PNG's Response to Bougainville Referendum on Independence - Essay Example

Name: Institution: Course: Tutor: Introduction The independent Island of Bougainville has planned to organize a referendum on its future political status anytime between now and 2020. The agenda of the referendum is to establish whether it should move to full independence or remain a region of Papua New Guinea (PNG). The course to the referendum by the Bougainville has been complicated, costly and very long (May, 2009). Secessionist movement of the Bougainville has developed over several decades. However, the complications brought about by a lucrative yet environmentally-destructive mine, a civil war that leads to the death of many people, and a countrywide government unwilling to set practices for other regions has resulted in an increase in the complexity and divisive issue of the political status of Bougainville. The Bougainvilleans were promised a referendum that would contain the preference of independence, ensuring a set period of independent government in the Bougainville Peace Agreement, which was signed in 2001. However, it is so far to be established if the referendum demonstrates to be the ultimate resolution to the struggles of Bougainville or if it has enabled a short-term lull in conflicts (Jennings and Claxton, 2013). This paper will discuss the potential implications for Australia by how PNG might respond to the Island of Bougainville referendum on independence to be held at a point between now and 2020. It will identify the diplomatic, military, economic and social implications of such a move. The diplomatic part of it will examine the relevant provisions of the Bougainville Peace Agreement, relevant characteristics of PNG-Bougainville inter-governmental relationships as well as other relevant legal and political issues. The military section will assess the ability and obligation of the armed forces, police, ex-combatants and spoilers components. The economic section will address the costs associated with ensuring peace in the region. The social part will focus on the way the Bougainville misperceptions will influence the Australian efforts to establish security and stability in the region. This paper will use this approach to argue that important risks exist in Australia as regard the direction the Bougainville Referendum will take. It will focus on the period before and after the referendum as well as the possible frustrations in case the legal barriers to executing the referendum are raised. Moreover, it will look into the risks and temptations of accelerating the economic recovery before the referendum, and conflicting expectations between Bougainvilleans and the PNG government over what the result of the referendum would be and the way it will be executed. This paper claims that there exist important indicators that the peace process in Bougainville can be running riskily adrift with the timeline closing in on the guaranteed referendum. Given the 21st century post-conflict situation whereby violence is seen as the best tool to deal with grievances, it may prove rather difficult to resolve the tensions that may result due to the referendum. If significant risks are not identified and countered, Bougainville may return to bloody conflict, and this may have serious impacts on Australia. The role of Australia leadership in tackling the political, social, security and economic challenges of the Bougainville Referendum is acknowledged by scholars, military leaders, and politicians (Jennings and Claxton, 2013). Economic Implications Although the Bougainville Referendum may not result in conflict, it would pressure Australia to uncomfortably accept whatever the outcome of the referendum for the sake of peace that it established in this region. However, if a conflict emerges, then the interests of Australia would be even sharper. Australia has strategic, reputational and trade interests in PNG. A renewed Australian-led mediation initiative in Bougainville might result in significant risk and costs. For example, the Australian military mission of the 1997-2003 cost more than $109 million and resulted in the accidental demise of a serviceman (Jennings and Claxton, 2013). Given the nature of current civic conflicts, it is expected that the costs of a re-intervention would be potentially very high than it was in 1997. It is estimated that it would be closer in shape and size to the bigger and complex peacemaking initiatives in Solomon Islands that cost $350 million or else Timor-Leste that cost around 4.3 billion (Jennings and Claxton, 2013). If the Bougainville Referendum results in bloody conflict, then the Canberra would not hesitate to intervene. It is also feared that a renewed conflict would present a dangerous environment for peacemaking compared to late-stage intervention in 1998. The Australian responses to the conflict situations in these regions would require significant money and time to resolve them when they escalate. Hence, the Australian government might be forced to take intense pre-referendum action to address political, development and security issues on Bougainville. The process of coordinating and collaborating with its regional partners to ensure the stability of Bougainville can be lengthy and costly. Australian will need to renew its peace initiative for Bougainville that entails increasing development, armed forces, police, mobilizing regional support, promoting peace dialogues between Bougainville and PNG leaders. This would translate into constraints in the Australian budget and resources (May, 2009). Australia would be expected to increase development assistance regarding aid funding to Bougainville. The vital building blocks for a viable Bougainville include a more able ABG, a stronger economy, the complete execution of the peace treaty and further resolution and