What Is Donald Davidson's Anomalous Monism - Essay Example

What is Donald Davidson’s Anomalous Monism? Anomalous monism of Donald Davidson is considered to be a significant argument in opposition to the reductability of the mental to the physical. As per Davidson constitutive normative aspect constrains the psychological behavior, which is not influenced due to any physical sciences. The theory of anomalous monism is coined by Davidson and is seen as a nonreductive view about the relationship between the physical and the mental. Davidson states that every mental incident can be seen as a physical event, even when the mental event might not be reducible or inter-related with any physical aspect. This means that although the mental event does not have characteristics that might link it with any physical incidents, mental events can still be considered as a physical one. Some of the mental activities that can be associated with physical actions are desires, sensations and beliefs. The argument of Davidson regarding such a hypothesis stems from the juxtaposition of three seemingly inconsistent principles. Out of these three principles, Davidson defends the third one at length while the other two is seen as plausible in their independent capacities. As per the first principle which is known principle of causal interaction (PCI), Davidson states that mental incidents are the result of physical events and the converse is also true. The principle of the nomological character of causality (PNCC) is the second principle which affirms that causally relate events are actually governed by strict causal laws. As per the third principle i.e. the principle of the anomalism of the mental (PAM), Davidson says that mental terms cannot be grouped into any strict laws. This third principle is seen to be in conflict with the other two as the third principle denies the assumptions presented in the first two that mental events are governed by strict causal laws. However, Davidson provides the argument that these seemingly differing principles can be bought together through the common thread of describing the mental events as part of physical incidents. He further provides an example to describe the correlation between the mental and physical events. For instance, a physical event, x, is caused due to a mental event, y. Then as per the second principle PNCC, x and y are supposed to be governed by strict causal law. However, the third principle i.e. PAM states that the resulting physical event cannot be a mental one as it does not have any mental descriptions. Thus, the mental action needs to contain some physical characteristics so that the strict causal law clause could be fulfilled and make the mental action a physical event. How does Davidson argue for it? Davidson bases his theory on two major assumptions, which are the hypothesis that mental actions are anomalous and mental events can be equated with physical ones. With regards to mental events being anomalous, Davidson states that these events are not been governed by any stringent physical laws. Davidson especially argues about the mental state’s correlation with the physical one in his later works and could be found frequently in a number of his work. Davidson mentions about this theory first and foremost in the ‘Mental Events’ published in 1970, wherein he provides the three principles that focuses on the correlation between mental and physical events. The three principles provided by Davidson are: the first states that there is a causal interaction between some mental incidents with the physical ones. This principle is also known as the Principle of Causal Interaction. The second principle states that the mental events that are related to physical ones can be termed under stringent laws. This is known as the Principle of the Nomological Character of Causality. The third principle however, denies the first two and affirms that there are no stringent laws that govern the correlation between the physical and mental events. This principle is also called the Anomalism of the Mental. The first two principles can be viewed in contradiction to the third one as the first two are governed by the fact that the physical and mental events are inter-related due to cause and effect factors and therefore needs to be based on strict causal laws. However, the anomalism of the mental says that there are no stringent laws that can define the correlation between physical and mental events. Therefore, in order to understand Davidson’s arguments, it is important to understand his third principle and find out the basis of the Anomalism of the Mental. It has been found that the Anomalous Monism propagated by Davidson as well as his Identity Theory of the mind is the result of contradictions. The three principles proposed by Davidson are in conflict with each other, or at least the first two with the third principle. While the first principle states that there is a causal dependence between mental and physical events, the second focuses on the strict laws governing this causal relationship. However, the third seems to deny these two principles by stating that no stringent laws can define the correlation between mental and physical events. Is his argument valid? As per Davidson every event is a particular incident and therefore, can be grouped under not just one description but many. He also states that the physical and mental events are related causally with each other and should be seen under stringent laws. However, he also points out that laws have linguistic nature and therefore, these events needs to have some descriptions so that they can be specified under strict causal laws. Therefore, as per the approach of Davidson, an event which might be defined under a law due to its particular description but might not be in case of other differing descriptions. For instance, there might not be any stringent laws that can establish a correlation between the descriptions of the ice formation on a street and the falling of a child on that street. However, if the descriptions are altered and a different angle is taken to describe the incidents, the correlation could be defined through stringent causal laws. Thus, in order to define the relation between a physical and mental event on the basis of causal laws, it is important to discuss the descriptions. However, it is also true that in case the cause of the events could be established then the descriptions are not relevant. For instance, if it is established that ice formation on the street caused the child to fall on that street, then the description of the events would not matter to create a correlation based on causal laws. Therefore, in such a case, the description whether it is physical or mental would not matter as the causal relation between the two are already been established. Further, it needs to be seen that the same events which are not casually related with each other under some descriptions might get inter-related in case of other descriptions and therefore may be governed by strict causal laws. Therefore, it is possible that a particular