Australian Defence White Paper - Essay Example

AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE WHITE PAPER Name University Date Australian Defence White Paper Introduction The major aim of governments is to ensure that they guarantee the security of their citizens and that the general interests of their nations are not threatened. In these noble endeavours, any government has to issue legislations and design strategic policies aimed at ensuring the success of the defence mechanisms and systems. The Asian pacific region is embroiled in a number of security threats that stem from the existence of world renowned rogue states that pose serious economic and social threats to the Australian people. Apart from these rogue states, global terrorism has been on the rise lately. Australia is increasingly playing key roles in the stability of the South East Asian economy; thus obliged to prioritize security and stability within this region as its fundamental goal. Given these factors, the Australian government has to protect its waters, air space and citizens from possible attacks. In response to these impending dangers, the Australian government has put forth the 2013 defence white paper. Released earlier than scheduled, government officials note the current global developments and the changing strategic conditions as the driving factors to the early release of the paper.1In the white paper, the Australian government has an ambitious plan that seeks to strengthen the defence forces and also to improve the country’s capability to protect its boarders from any form of military attacks through effective surveillance and retaliatory capabilities. Whereas the white paper is elaborate and its proposals feasible, the impacts are varied not only on the economy, but also on the international community especially the neighbouring nations. Coming at a time when the effects of the global economic crisis are apparent in the Asian pacific nation, the fundamental question is the necessity of certain capabilities that the paper states. Since the Second World War, the Australian defence advisory committee has followed the strategic guidance for policies and decisions on defence. In the process, every other decision on defence follows the guidelines contained in the strategic basis documents.2 The propositions that the 2013 white paper presents are far more complex. They comparatively take into account new and emerging issues that the country has to cope with and some imminent threats which have to be contained. Pointedly, the white paper presents more than the economy and the available national funds can support. It is against this backdrop that the capabilities should be critically analyzed to ascertain the level of need each capability bears. In addition, the impacts on the FIC, the underlying risks and possible ways of mitigation should be considered. Developments in the Australian defence Policies Australia’s size and position makes the country vulnerable to attacks from outside. The developments in defence policies have followed this argument over the years before and after the world wars. The country had to rely on external support in order to secure its boarders until 1959 when the then government changed to self defence without the aid of its Allies. This gave rise to the 19673 strategic basis that demanded that the country should create its own defence systems. The 1976 defence white paper determined the nation’s major areas of concern as mainly the regions south west of the pacific and the South East Asian territories.4 It should be noted that changing political and economic climates have the country’s reaction and adoption of new defence policies. In reaction to shifting political alliances, the Australian Defence Forces have pursued different capabilities and increased their military presence in areas around the South East Asia and south west of the Pacific Ocean. In the recent past, the ADF in its year 2000 white paper angered China by the declaration that Beijing was a growing threat in the region. White notes that in a similar way, the 2013 defence white paper has inherent factors that prompted the release5. In the annals of the Australian Defence Force, it is observable that the policies have often been pre-empted by foreseen threats, both real and imagined. However, the reaction, reception and implementation of the policies have in most cases been different. In this respect, the 2013 white paper has taken into consideration the threats posed, albeit this time from a broader perspective. For instance, the paper considers the ever eminent cyber space and extraterrestrial attacks. Unlike the previous papers, the present paper focuses on strengthening the relationship with the United States of America in almost all aspects. The budgetary requirements as per the white paper are thus increased with a huge margin following the government’s desire to improve on its defence capabilities and also to monitor a wider area previously not within the consideration of the defence forces. As part of the plan, the white paper demands that the country should invest more money on the prospect of developing the future forces. In chapter eight for example, the white paper demonstrates Australia’s aspiration to secure not only its boarders and interests, but also documents an elaborate plan aimed at positioning the country as the watchdog of the entire region. It is important to note that this is indeed a vital capability given the economic conditions of the neighbouring states, and the effects instability within the region has on the country’s welfare. However, this is a venture that the country can scale back on and instead focus on other areas of interest. According