Priorities of the US Foreign Policy, American Future Grand Strategy - Literature review Example

United States of America’s Grand Strategy, Priorities of the U.S. Foreign Policy Thomas Friedman The future of the United States of America’s grand strategy is to search for a long-term strategy in neo-conservative policies. A neo-conservative foreign policies would be good for conservatives, good for America, and good for the world since these would inspire Americans to assume cheerfully the new international responsibilities that went with increased power and influence (Kristoll and Kagan, 1996). Current statistics showed that the United States of America is a great power on the brink of decline. For this kind of situation, the grand strategy, therefore, is to maintain the United States’ power and influence internally but channel these powers through international institutions. Marquardt (2006) conducted an in depth analysis on this grand strategy. According to Marquardt (2006), while the future of the United States’ foreign policy will not be radically different than it has been in the earlier years, the different policy prescriptions found in the contending internationalist grand strategies should not be underestimated. These may eventually distinguish the difference between war and peace, open economies and trade wars and arms racing and arms control in the years to come (Marquardt, 2006). Three analytical perspectives such as realism, liberalism, and marxism/neo-marxism are generally used to organize thinking about international relations (Strategic Planning, 2006). According to the U.S. Navy Military Syllabus, 2006, these perspectives influence not only assessments of the evolving international security environment description but also efforts to develop an overall United States of America’s grand strategy prescription. The significance of such phenomena as international anarchy, system structure, nuclear weapons, economic interdependence, the spread of democracy, and the end of the Cold War as well as proposals for how the United States of America should react to and attempt to shape such international phenomena are largely determined by the analytical perspective of the strategist (Strategic Planning, 2006). Analytical premises and assumptions shape not only strategic assessments but also prescriptions for action, according to the U.S. Navy Military Syllabus (2006). As John Maynard Keynes put it, “Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct academic scribbler of a few years back.” It is important, therefore, according to the U.S. Navy Military Syllabus (2006) to develop an understanding of and appreciation for the contending analytical perspectives in international relations at the outset of our effort to grapple with alternative grand strategies. It is also important to recognize that these three analytical perspectives should not be confused with political perspectives (Strategic Planning, 2006). It has been observed that the United States of America’s image and public opinion is that this country is a superpower. As shown by the current statistics, it is not the case anymore in a few years time. That is about to end soon. Lately, the China economy has been growing over twice as fast as the United States of America’s economy for almost two decades now (Terrill, 2006), and an Indian economy that has been growing at around twice the U.S. rate for almost a decade already (Marquardt, 2006). As such, Goldman Sachs estimated in the late 2003 that China’s Gross Domestic Product would surpass that of the United States of America as a superpower so long as it is ruled by the Chinese Communist Party in 2042 (The Great Decisions, 2005). Unlike China, India started later and growing slightly slower will not reach the same milestone for a further decade or more. However, both China and India will be nipping at the U.S.A. heels long before that (Dryer, 2006). Take note that economic power is the source of most other kinds of power. Per capita income in India and China will still be much lower than that of the United States but it will not be that low. Goldman Sachs (2003) predicts a China per capita income in 2042 comparable to that of Western Europe today (The Great decisions, 2005). Combine this wealth with populations that will be four times bigger than that of the United States in the 2040s, there will be unlikely to be any remaining innovation gap (Dryer, 2005). In developing the grand strategy for the United States of America, strategists should not use the "terrorist threat'' or any other excuses that comes to hand to justify their strategies. As the official rationales for the United States of America’s invasion of Iraq that this Middle East country possessed “weapons of mass destruction” which threatened the national security of the United States of America (Zunes, 2003) and that the Iraqi government had operational ties to al-Qaida (Zunes, 2005) are now widely acknowledged to have been fabricated (Zunes, 2005). The back-up rationalization of bringing freedom and democracy to Iraq (Zunes, 2005) is also losing credibility, increasing attention is being given as to why the United States of America government with broad bipartisan support made such a fateful decision (Zunes, 2006). This will not work. The United States of America needs radical departure from its current course (Dryer, 2005). In the year 2004, Walter Russell Mead came up with a book entitled “Power, Terror, Peace, and War: America's Grand Strategy in a World at Risk.” The book was specifically written for the Study Group on American Grand Strategy research project. The said book discusses the United States of America’s foreign policy and its current grand strategy for the world under the Bush administration (Mead, 2004). According to Marquardt (2006), there are two key elements in the grand strategy to maintain American power and influence in the world but channelling them through international institutions. These are the strategies of primacy and collective security. Marquardt (2006) says that the strategy of primacy emphasizes that a preponderance of the United States of America’s power is the best way to achieve peace after the Cold War. This will have basic effects such that it will reassure the United States of America’s allies and coalition partners that the United States of America will stand by them in times of need and also it will signal to potential aggressors both at the regional and global levels that moves against the