Factors That Made North Korea to Pursue Nuclear Weapons - Literature review Example

FACTORS THAT MADE NORTH KOREA TO PURSUE NUCLEAR WEAPONS By Name Course Instructor Institution City/State Date Factors that Made North Korea to Pursue Nuclear Weapons Introduction The proliferation issue of nuclear weapons according to Jo (2007, 167) has been presently been the most intricate facets of international security. Basically, the proliferation risk arises not just from countries having that resources and ability of developing nuclear program, but as well from those already having nuclear weapons. As it will be evidenced in the article, there are numerous factors as well as motives that drive countries to pursue and acquire nuclear weapons: nuclear as well as technological ability, state leadership objective, domestic politics, stability of the region, and relationship with countries already having nuclear weapons. Observably, majority of countries including North Korea are pursuing nuclear weapons for security reasons, purposes of ideational attractions, and also politics within the country (Huntley 2010). According to realist security model, countries pursue nuclear weapon so as increase security of the country and reduce nuclear threats from its adversaries (Sagan 1997, 55). Domestic politics model argue that countries pursue nuclear weapons for bureaucratic as well as parochial domestic interests, but according to normative symbols model this is so for purposes of inducing significant normative symbols of the government’s identity as well as modernity (Huntley 2010). For this reason, the article seeks to discuss factors that have driven North Korea to pursue nuclear weapons in view of both domestic as well as international variables. Discussion Most states that are pursuing nuclear weapon regularly have a bestowed interest in asserting that they decided to create nuclear weapons to counter nuclear threats. According to Brown et al. (2010, xv), such policies seem to be normal endeavours in pursuing national interest. Furthermore, a country can easily recognise a number of threats existing prior to making the decision of pursuing nuclear weapons. Therefore, there are a number of factors and motives that make countries invest in nuclear programs. As stated by Nakatani (2012), the paradigm of domestic politics acknowledges that pursuing nuclear weapons normally is intended to serve different domestic groups interests: such as some units in the military and politicians. Different from South Korea, whose liberalization coalition pursued economic development by heightening its integration into the world economy, North Korea has fundamentally pursued nuclear program with Pyongyang viewing this as a national independence symbol (Brown, et al. 2010, xx). As mentioned by Martin (1999, 36), the nuclear policies of North Korea have a resilient backing from its military institutions. From late 1994 during the signing of the Agreed Framework between North Korea and the United States and, the security status quo in Northeast Asia as well as on the Korean peninsula has qualitatively changed poor to worse (Squassoni 2006, CRS-5; Armitage 1999, 1). Since the discovery of a nuclear site in the North Korea, a number of states including Japan and U.S have become worried because the intentions of the Pyongyang is still unknown. Basically, so as to generate adequate highly enriched uranium for one to two nuclear weapons, North Korea according to Squassoni 2006 (CRS-8) would need lots of centrifuges. So, if the Pyongyang can create its own centrifuge rotors, or already has finished assemblies of centrifuge rotors, then creating highly enriched uranium is easier. As stated by Howard (2004, 808), the unofficial delegation from the United States to North Korea noted a bigger reactor at Yongbyon that was still under construction. Besides that, the 2002 CIA paper projected that North Korea can generate adequate weapons-grade uranium for a number of nuclear weapons annually, but only when the country’s enrichment plant is completely functioning. Pursuing a grand bargain with North Korea according to Yun and Choi (2014, 220) is the most encouraging course in resolving the Northeast Asia nuclear crisis that is getting worse every day. In this case, the U.S., Japan, Chia, and South Korea governments have to acknowledge that economic deterioration of North Korea attributed mainly by country’s too much spending on its military force and its unsuccessful command-economy system, as the main reason behind the country’s investment on nuclear weapons (O'Hanlon and Mochizuki 2003, 5). According to Hecker (2006, 4), almost nothing is known about the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) nuclear stockpile in addition to their nuclear strategy with country’s government officials often claiming that their nuclear weapons role is for security purposes; that are such as preventing U.S. from military invasion as well as to protect their state’s sovereignty (Krauthammer 1991, 25). Pyongyang as asserted