to the white paper, the Australian Defence Force is expected to restructure to adequately handle the security needs of the Indo-Pacific areas as the major partner in its administration to ensure it is operational. Among the duties that the ADF is to handle under this capability, are to provide fundamental requirements namely the organisational structures, military and security personnel, offer training, and provide major security systems, as well as command and manage the joint forces.6 Whereas Australia seeks to assert its authority over the region in this manner, the financial obligations of this venture are exceedingly high. In the maritime department, the government intends to increase its fleet of amphibious vessels from the current number and sophistication to a new level. It is interesting that the ADF has in the recent not had an amphibious ready group. The White states that the government is pursuing the amphibious capability mainly for the purposes of humanitarian and disaster relief exercises. The main threats in the south pacific and East Asian regions remain China and the republic of North Korea, according to the western allied nations. The fears these nations harbour against China is arguably economical while North Korea is a possible nuclear threat. Comparatively, Korea poses more of a threat to Australia than China does. Developing electromagnetic capability is indeed a precaution against such attacks. North Korea has over the years threatened the stability of the globe with nuclear capability and little of electronic or cyber based warfare. In this regard, electromagnetic shields are not a major priority given the fact that terrorists and the common enemies that Australia has in China and Korea are unlikely to embark on an electromagnetic confrontation. The government can make use of the current super hornet aircrafts to monitor and shelve the intended purchase of twelve Growler aircrafts in preparation for an encounter that is not forthcoming in the near future. The current space explorations and surveillance operations are considerably not informed on the basis of impending war of the worlds. Pursuing space surveillance systems is way too ambitious and mostly not in order for Australian Defence Forces. The white paper states the country’s collaboration with the United States aimed at monitoring space activity. On the other hand, the space surveillance capability is expected to position the Australian forces in readiness to counter any debris falling from the remains of space monitoring objects. The plan of implementation requires a lot of money in additional to the sophisticated systems and hardware. It is worth noting that the falling debris often breaks up upon entry into the atmosphere. Given this fact, the falling debris should not be of great worries to the defence systems of the country. Additionally, the frequencies at which these space objects disintegrate and fall to the earth are low and thus pose a low threat to a country. The space surveillance program is not a priority and will only demand extra funds and personnel. The government suggests that through the cooperation with the United States government, the two nations are on the process of relocating powerful optical telescopes to western sides of the country. The implications of the project should be seen in the transformation of the livelihoods of the natives and security enhancement. On the contrary, the move shall have little or no effect on the lives of the people. Relation to Australian strategic guidance Modern theory of war, and strategic planning during the war, are comparatively different from the theories that define the ancient times. Handel7 observes that war is uncertain and that policy makers can only speculate that there is a conflict in the offing. In his argument, the victors in war are those who understand that wars are uncertain and handle the uncertainties effectively. Gray notes that the modern theory of strategy in war is determined by the inherent gains the policy maker stands to achieve8. The strategic guidance determines and guides decision making in the event that the country is making any new policies that govern war in Australia. Fruhling writes that the fundamental role that the strategic guidance paper played was to set, among many priorities, the possible and factual threats that Australia faced. The strategic guidance ultimately outlined a workable plan that could avoid the impending problem or identify possible ways of using the perceived advantage. From this analysis, the basis paper directed the Australian authorities to derive principles that could guide the country on the plausible ways of developing a formidable defence system for the country. The elementary purpose of the guidance paper was to inform, rather than to determine the course of action for the development of the defence forces. The decision to include the capabilities discussed in the structuring and strengthening for Australia and the region, did not take into account an in-depth analysis of the options available for the government and the scope of the military strengthening that the government ought to have undertaken. For instance, the main objective of strengthening the force should have been based on the need to offer more protection to the nation with a minimum amount of money spent on the exercise. The strategic guidance informs that Australia should not take undue responsibility and provide resources for areas not within its borders. The defence white paper places on the Australian defence forces the responsibility of not only providing material support in the larger region, but also to provide security to the entire area. The strategic guidance was