U.S.A. and its many interests abroad can only come at very high cost to them. The hope is that the United states of America’s power will act as a strong deterrent against aggression and soundly defeat aggression should deterrence fail (Marquardt, 2006). Through the primacy strategy, policies like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s expansion [NATO-L (NATO Expansion), 1997] and a continued United States of America’s role in the international organizations are the priorities for as long as institutions do not stray far from the United States of America’s core interests such as maintaining the United States of America’s pre-eminence. Primacy puts more details to identifying potential threats to the United States of America’s interests and measures to contain them. A rising China and India are among the potent competitors to the United States of America’s pre-eminence. In the primacy strategy, non-traditional military threats from non-state actors such as terrorist organizations with weapons of mass destruction are look into. There is also a fear that a rogue state like the North Korea may try to strike the United States of America’s homeland. This is the rationale behind the primacy's call for the continued strong support for the development and eventual deployment of ballistic missile defense. The most important factor in the primacy strategy is the United States of America's political will to lead rather than the costs of that leadership (Marquardt, 2006). It should be noted that primacy has its shortcomings. A good example is the United States of America’s muscle flexing and paternalism will more likely upset its allies than reassure them. The French government has expressed concern about the elements of primacy in the United States of America’s foreign policy in the 1990's. One of the main rationales behind France’ favour in a stronger Europe, including the formation of a European army, is the fear that the United States of America will use its unique position in the world to keep Europe under its wing. Likewise, France has expressed the opposite fear that in the event of a United states of America’s retreat into isolationism, Europe will be unprepared to provide for its own security needs. There are also critics who argue that a muscle bound United States of America simply increases the likelihood that statesmen will seek out crisis areas where the United States of America can push its weight around. Still others argues that as a result of its high level of international involvement, the United States of America will find it increasingly difficult to stay on top, as much as the U.S.A. might try to prevent it, other states will balance against the U.S.A.in order to contain its power and influence (Marquardt, 2006). Primacy best exemplifies the George W. Bush administration's foreign policy from the year 1989 to 1992. The development, maintenance and the exercise of the United States of America’s power occupied the centre of the Bush administration's vision of a "new world order." National security planning documents argued that the United States of America should harness its formidable military power to establish a post-Cold War "Pax Americana." This power would reassure the United states of America's allies that their security was in U.S.A.’s national interest and serve as a clear rationale against their enhancing their own defenses, which they might one day use to challenge the United States of America’s global leadership. A good example is when President George W. Bush supported the deepening and widening of the European Union (EU) but looked askance at the European efforts to develop an integrated military force that could act outside the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s channels, and hence, American stewardship. To the United states of America's foes, primacy under President George W. Bush made it plain that the United States of America stood ready to defend the new world order against rogue states, states with aspirations for regional hegemony, and a resurgent Russia. That is, precluding the emergence of any potential future global competitor stood as the central objective of the President George W. Bush administration's foreign policy (Marquardt, 2006). Another important element of the grand strategy is collective security. Collective security strategy is committed to maintaining an open world economy and supporting democratization and humanitarianism abroad. This is different from the primacy in that collective security favours multilateral mechanisms to achieve the goals. On the other hand, primacy puts unilateral action above coordinated action. Also, primacy is less committed to humanitarian intervention than collective security especially when the use of force in this way compromises the United States of America’s power and does not have a clear "exit strategy." Because they envision new roles and missions for United states of America’s power, both strategies also call for increases in defense spending. It should be noted that the collective security seeks modest increases in spending. As explained by Marquardt (2006), the United States of America’s global military engagements are likely to increase, but their costs will be off-set as a result of collaboration with other like-minded states. He also said that “primacy calls for major increases in defense spending, since America’s post-Cold War engagements in world affairs will be numerous, are likely to require the unilateral use of force, and should be carried out with overwhelming power and superior technology so that political goals are achieved at minimal cost” (Marquardt, 2006). References Dyer, Gwynne. America's Superpower Status is About to End. Cincinnati Post. Information Clearing House: News you wont Find in CNN, March 30, 2005. Dyer, Gwynne. U.S. Empire Ready for a Fall. Solon Salon. 2 dyers and a gaiman, March 31, 2005. Kristoll, William and Kagan, Robert. Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Foreign Affairs, July/August 1996. Marquardt, James J. 2006. Grand Strategy and the Next President of the United States. The Colby Reader. Mead, Walter Russell. 2004. Power, Terror, Peace, and War: America's Grand Strategy in a World at Risk. CFR Book. NATO-L (NATO Expansion). 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FPIF Commentary, January 4, 2006. Gershman, John (ed.). Zunes, Stephen. 2003. Tinderbox: U.S. Middle East Policy and the Roots of Terrorism. Common Courage Press. Read More