Counter Insurgency - a Comparison between the Irish Troubles 1919-1921 and Dhofar 1970-1975 - Assignment Example

Counter Insurgency, A Comparative Analysis between the Irish Troubles 1919-1921 and Dhofar 1970-1975 Introduction "Guerrilla warfare is what regular armies always have most to dread." CITATION Whi08 \l 1033 The above by Major C.E. Callwells work on Small Wars did not help the British Army in the Irish War of 1919-1921. The British Army fought myriad campaigns against recalcitrant indigenous peoples that resented British efforts to turn them into law-abiding subjects of the Kings and Queens of England. The bulk of these campaigns fought in India, Africa, and other colonies of the Empire. These campaigns added to the operational experience available to commanders faced with similar situations. The British Army fought a series of Communist backed insurgencies in Asia and Africa. British experience gained in Malaya aided British advisors in Oman (Dhofar) to halt a rebellion in that country. This study compares the failure in Ireland and the success in Dhofar and how the British Army applied those lessons. Ireland England effort to assimilate Ireland into the Empire failed in large part because Englishmen treated the people as a province. Their repression of the Irish people a root cause for their failure. Small wars again to quote Callwell, is a result of imperialism. The Irish people considered themselves a conquered people and rejected the notion that they were citizens of the United Kingdom. This sentiment led to countless rebellions in an effort to free them of British rule. All these earlier rebellions failed for one reason or the other. The Easter Rising of 1916 drove home the point that the Irish could not defeat England under the normal rules of warfare and a need for a change of tactics was needed to continue. The impetus for change in tactical thinking was John MacBride, a deputy commander of the Volunteers announced to his men shortly before they surrendered to never again allow themselves "to be cooped up inside the walls of a building again". CITATION Whi08 \l 1033 MacBrides words burned into the minds of the new emerging leaders of the Volunteers such as Michael Collins and Cathal Brugha. Collins and Brugha began a reorganization of the Volunteers. The new organization concentrated on regional organizations and unlike the secretive leadership of the Irish Republican Brotherhood, Collins relied on a system of couriers to coordinate movements in the countryside. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) replaced the Irish Volunteers. The military forces of the occupying power needed to set establish an overall strategy to prosecute the conflict. These steps consist of isolation the combat zone, committing sufficient forces to hold cleared areas of the country, and offering the population of the disaffected areas a choice of peaceful methods to resolve issues. CITATION Whi08 \l 1033 The British Army failed to isolate the combat zone. The new leadership recognized that key to achieving Irish independence was to survive while harrying the occupying forces. The IRA began attacking isolated police stations to steal weapons through 1918. January 21, 1919 two police officers guarding a load of gelignite (an explosive), died in a raid at Soloheadbeg, County Tipperary. The campaigns made the RIC abandon isolated police barracks and to concentrate in barracks closer to the main towns and villages and in supporting distance of the army forces in the area. The IRA gained control of the countryside and left the RIC badly crippled as thousands of constables resigned. The difficulty for the British Army is that the entire island operational zone. Northern Ireland remained relatively peaceful due to the Protestant majoritys active assistance of the authorities to root out the IRA. The second principle commit sufficient forces proved difficult. The Armistice in 1918 led to the demobilization of thousands of British soldiers. Englands other imperial possessions needed troops for garrisons and the War Office could not find sufficient soldiers for Ireland. Peaceful negotiations failed in the past to gain Irish independence and the population at large believed only force would force England to disgorge her Irish colony. The IRA defied efforts to eradicate them from the countryside. The key to IRAs success was the column; small groups of men who roamed the countryside and attacked patrols, barracks, and police stations to paralyze British efforts to govern the country. The key for the columns success was the ability to pick the time, place, and manner of attack. Counterinsurgency begins with a defined political objective. England offered Home Rule. The Protestant Irish of the North refused the notion of autonomous government with a Catholic majority. Second principle of guerrilla war is commit sufficient forces to accomplish the mission. The British Empire absorbed much of the available manpower it was difficult to find sufficient manpower for the Army. Noted in the opening, regular armies dislike fighting unconvential warfare; successful counterinsurgency needs permanent garrisons to hold areas cleared of guerrillas. The British created the Black and Tans, composed of former British officers. CITATION Whi08 \l 1033 Tans practiced collective punishment of a district where IRA activity occurred. Houses of suspected IRA members and sympathizers were burned. The free use of torture on captives and assassinations turned the entire population against British policy. Violence begets violence and the IRA stepped up its campaign against suspected informers, government officials, ambushes, and their own burn campaign that turned most rural areas of southern Ireland into a wasteland. The third principle to convince the Irish that Englands Home Rule bills were genuine. Historical failures at autonomous rule canceled the Home Rule option as both Northern and Southern Ireland leaders rejected the proposal. War weariness on both sides of the issue led the opposing sides to hammer