redrafted after the cold war thereby giving the country the green light to involve other commonwealth countries in maintaining the stability and peace in the South East Asia9. However, this was to be done after the country had evaluated the nature of concern and the threat posed by war or situation in the country or region that Australian forces were reacting to. In the developments and changes that were made on the guidance basis, the Australian forces were to operate autonomously in the South East Asian region. As noted in the white paper, the government notes the inclination to the United States as a major partner in the intended changes. The most notable being the sourcing, collaboration and supply of equipment to the ADF during the operations in the larger South East Asia. The FIC impacts and risks The propositions contained in the 2013 defence white paper do not only have impacts on the Australian interests, but equally, carry profound effects on the international community. The basic underlying provisions run across the main facets of the security systems in the South East Asia. The move to strengthen the defence force is undoubtedly informed by, among others, the eminent threats that terrorist organisations whose activities are concentrated in the South East Asia pose. According to the Australian foreign affairs authorities, the terrorist activities linked to the Jemma Islamiya have been on the increase over the years10. The authorities note that the terrorist activities in this region have in most instances targeted western interests, especially Australian interests. As contained in the white paper, the Australian forces intend to increase their presence in the area, a move that is likely to expose the forces and administration personnel to the terrorist militants. It is also important to note that the Australian move is heavily backed by the United States. This association makes Australia part of the larger axis that terror groups blame for their woes. Transnational terrorism notwithstanding, the elaborate military improvement plan positions the Australian defence force as a threat to the stability and the success of the neighbouring countries. For instance, the North Korean regime is closely following the developments in East Asia and the south pacific regions. It is possible to note that a strong Australian force allied to the United States is a possible threat that the Pyongyang administration will closely monitor. As a matter of fact, the Korean government, with its ability to launch ballistic missiles, is apt to consider the Australian military campaign as a strategic move aimed at checking its activities. Australia is increasingly becoming linked with the nations in the Korean peninsula in business and cultural settings. The results of this growing relationship have varied impacts on the foreign policies of these states. Campbell11 observes that with the increasing relationship, Australia is at greater risk of increased volatility and suspicion from the neighbouring countries. In her observation, she posits that the current defence policies do not take into account the effects that an unstable Korea presents to Australian interest’s of security. Given the facts and Australia’s current shift, the 2013 policy should emphasize on the reality that it will have to be responsible for the security operations in the peninsula in case of instability that arises from North Korean offensive military exercises12. Even though China has its own ballistic missiles capability and is increasingly considered a threat, it is worth noting that the threats it poses are minimal. On the other hand, it is possible to state that the country is undeniably suspicious of the activities that Australia is undertaking in South East Asia. China has within its arsenal, missile interceptors and a cache of missiles that it keeps in case of an offensive on its interests13. The current developments and the new found relationship between the United States and the Australian governments are factors that make it possible for the Asian country to be prepared and cast a suspicious eye on Australia. The economic impacts of an enhanced defence force are pegged on the Australian authorities’ aim of protecting the trade routes and the communication links between their interests. In this regard, Australia is headed for a showdown with China on their association with the United States of America because the Chinese government will consider any surveillance and administration activities organised by the Australian defence forces as part of the greater American course. It is noted that since the time Fraser ruled, the Chinese- Australian relationship has taken a sharp downturn.14 Mitigating the risks The risks of a possible attack and an unstable Korean peninsula are the top most priorities that the Australian defence systems and policies should observe. Increased monitoring and surveillance over the Korean peninsula has warded off possible attacks on not only the Australian interests, but has also ensured global security. It is clear that the terrorist threat and risks associated with their activities are adequately countered by the collective security forces. However, the risk of a failed South East Pacific has far reaching effects on the economy and the security of the Australian citizens. That North Korea is capable of launching ballistic missiles on its perceived foes is not questionable. It is against this backdrop that the Australian authorities should deploy more ballistic missile defence systems all over the pacific.15 Whereas China is perceived as a possible threat to the global peace and security, it would be adversely affected if it were to launch an offensive. With