 400 to 1,400 casualties, depending on the source of the information. But does the number really matter compared with the enormity of the atrocity?” (Ibrahim par.1). His main point is that the international community should not just focus on the dead, but the living ones who are left behind and who need immediate help. In addition, Ibrahim uses the buzzwords of “refugee problem,” “children,” “slow” and “watch” to argue for the moral responsibility of the world in helping Syria resolve its problems, while responding to the immediate needs of its refugees. Ibrahim notes that “it is unconscionable that the refugee problem is being overlooked as collateral damage in an ongoing civil war” (par.3). He uses the buzzword of “refugee” to assert that it is an invisible problem to the West that treats refugees as “collateral damage” (Ibrahim par.3). Ibrahim further uses the buzzword of “children” to evoke compassion from the audience. He mentions that around half of the refugees are “children” (par.6). Ibrahim uses the word “children” that can make people act on the refugee problem faster. Additionally, Ibrahim highlights that the West is slow to act on the refugee problem, when it has a moral responsibility to help it. He says that while other countries already do their share: “European countries have been slow to respond to the rapid increase of refugees entering Europe” (Ibrahim par.14). By using the word “slow,” Ibrahim asks the West to move faster. The word “watch” is another emotional buzzword, when Ibrahim says: “It is time for the world to take responsibility for the other half -- the Syrian diaspora of refugees -- because after all, the rest of the world watched it happen and failed to prevent it” (par.19). Ibrahim notes that the world has a responsibility to help Syria because they did not help avert the conflict. Ibrahim does not state it directly, but he wants the world to be more responsible in reacting to Syria after the conflict, since they have become indifferent to Syria’s problems in the first place, which led to the chemical weapons attack. Frank Bruni presents his position on Syria in The New York Times Opinion article, “The Syria Babble We Don’t Need,” where he uses the metaphors “eyeball bait” and “reality TV show” and the buzzwords “cynical,” “defining moment,” and “nobler” to assert the irrelevance of journalists and pundits in resolving the Syrian conflict. Bruni does not focus on factual or sketchy information, aside from presenting his position on what he thinks the Syrian conflict does not need. He criticizes how the media uses the Syrian conflict to create media attention. He uses the metaphor of “eyeball bait” (Bruni par.21) to criticize what the media is doing to an important issue: “[Views from Sarah Palin and Donald Trump are] eyeball bait: ready, reliable clicks” (Bruni par.21). He uses the sarcastic metaphor of “eyeball bait” (Bruni par.21) to argue how the media demeans the issue by asking the opinions of people who are not direct stakeholders to what is happening in Syria. These opinions attract clicks or attention from the public because they are controversial, but for Bruni, these opinions and clicks are meaningless to those dying in Syria. The metaphor “eyeball bait” is connected to another metaphor, “reality TV show” for Bruni. Bruni says: “we journalists ought to resist turning the Syria debate into the sort of reality television show that we turn so much of American political life into, a soap opera often dominated by the mouthiest characters rather than the most thoughtful ones” (par.19). He claims responsibility for the “Syria babble,” when he says “we journalists,” and he notes media sensationalism and its immorality when something so serious is turned into a “reality television show” (Bruni par.19). Bruni wants the media to stop contributing nonsense to a highly critical dilemma in Syria by interviewing people who do not matter. In addition, Bruni uses the buzzwords “cynical,” “defining moment,” and “nobler” to assert the insignificance of journalists and pundits in resolving the Syrian conflict. Bruni talks about the “cynical” angles of the media on the Syria conflict. He mentions the “cynical political grinder, subjecting it to the same cynical checklist of who’s up, who’s down, who’s threading a needle…” (Bruni par.4). He uses the word “cynical” to undermine the authority of these cynical people, since they are not the direct stakeholders of the potential war or absence thereof in Syria. Bruni already mentions these stakeholders when he uses the buzzword “defining moment.” He says: “You know whom it’s an even more defining moment for? The Syrians…the Israelis, Lebanese and Jordanians next door; the American servicemen and servicewomen…” (Bruni par.16). By determining these stakeholders, Bruni supports his position that these are the people whom the media should focus on, not the politicians or irrelevant celebrities. The final buzzword that Bruni uses is “nobler.” Bruni concludes his opinion article with this statement: “On a question of war and peace, we need nobler. We need the highest