out the agreement for the Irish Free State. Northern Ireland was exempted from the treaty. The failure to apply the principles of counterinsurgency doomed the British effort to failure. World War II brought its own set of problems with a new twist to wars of liberation, Communism. The Malay Emergency began in 1946 by Malay Communists of Chinese extraction. The Malay government found itself dealing with internecine war of assassination, ambush, and intimidation. The governments apparent inability led to Sir Robert Thompson in charge of defeating the insurgents. The principles of counterinsurgency had not changed. The government needed to isolate the insurgents, commit sufficient forces to accomplish that goal, and convince the population that the government can protect them CITATION Whi08 \l 1033 Initial efforts by British forces consisted of search and clear operations that proved ineffective. A number of junior officers developed tactics to defeat the guerrillas at their game. Military efforts designed to neutralize the guerrillas support base and political efforts convinced the rural population that the government cared about their welfare. Counterinsurgency involves a government having a political aim for its response to insurrection. As noted above isolation of the zone of operations is key. British authorities accomplished this with the strategic hamlet concept; isolated villagers from guerrillas and the enemy found themselves at a disadvantage to supply themselves with food and intelligence. CITATION Whi08 \l 1033 The government gains support of the people by adhering strictly to the laws. The excesses of the Black and Tans turned the people against the government effort and ensured victory. CITATION Whi08 \l 1033 Thirdly, the government must have an overall plan of how to defeat the enemy. Fourth, efforts focused on the political battle and not the defeat of the guerrillas themselves. The British recognized that Malaya was on the road to independence and announced Malaya would be granted independence in 1957, removing the Malay Communist Partys assertion, they were fighting a war of liberation. CITATION Whi08 \l 1033 The adoption of these principles allowed the Malay government to stamp out the guerillas in 1960. Dhofar is a province of Oman second largest nation on the Arabian Peninsula and commands the southern side of the Strait of Hormuz. CITATION Whi08 \l 1033 Dhofar lies close to the Yemen border and 500 miles from the capital of Muscat. The Sultan Said a repressive and secretive ruler controlled the nation. The country suffered greatly from disease and rampant poverty. Roads were nonexistent except for that linked the capital Muscat with Dhofar. The nations condition made the country ripe for revolution if opposition groups could organize. The Dhofar Benevolent Society and the Dhofar Soldiers Organization emerged in 1962-1963 as the opposition to the Sultan. These two groups drew encouragement and support from the Arab Nationalist Movement The initial Dhofari resistance sought political and economic improvement of Dhofar by overthrow of the Sultan. The insurgents began with small attacks on these installations. The initial rebellion collapsed when a dhow full Dhofari was captured by Iranian security forces. This led to the arrest of the leadership. Survivors fled to the Democratic Republic of Yemen and reorganized as the Dhofar Liberation Front. CITATION Whi08 \l 1033 The new organization commenced military operations by ambushing a patrol June 1965. The Front concentrated gaining outside recognition and control of Dhofar. The Oman government underwent change when his son Said Qabus overthrew Said July 23, 1970. Qabu, a graduate of the Royal Military College Sandhurst, took active steps to quell the insurgency. He offered a general amnesty to all who opposed the Sultan, incorporate Dhofar into the main frame of the Omani nation, a military action to suppress those rebels who rejected amnesty, and active campaign to improve the lot of the Dhofar people. CITATION Whi08 \l 1033 Qabu embarked on a diplomatic campaign to have Oman recognized as an Arab State with a legitimate government and isolate the Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) from receiving aid from other Arab nations. The critical need Qabu and his British advisors Dhofar needed was economic development. The Sultan used Omans oil revenues to build schools, clinics, wells, and improve communications. The military front used locally organized tribal militias called firqas to protect the population and root out the guerrillas. CITATION Moc93 \l 1033 The militiamen were former insurgents that accepted amnesty. These units had British SAS soldiers contracted to form Training Teams to instruct the levies. The Sultans Armed Force was reorganized, reequipped, and armed and set out to aggressively wrest control of Dhofar from the Communist backed DLF. This strategy proved effective and hundreds of insurgents accepted the amnesty program and joined the firqas. Communist anti-religious dogma sparked a counter-revolution by traditional Islamic members of DLF. Qabus received support from Iran, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and the British. These political acts stemmed from Omans acceptance into the Arab League and United Nations. The DLF and PDRY found themselves isolated. The tide turned decisively in favor of Qabus and the insurgency collapsed December 11, 1975. British failure in Ireland resulted from the lack of a clear political objective, failed to isolate the IRA from the people. They failed to improve the lives of the average Irish citizens and Black and Tan excess turned a neutral population into active sympathizers. The Dhofar experience applied the lessons of counterinsurgency. Qabus assessed the situation and began an active program of economic development, reorganized the military forces, and launched a diplomatic campaign that cut the insurgents and their supporter from regional support. E., Callwell C. Small Wars. 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