its rapidly growing economy and a swelling population, the country is currently seeking further investment destinations and is preoccupied with settling its surplus population. For convenience and security measures, it is advisable to closely monitor their activities within the south east pacific region16. This will enable the country to fast track the shifting political outrages that may trigger the launch of missiles. Conclusion The developments leading to the 2013 Australian defence white paper reveal a country that has had to identify its security threats and imminent dangers that each situation brings. As noted in the history of the nation, the country’s defence policies have been drafted from the experiences of past wars and their inability to provide a national defence system. However, this has been changed by the shifting global political and economic circumstances that prompted of the defence policies. In the changes that have marked the shifting political alliances, Australia has made friends and foes in the process of providing and protecting its citizens. The latest policy paper on the defence systems is arguably one of the most elaborate and ambitious defence strategies that encompass the global trends in security and defence mechanisms. Since the adoption of the strategic guidance paper, the nation follows a set of principles that determine the procedures applicable to design defence policies. The most notable aspect of the guidance paper is that it does not allow for a confrontational approach to war, and neither does it empower policy makers to make war pronouncements on perceived foes. In consideration, the guidance paper in its application determined the outcome of the 2013 white paper. Unlike the previous white paper issued in the year 2000 that identified China as a threat, the latest paper has not singled out a specific nation as a potential threat. The elaborate plan in its design seeks to position Australia as a force to reckon with in the face of growing instability within the South East Asia. It is worth noting that unlike the previous white papers on the nation’s defence policies, the country has changed its approach in handling of the security issues. The current plan considers the global security details and the need to have a defence force fully and adequately equipped to handle the challenges of a globe with varied interests. On the other hand, many critics observe that the plan is expensive and that the nation should shelve some of its plans or scale down on its expected capabilities. In this paper, the discussion focused on the possibilities of down scaling and the intention to expand the defence force capability’s to monitor the external borders of the country, considering the fact that the financial allocations for the venture are far more serious given the biting after effects of the global economic recession. In addition, the strategic guidance paper considers the interests of the citizens and that Australia should not take the sole responsibility of the greater South East Asia. Bibliography Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2004.Transnational Terrorism: The Threat to Australia. 2004. August 20, 2013. http://www.dfat.gov.au/publications/terrorism/chapter6.html. Campbell, E .Australia ignores the Korean peninsula at its peril: and it's not just the nuclear weapons we should be worrying about. Strategic & Defence Studies Centre. The Australian National University n.d .August 20, 2013. http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper2013/docs/055_Campbell_130227_Y.pdf Department of Defense, Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report, Washington, DC, February 2010. August 20, 2013. http://www.defense.gov/bmdr/docs/BMDR%20as%20of%2026JAN10%200630_for%20 web.pdf. Defence Committee, A Suitable Basis for the Distribution of Strategic Responsibility and War Effort. 1948. August 20, 2013. http://www.info.dfat.gov.au/info/historical/HistDocs.nsf/%28LookupVolNoNumber%29/ 14~104. Dibb, Paul. The Self-Reliant Defence of Australia: The History of an Idea.n.d. August 20, 2013. http://epress.anu.edu.au/sdsc/hap/pdf/ch01.pdf. Gray, Collin. Modern Strategy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. Handel, Michael. Clausewitz and Modern Strategy. New Port: Routledge Publishers, 2012. Huisken, Ronald. History as Policy: Framing the Debate on the Future of Australia's Defence. Canberra: Australian National University Press, 2007. Rinehart, I., Hildreth, S, A., Lawrence, S, V. Ballistic Missile Defense in the Asia- Pacific Region: Cooperation and Opposition. Congressional Research Service.2013. August 20, 2013. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R43116.pdf. Segell, Glen Axis of Evil and Rogue States: The Bush Administration, 2000-2004. Glen Segell Publishers, 2005. Stephan, Fruling .Australian Strategic Guidance since the Second World War.2009. August 20, 2013. http://www.defence.gov.au/strategicbasis/pdf/consolidated.pdf. The Australian Government. Department of Defence. Defence White Paper 2013.August 20, 2013.http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper2013/docs/WP_2013_web.pdf. Wang, Yi. Australia-China Relations Post 1949: Sixty Years of Trade and Politics. Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, 2012. White, Hugh. What to expect from Australia’s 2013 Defence White Paper. Australian National University East Asia Forum 2013. August 20, 2013. http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/04/09/what-to-expect-from-australias-2013- defence-white-paper/. Young W. Kihl, Peter Hayes. Peace and Security in Northeast Asia: The Nuclear Issue and the Korean Peninsula. New York: M.E. Sharpe Publishers, 1997. Read More