peacebuilding initiative. Consequently, these call for a quicker handover to legal authorities, increased capitals for the ABG as well as efforts to avoid financial mismanagement. Australia will be pressured to triple its development assistance to Bougainville before the referendum to about $100million every year by offering about $40 million to supplement the budget and to double the current amount of $35 million used in undertakings of contracted advisers and sectoral support (Jennings, 2013). The decreasing aid budget and the official incorporation of the Australian aid into the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will impact negatively on the Australian strategic interests in Bougainville and PNG. Australia will be pressured to expand its aid program to create a significant long-term cost-saving and avoid an extensive military intervention in some years to come. Unemployment has been the major cause of conflict in Bougainville and hence it would be necessary for Australia to focus on capacity building. It needs to ensure providing access to services, accelerating economic reform and developing favorable conditions for employment creation. The most important need is enhanced ABG administration, particularly the abilities to be capable of making good use of larger funding, such as engaging contractors effectively and transparently. Accelerating economic recovery and accessibility to services in a nation characterized by high pre-conflict levels, high illiteracy levels, and high unemployment levels would necessitate focusing more on entrepreneurship. The Australian government will need to develop deposited gold mining as the best source of employment and income or else support smallholders handle cocoa pod borer as one of the backbones of accelerating the economy of Bougainville. The NGOs, organizations, and businesses in Australia have a wide range of skills essential for the case of Bougainville (David, and Regan, 2006). Diplomatic Implications Australia has already demonstrated that it will not just sit and wait for the situation to worsen. Given what is at stake, the Australian government is taking the lead in new global assistance effort for avoiding the future need for re-intervening militarily. Some indicators of greater activity and attention are at present apparent. The Joint Supervisory Body of PNG has already reconvened while the Australian government has already dispersed five Australian Civilian Corps professionals to work in cooperation with the contracted advisers (Jennings, 2013). On the other hand, United Nations is providing Peacebuilding Fund support. However, a more rigorous and much-lengthened program is required to develop the conditions established in the peace treaty to enable a sensible choice between sustainable independence and significant autonomy. The Joint review of Authority Arrangements is expected to offer a guideline for the next phases of the peace building process. However, there are some hopes that Port Moresby and the ABG might arrive at an arrangement to release the ensuing tranche of effect project funding. The allocated $38 million every year to be used on infrastructure projects would not be enough to give the level of expertise, investment, and energy needed to make independence work (Jennings and Claxton, 2013). As the timeline for the referendum closes, a typical Canberra interdepartmental commission may not be enough to manage the vigorous and improved reaction that is needed. An active task force would be required to give clear lines of control for foreign relations instead of just chairing discussions between agencies. For Australia to realize any substantial progress on this issue, then it needs to give far-reaching and constant administrative priority to Bougainville. It is the responsibility of the whole-of-government committee regularly to bring up-to-date the Cabinet's National Security Committee concerning the peace building initiative. Moreover, a standing committee must harness capability and support from NGOs, businesses, academics and broader society of Australia (Bob, 2001). The PNG is a strategically significant region for Australia as the historical links, and geographical proximity has placed PNG at a special position in the foreign affairs of Australia. The Australian Government and private sector have heavily invested in PNG regarding aid funding, bilateral defense cooperation and business links (Jennings, 2013). Thus, Australia has a reputational as well as a strategic role in ensuring the stability of PNG. This applies to Bougainville as well. A global approach was used to establish the secure space required to facilitate peace dialogues and weapons confiscations in Bougainville. Australia made great political, military and financial investments to assist Bougainville to achieve peace through peaceful means. This entailed holding a series of important meetings and using a huge number of weaponless peace monitors. About 3,800 Australian armed forces and 300 Australian noncombatants served at different periods on Bougainville (James, 2009). Moreover, the Australian government spent more than $250 million to support the peace building initiatives and post-conflict reconstruction in Bougainville (Jennings and Claxton, 2013.). The fact that PNG and Australia have the same national interest on Bougainville implies that sovereignty sensitivities can be manageable. PNG has a deeper stake than any other nation in establishing a viable, diplomatic solution for Bougainville. Thus, both Australia and PNG have a good motive in maintaining stability in Bougainville, and this depends on organizing an orderly referendum resulting in a broadly acceptable outcome. Besides, they both have the same interests in an outcome preserving the status of PNG as a positive multi-ethnic state. Moreover, they both have similar