mental incident if given proper descriptions might get related causally with a physical incident. However, there might also be no stringent laws that would govern this correlation under other descriptions. For instance, a person’s wants to drink a milk product leads him to the shelf containing yogurt and therefore the want causes the physical movement in certain time and space. However, there is still no stringent law that could relate this want to have milk product to the physical aspect of moving towards the shelf. Furthermore, the mental events might get indentified with some physical acts, it might be stated that in case of certain descriptions both might be seen as the same event. It might be possible that no stringent laws may relate the mental events with the physical description as well. Davidson, in fact, explicitly discussed that there might not be any stringent laws that can establish a correlation between the physical and mental events. This denial by Davidson regarding the absence of any law to establish the correlation between mental and physical actions stems from his opinion that mental activities are ruled by rational principles, which might not be applied to any physical act. For instance, our coherence about an event or other such considerations may restrict our opinion about an event that could be described in physical terms. However, it cannot be stated that these physical events were the result of our mental analysis. Nonetheless, this does not help in assuming that any correlation could not be drawn between the physical and mental action. Instead, it does state that inter-relations could be understood through the implication of stringent laws, which would be needed for the reduction of mental action to the physical descriptions. Therefore, the absence of stringent laws that focuses on the mental descriptions can be seen as a challenging roadblock for bringing the mental event within the structure of the physical action. Although, the mental events are not reducible to any physical component, it is found that all the mental events may be paired together with some or the other physical action. Therefore, all the mental descriptions of a particular event might be combined with the physical description given about the same incident as well. Thus, Davidson states that the mental incidents are ‘supervening’ upon the physical events in such a manner that dependency could be drawn between the predicates of mental and physical events. This means that the events which is not possible to be classified under certain physical description may not be identified under mental description as well. In case a mental event results into a physical action, it can be said that there exist a connection between the two governed by some strict law due to their description. However, as per the third principle propagated by Davidson, no law governs the relationship between the mental and physical events. It is further explained that the relation may be explained by understanding the description of the events as in case of certain descriptions laws might be implemented, while in others it would not be. Davidson states that the concept of an event cannot be reducible and therefore, it might not be possible to remove it from the ontology. Further, an event can be described in various manners and have different aspects. For instance, while describing the child’s fall on a snowy street, the description of the event would matter the most to establish any correlation between the mental and physical aspects of the event. Therefore, as per this view, the concept of event may not be required to have a causal relationship but have generally conceived notions that establish the relation without any causal law. For instance, in the case of the child falling on the snowy street, there might not be a causal law governing the two instances, however, the fall resulting from a snowy street establishes the cause of the fall and therefore, the relationship between the mental and physical actions could be established easily even without a causal law. In case a mental event is a result of a physical incident, many questions arise. Chief among them is how to establish the cause of the correlation between the two events and the properties that govern the cause of the events. In case the event is a physical one, Davidson states that the mental event that may cause the physical event might be the attitude or belief of the person. It has also been seen that mental events might be created due to intentionality, i.e. the intention of a person to undertake certain tasks. The mental events might also be linked with any physical act as well. For Davidson, if one is describing a mental event, it might also mean describing the physical event as well, as both share the same characteristics. Thus, on the surface, anomalous monism might look very attractive and provide a certain way of finding a correlation between the physical and mental events. The theory of Davidson juxtaposes anomalism and monism in order to find the cause effect relation between the mental and physical events, while retaining the desires, beliefs and other such acts and reasoning. The concept of anomalous monism has be debated over for a long time and has drawn criticism from all the quarters, be it physicalists or non-physicalists. This paper also found that Davidson has not been able to provide adequate instances or defenses for his second principle regarding the principle of the nomological character of causality (PNCC) which affirms that causally related events are actually governed by strict causal laws. However, Davidson is not able to provide arguments in the favour of the second principle. Further, Davidson’s statement about mental incidents are ‘supervening’ upon the physical events are also incompatible with his other views and could be often confused or mistaken. It can be further stated that the ‘supervening’ assumption has made the mental cause inefficient. Davidson’s theory of anomalous monism therefore, is full of contradictions, especially regarding the second and third principals, which present two contrary views. The second principle states that the mental and the physical events are being governed by strict causal laws, while the third principle assumes that there is no law that provides a correlation between the physical and mental events, resulting into conflict between these two principles. Davidson however, has not been able to describe these principles and resolve the conflict in his theory, although, he had attempted to diffuse the conflict by including the clause of describing an event to find the cause and the therefore, the relationship between the physical and mental events. Bibliography: Antony, M. V. (2003). Davidson's Argument for Monism. Synthese, 135 (1), 1-12. Branquinho, J. (ed.). (2001). The Foundations of Cognitive Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Crane, T. (2000). Dualism, monism, physicalism. Mind & Society, 1 (2), 73-85. Goddu, G. C. (1999). Is Anomalous Monism inconsistent after all? Philosophia, 27 (3-4), 509-519. Read More