In addition, the impacts on the FIC, the underlying risks and possible ways of mitigation should be considered. Developments in the Australian defence Policies Australia’s size and position makes the country vulnerable to attacks from outside. The developments in defence policies have followed this argument over the years before and after the world wars. The country had to rely on external support in order to secure its boarders until 1959 when the then government changed to self defence without the aid of its Allies.

This gave rise to the 19673 strategic basis that demanded that the country should create its own defence systems. The 1976 defence white paper determined the nation’s major areas of concern as mainly the regions south west of the pacific and the South East Asian territories.4 It should be noted that changing political and economic climates have the country’s reaction and adoption of new defence policies. In reaction to shifting political alliances, the Australian Defence Forces have pursued different capabilities and increased their military presence in areas around the South East Asia and south west of the Pacific Ocean.

In the recent past, the ADF in its year 2000 white paper angered China by the declaration that Beijing was a growing threat in the region. White notes that in a similar way, the 2013 defence white paper has inherent factors that prompted the release5. In the annals of the Australian Defence Force, it is observable that the policies have often been pre-empted by foreseen threats, both real and imagined. However, the reaction, reception and implementation of the policies have in most cases been different.

In this respect, the 2013 white paper has taken into consideration the threats posed, albeit this time from a broader perspective. For instance, the paper considers the ever eminent cyber space and extraterrestrial attacks. Unlike the previous papers, the present paper focuses on strengthening the relationship with the United States of America in almost all aspects. The budgetary requirements as per the white paper are thus increased with a huge margin following the government’s desire to improve on its defence capabilities and also to monitor a wider area previously not within the consideration of the defence forces.

As part of the plan, the white paper demands that the country should invest more money on the prospect of developing the future forces. In chapter eight for example, the white paper demonstrates Australia’s aspiration to secure not only its boarders and interests, but also documents an elaborate plan aimed at positioning the country as the watchdog of the entire region. It is important to note that this is indeed a vital capability given the economic conditions of the neighbouring states, and the effects instability within the region has on the country’s welfare.

However, this is a venture that the country can scale back on and instead focus on other areas of interest. According to the white paper, the Australian Defence Force is expected to restructure to adequately handle the security needs of the Indo-Pacific areas as the major partner in its administration to ensure it is operational. Among the duties that the ADF is to handle under this capability, are to provide fundamental requirements namely the organisational structures, military and security personnel, offer training, and provide major security systems, as well as command and manage the joint forces.

6 Whereas Australia seeks to assert its authority over the region in this manner, the financial obligations of this venture are exceedingly high. In the maritime department, the government intends to increase its fleet of amphibious vessels from the current number and sophistication to a new level. It is interesting that the ADF has in the recent not had an amphibious ready group. The White states that the government is pursuing the amphibious capability mainly for the purposes of humanitarian and disaster relief exercises.

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