Montaignes Argument of Conflicting Appearances, Reconstruction - Essay Example

For the Pyrrhonians, where the goal is this prescription to not be swayed by appearances, there is really nothing about the nature of the things perceived by the senses that can be known for sure, and that in effect, categories such as bitter, sweet, both sweet and bitter, or neither bitter nor sweet, have no meaning. To be more specific, the formulation of Pyrrho relates to the attainment of freedom sans the categories of thought that can limit or imprison/rob the person of that freedom (Mattey(b)):
Pyrrho's idea was that when any given matter is not apparent, the reasons for and against the truth of the matter cancel each other out, leaving neither side at an advantage. By refusing to make a judgment on any such matter, a person is able to attain freedom from the mental strife that comes with a futile search for the truth (Mattey(b)).

Taking off from this pronouncement, The Pyrrhonians went on to notice that the senses function not to clarify, but to present alternatives to the mind. To the mind, the senses are nothing but a source of these appearances, which because they conflict, give the mind no resolution as to the nature of those things that appear, are made available, by the senses. “If we ask whether a thing really is the way it appears to be, we are always confronted with conflicting appearances. A piece of paper looks white to one man and yellow to someone suffering from jaundice” (Mattey(b)).

Democritus, meanwhile, in asserting that neither qualities of sweetness and bitterness are inherent in the honey, roots that assertion from an earlier epistemological position, that qualities are not inherent in the nature of things, but are dependent on the perceiver, and that all perceptions qualitatively made by every being are in a way valid, if not true. This is not to say that all subjective judgments and beliefs are true, only that the reality of things is in essence subjective. Therefore, from this, it makes sense for Democritus to essentially say that where sweetness or bitterness of honey is the point of debate, neither can be found to be an inherent quality of honey, but is a factor of the subjective experience of the perceiver (Lee). This epistemology in turn roots itself from an earlier assertion of Democritus relating to human knowledge, which comes from the senses, even as the senses themselves, according to Democritus, have not a true grounding or contact with things as they really are. This disconnect then, makes it possible for Democritus to say that subjective experiences from the senses are valid, according to the experiencer (Berryman).

The latter assertions of Democritus and the Pyrrhonian diverge from the views of Heraclitus meanwhile, as well as Pythagoras, as to the qualities of honey and the nature of things as they can be known or not known by man. Both posit sweetness and bitterness as inherent in the honey itself. For Heraclitus for instance, the assertion can be rooted in his earlier assertion about an ultimate reality inherent in some particular kind of matter, regardless of who is perceiving it. Reality is inherent in things, as well as the qualities of those things, and therefore from this assertion can flow the former assertion of qualities of honey being inherent in the honey, rather than being essentially subjective or unknowable, as Democritus and the Pyrrhonian assert, respectively (Graham).