ground we can find” (par.30). He uses the word “nobler” to assert that the Syrian discourse right now is not noble if it is a mere babble of personalities in a reality TV show. Bruni calls for everyone to not rely on the babble and find nobler perspectives that can truly serve the stakeholders of the Syrian conflict. In U.S. News and World Report, Susan Milligan argues that it does matter if the U.S. solution to Syria is messy in “So What If the Syria Solution Is Messy?” by using sketchy information on the means toward the solution to the Syrian conflict and the metaphors of “wartime box” and “image” and the buzzwords of “Who cares” and “final goal.” Milligan does not mind the “mixed messages” from President Obama (par.3). Her main point is that whatever the means to the solution of getting Syria to give up its nuclear weapons, what is important is that it can be done with minimum expenses and cost of lives for the U.S. Furthermore, Milligan uses the metaphors of “wartime box” and “image” to underscore that the right solutions are not always right if they are about war and political images. She says: “Who cares if Obama didn't deliver an unequivocal, we're-going-to-bomb-them speech, especially if such a speech would lock us more securely into a wartime box?” (Milligan par.6). She says “wartime box” to talk about the war that will never end if the U.S. bombs Syria. Milligan also talks about political image as a metaphor. She states: “the conversation has been all about image and what has become known in Beltway speak as ‘messaging’” (par.2). The use of “image” stresses that politicians are not concerned of real solutions, but are more focused on their political interests. Finally, Milligan employs the buzzwords of “Who cares” and “final goal.” When she mentions the intentions of Putin and Obama, she asks in the end: “Who cares?” (Milligan par.6). These buzzwords indicate that people should not be bogged down by the means, when the goal is more important. Milligan stresses the “final goal.” She says: “being a leader means staying focused on the final goal – not on how you got there” (Milligan par.7). Milligan uses the buzzwords of “final goal” to prove her position that the end justifies the means. In the Opinion article in The New Yorker, “Two Minds on Syria,” George Packer asserts that sketchy information regarding the consequences of bombing Syria and the metaphor “pound” and the buzzwords “dying children,” “retaliate,” “escalate,” and “inaction” to support his position that it should not be too easy to decide to bomb Syria because of numerous consequences to Syria and the U.S. Packer uses a different approach when he emphasizes the complexity of a U.S. airstrike in Syria. He uses the strategy of two voices to underscore that the success of a U.S. airstrike in Syria is not as clear-cut as it seems to be. To further explore this position, the metaphor “pound” is used. Packer uses a pro-airstrike position voice, where “pound” becomes a violent action against violence. The pro-airstrike says: “And you don’t want to pound the shit out of him?” (par.6), where the anti-airstrike responds: “I want to pound the shit out of him” (par.7). The dialogue shows that it is easy to provide a violent response, but it is not always the best and only option, as further buzzwords show. Packer uses the buzzwords “dying children,” “retaliate,” “escalate,” and “inaction” to support his position that it should not be too simple to decide to bomb Syria because of several consequences to Syria and the U.S. The anti-airstrike says: “Weren’t you just saying that I don’t care about dying children? (Pause.) So you want us to get involved in their civil war” (Packer par.22). Packer uses the buzzword of “dying children” to imply that an airstrike also means additional dying children on top of already dying children. He means that an airstrike means deaths too. Packer also uses the buzzword “retaliate.” He says: “And what do we do if Assad retaliates against Israel or Turkey? Or if he uses nerve gas somewhere else?” (par.29). The anti-airstrike says that an airstrike may be a riskier and deadlier option for the U.S. and its allies. Aside from “retaliate,” the buzzwords “escalate” and “inaction” are used. Packer says: “I think Russia isn’t going to let Assad go down. Neither is Iran or Hezbollah. So they’ll escalate” (par.40). He uses “escalate” to argue that military action escalates to further military actions. Packer also notes the consequences of “inaction”: “Inaction has consequences, too. Assad gases more people, the death toll hits two hundred thousand, the weapons get into Hezbollah’s hands…the whole region goes up in sectarian flames” (par.55). He considers that inaction has dire consequences too. In essence, Packer uses these words to argue that the solution to Syria is not simple or easy. In “Some Progress on Syria,” Andrew Rosenthal et al. of the editorial board of The New York Times use sketchy information regarding the punishment for Syria as a motivation for defining its accountability more and they also use the buzzwords “feckless” and “resolution,” as