by Hecker (2006, 4) cares less about the new problems facing them for nuclear weapons security as well as safety that arise from having nuclear weapons. Based on the realist security paradigm, it appears that factors that made Pyongyang to pursue nuclear weapon are many, but mainly is for regime survival and security purposes, which internally according to Kim (2013) is seen as convergent. Pyongyang security worries concentrates on the U.S, which pose danger to North Korea both directly as well as regionally. The direct security threat is attributed to the fear that the United States can attack North Korea for a number of reasons through military invasion or nuclear weapons (Allison 2004, 73). The region threat arises from the U.S. support to the government of South Korea, which thwarts Korea reintegration on North Korea’s terms (Carter and Perry 2006, 2). As stated by Lee (2008), North Korea could be pursuing its nuclear weapons in order to remedy its increasing conventional weakness to the South Korean as well as U.S Military forces that are currently aligning against it, as well as to prevent defensive action by the United States. Basically, the justification that Pyongyang deems pursuing nuclear weapons can prevent the U.S form attacking it appears valid, but still there is a chance that North Korea can trade its missile weapons so as to save its deteriorating economic system (Mack 1991, 92). In spite of the impenetrability of the North Korean regime, a number of scholars such as Plant and Rhode (2013, 62) and Hong (2014) doubt the security justification adequacy in the case of North Korea its nuclear program have failed to offer a resounding deterrent capability. This is so, considering that the nuclear project has made North Korea to experience a high attack risk during the development stage of the nuclear weapons and overpowering international acrimony as well as sanctions by United Nations (Manyin and Nikitin 2008, CRS-5). As mentioned by Kim (2013), national exposure to danger for the period needed to create nuclear deterrence that is meaningful would be varying with a short-run strategy for surviving. The Pyongyang conventional capabilities successfully functioned in holding at risk valued antagonists’ assets as well as individually offering important deterrence value. Therefore, from this perspective, it is not easy to agree that North Korea chase for nuclear weapons is for the interest of the national security interests considering that other countries that similarly feel vulnerable such as Vietnam have not pursued nuclear weapons for deterrence purposes (Gowans 2013). Politics as well has contributed to North Korea’s pursuit for nuclear weapons. Basically, North Korea has domestic blocs that are not easy to detect, even amongst the domestic political players themselves. However, signs of their presence as well as their interactions terms may be picked up occasionally. Undoubtedly, Pyongyang’s military has continuously played a remarkable prevailing role, consuming nearly 30% of North Korea’s GDP gross domestic product since 1995 (Nanto and Chanlett-Avery 2005, CRS-3). Immediately after ascending to power, Kim Jong-il strengthened his internal authority through improving the military power through draconian laws. Still, the collapse of the country’s energy and economic imperatives made Kim Jong-il feel vulnerable, especially from domestic adversaries. So, Kim Jong-il developed nuclear weapons to exhibit his power and authority not just domestically and regionally, but also internationally. However, this action was followed with a number of economic sanctions, and since then Pyongyang has more and more depended on trade with South Korea as well as China (Shambaugh 2003, 46). In consequence, the Pyongyang military has invaded management of the country’s natural resources foreign sale, which according to Huntley (2010) offers a profitable substitute revenue source. In this regard, it can be argued that Pyongyang pursing of nuclear-weapons is mainly steered by units within the military who view the nuclear program as a way of husbanding resources, internal backing for its mission, as well as for national security. North Korea citizens are forced to support the nuclear program ambitions and those who appear to oppose are considered the enemy of the state and are punished through execution (Kwon 2013, Chang 2014). Besides that, the process dynamics of leadership succession, which are obviously not in order, have made a number of top leaders engage with political forces trying to shape the country’s leadership and economic policy. However, this has been met rancorously by the government who still aspire to show its military prowess to the U.S by creating more nuclear weapons. Ideational factors such as ‘juche’, which stands for self-reliance, can as well be considered as factors that resulted in the country’s pursuit for nuclear weapons (Dixon 2011). A number of North Koreans believe that the country should stop the overwhelming hegemonic intents of the U.S to take their valuable natural resources with any means possible. It is under this belief that Kim Jong-il authenticated the significance of increasing the country’s military and developing nuclear weapons. According to Dixon (2011), this standpoint strongly demonstrates the leadership legitimation that is oriented inwardly is frequently related to nuclear weapons ambitions. Therefore, in North Korea, nuclear weapons prowess connotes the embodiment of national self-reliance. China has also contributed to Pyongyang pursuit for nuclear weapons, with a number of analysts claiming that the burgeoning relations of China with South Korea as well as its less commitment to North Korea’s Military as compared in the past have made Pyongyang feel abandoned, inflaming its nuclear motivations (Wu 2005, 36). However, it is believed that the nuclear program in North Korea started prior to the abovementioned developments, but has since intensified as evidenced by the recent Pyongyang missile launching. Vietnam has since 1979 fought with China, and even though India’s nuclear-weapons development is attributed to its never-ending border conflict with China, Vietnam felt more intimidated by China than India but has never pursed nuclear weapons. Instead of pursuing development of nuclear-weapons, Vietnam unlike North Korea initiated economic reforms, and decided to boost its security prowess by joining the ASEAN community. Therefore, North Korea leadership legitimation can be considered as the main factor behind its nuclear program and not for security purposes as argued by a number of scholars. These factors are afar the security paradigm, and with lack of convincing strategic argument supporting Pyongyang nuclear weapons’ security utility prove that a number of states can pursue nuclear weapons without a convincing need for them. Using Vietnam as an example, it is evident that does not have to pursue nuclear to boost its security prowess, but can engage with other countries that have this ability to remain secure. Therefore, security threat cannot be utilized as a justification for nuclear weapon proliferation; this also applies for North Korea whose decision to pursue nuclear weapons remains insufficient. In 1950, North Korea was invaded by American-led forces, and this operation resulted in a demoralizing and costly war with China, and as stated by Mueller (1988, 64) it led to a significant decline in American passion for these military exercises. Mueller (1988, 64) posits that, if U.S could have succeeded in taking over North Korea, a number of countries would have started engaging in similar ventures and further heightens weapon of mass destruction proliferation. Information concerning the Pyongyang production of nuclear weapons has largely relied on defector information as well as remote monitoring, and all have provided unclear results. Besides that, satellite images appropriately showed the initiation of a reactor in North Korea, but failed to offer comprehensive information concerning its operations. Also, a number of truck movements were detected by satellites early in 2003 at Yongbyon, but there was no confirmation on what the trucks transporting to the newly constructed reactor (Howard 2004, 808). The U.S has continually accused North Korea regime of pursuing nuclear weapons, but has never provided substantial evidence to prove their accusations. Its unofficial delegation to North Korea in 2004 also failed to justify North Korean regime was involving in nuclear development program. As stated by Squassoni (2005, CRS-6), North Korea involvement to nuclear program can only be substantiated through cooperation from the government and access to various resources. Essentially, getting fissile material, highly enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium-239 is the main obstacle that countries experience in developing nuclear weapons (Squassoni 2005, CRS-2). Generating these two materials has been very challenging as opposed to the belief by many experts that weaponisation is very easy. As it stands, North Korea is large producer of uranium and has numerous plant facilities for converting uranium; the country as well has plant for fabricating fuel, a reprocessing plant, as well as a nuclear reactor; that is to say Pyongyang has everything required to develop Plutonium-239 a key fissile isotope utilised in developing nuclear weapons. Conclusion In conclusion, it has been argued that North Korea most recent activity has been to create crisis as a way of intimidating diplomacy in order to generate crisis situations and incite U.S to act in response. As argued in the article, factors that could have led North Korea to pursue nuclear weapons include: security purposes, especially preventing itself from U.S possible attack, to intimidate its adversaries, to improve its military prowess, and as symbol of self-resilient. Pyongyang regime believes that nuclear weapons promotes national unity and reinforces its regime legitimacy. 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