well as the metaphor “slaughter” to argue that the legal resolution must fit Assad’s contribution to the slaughter. Rosenthal et al. employ sketchy information regarding the right solution to the Syria crisis: “The resolution to rid Syria of its chemical weapons…is a useful, if imperfect, step toward a credible international response to a bloody war that has killed more than 100,000 Syrians” (par.1). The information is used to underscore that at least, there is some kind of international response, though it is weak at the moment. One of the buzzwords is “feckless”: “Since October 2011, Russia has blocked three attempts to condemn or punish Mr. Assad for brutality against civilians, leaving the Security Council looking feckless in the face of slaughter” (Rosenthal et al. par.4). “Feckless” means that the Security Council is incompetent in punishing the main actors of the slaughter, which Rosenthal et al. condemn. The piece also mentions the metaphor “slaughter” in the context of Russia’s inability to hold President al-Assad responsible for the slaughter of his own people. The point of using the word “slaughter” is to remind Russia and the U.S., among other global players, that they still have to resolve the question of accountability for President al-Assad. “Slaughter” is used to underscore the responsibility of all parties involved to prevent future slaughters. The final buzzword is “resolution.” Rosenthal et al. state: “The chemical weapons resolution moves toward that goal” (par.7). They note that the “chemical weapons resolution” is not a 100% solution, but it helps in attaining peaceful solutions to Syria. The article is saying that though Rosenthal et al. do not approve of the lack of punishment for Assad, the resolution has enough credibility to show the world that something is being done to resolve the Syrian conflict. After reading these “Opinion” articles, I have not developed a more concrete viewpoint on the proper immediate solution to the Syrian conflict. I agree with Bruni, Packer, and Milligan that the U.S. should look for peaceful resolutions. Bombing Syria is not the best solution if it can escalate the crisis further. On the contrary, I agree with Kristof, Strassel, and Lieberman that doing nothing leads to more lives shed in Syria. It is sad to realize that just because we are not directly affected, we can delay a tangible reaction to the conflict. Kristof is right that as Americans do nothing, thousands more are dying in Syria. Still, I am thankful that Russia is extending a helping hand, even if Milligan notes that the means to it is messy. This way, I am absolved of the charge that I did nothing. At least, by supporting the chemical weapon resolution, I can support something solid. For now, I cannot do anything, not even recommend military intervention, even if Assad might still be killing his opponents and their families. To decide on military intervention is an agonizing position that I do not want to be in. I can only hope that the actions being done right now will be enough to stop further sacrifice of Syrian lives. I can only hope that without military action, the U.S. is indeed saving more lives, even if they are mostly American lives. I can only hope that what happened in Syria ends with Syria. For if it happened in my own country and if it affected my own family, I would take the missile myself and bomb the perpetrators. Nevertheless, being not directly affected, I can show restraint, although I feel empathy and understand where Kristof is coming from. The Syria discourse takes a whole new personal meaning when our own lives and families are at stake. Works Cited Bruni, Frank. “The Syria Babble We Don’t Need.” The New York Times, 7 Sept. 2013. Web. 2 Oct. 2013. < http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/08/opinion/sunday/bruni-the-syria-babble-we-dont-need.html>. Cowell, Alan. “U.N. Investigates More Alleged Chemical Attacks in Syria.” The New York Times, 27 Sept. 2013. Web. 27 Oct. 2013. . Kristof, Nicholas D. “The Right Questions on Syria.” The New York Times, 4 Sept. 2013. Web. 2 Oct. 2013. < http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/05/opinion/kristof-the-right-questions-on-syria.html?_r=0>. Ibrahim, Azeem. “Syria's Agony in Numbers: The Growing Refugee Crisis.” The Huffington Post, 4 Oct. 2013. Web. 4 Oct. 2013. < http://www.huffingtonpost.com/azeem-ibrahim/syrias-agony-in-numbers_b_4045327.html>. Lieberman, Joseph. “The Time Has Come for U.S. Airstrikes in Syria.” The Wall Street Journal, 2 Apr. 2013. Web. 4 Oct. 2013. . Milligan, Susan. “So What If the Syria Solution Is Messy?” U.S. News and World Report, 19 Sept. 2013. Web. 2 Oct. 2013. . Packer, George. “Two Minds on Syria.” The New Yorker, 27 Aug. 2013. Web. 2 Oct. 2013. . Rosenthal, Andrew, et al. “Some Progress on Syria.” The New York Times, 26 Sept. 2013. Web. 2 Oct. 2013. < http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/27/opinion/some-progress-on-syria.html>. Strassel, Kimberly. “The Politics of the Obama Delay on Syria.” The Wall Street Journal, 1 Sept. 2013. Web. 26 Oct. 2013. . Read More