interests in preventing the two parties from falling on differing sides in the main row and thus, avoiding the necessity for a post-referendum defense forces intervention that would more likely strain the bonds between Port Moresby and Canberra (Bowd, 2007). Thus, PNG and Australia have strong motivations to cooperate closely. Furthermore, PNG played a critical role in the election debates of Australia in a manner that makes it logical for Mr. O'Neill and Mr. Abbott to clarify the bilateral relationship. An earnest Australian obligation to Port Moresby pursuing a mutual strategy to Bougainville can offer a helpful way toward achievement of the objectives of the two countries. Therefore, a healthy bilateral relationship, an equal partnership, and collaboration are essential, especially in policing (James, 2009). Regional support plays a critical role in peacebuilding initiatives. Thus, Australia would be required to mobilize regional countries, such as Fiji, Tonga, and Vanuatu to take part in Bougainville peacemaking. Broad regional engagement would help assure the Bougainvilleans, the ABG and the Port Moresby that neighborhood nations with a good sense of the crisis are paying greater attention to the behavior of all parties. Moreover, such an active participation by different nations with a variety of sympathetic perceptions may dilute prevailing misperceptions that Australia is interested in the Bougainville autonomy or is against it at all costs (David, and Regan, 2006). Also, the Bougainville's referendum outcome will jeopardize not only the stability in Bougainville but also that of the neighboring regions. Bougainville is geographically near Solomon Islands that the Australian government and other regional partners have spent several years trying to stabilize. Renewal of conflicts on Bougainville would destabilize Solomon Islands as well as other regions of PNG. Consequently, Australia will be pressured to act as the regional diplomat of these regions (Bob, 2001). Furthermore, Australia played a major role in the peace agreement negotiations to appease the two sides on the way the global community was probable to respond in their benefit to the outcome of the referendum. Thus, the two sides would perceive Australia as the final guarantor of what would be utterly opposed stance after the referendum. Consequently, Australia would not have any option but just to step up to the occasion, especially if there was a threat of serious insecurity. Therefore, Australia will be pressured to utilize its Pacific regional power to implement preventive diplomacy to address any potential risk factor on Bougainville stability. This implies incorporating Bougainville in its strategic plan agenda and giving it a priority when it comes to bilateral relations with PNG, its local partners as well as its government strategic priorities (Bowd, 2007). Military Implications Extreme conflict in PNG might have direct effects on borders safety given the way this region is near to the territory of Australia. Given that Australia is a security partner, in this case, failure to provide security in the region might harm its reputation. This might make it more reasonable that another power, most likely China, would most likely become the desired security provider in regions conventionally within the Australia's area of influence and interest, notably PNG, East Timor and South Pacific. This can have long-term implications for the security interests of Australia. Moreover, Australia will be forced to take the lead in armed stabilization operations and humanitarian aid if its immediate regions continue experiencing political instability for a long period (Bob, 2001). Australia will need to deploy its police in Bougainville to help recruit and train the Community Auxiliary Police of Bougainville. The new Bougainville Police Service need more assistance regarding mediation, leadership, leadership skills and investigative to remain evolving into an expert, capable and reliable organization as the referendum draws near (Sinclair, McLeod, and Peake, 2006). Australia needs to support disarmament processes in Bougainville that have served as one of the pillars of peace treaty since 2003. Failure to support disarmament would result in an escalation of future minor incidents into serious conflict. Australian police role backing up community-led, incentives-oriented, voluntary disarmament efforts may help support a demilitarizing logic (Spark, and Bailey, 2006). Moreover, Australia would need to use its military to help in confidence-building. Professional logistics and abilities are essential to withstand a larger global development presence in Bougainville until such support would be offered commercially. The Australian Defense Force (ADF) needs to start including a discussion about Bougainville on its subsequent round of negotiations in Port Moresby. It would be critical to include joint planning and security assessments concerning the situation in Bougainville. Military experts would be needed to find opportunities to offer helpful, non-threatening assistance. Australian armed forces might attract unwanted attention from possible spoilers (Australian Civil-Military Centre, 2012). Social implications Bougainville might have a misperception about the interests of Australia in the region. They might think that Australians are having their interests at heart and not to the interests of themselves. Moreover, most Bougainvilleans do not have a good understanding of what independence and autonomy means. In such a fractured environment, misunderstandings, conspiracy theories, and rumors remain rife and might be manipulated. The Bougainvilleans may remain highly suspicious of the motives of Australians as regards the mining and independence. Also, Bougainvilleans may have a negative perception or became insensitive to the high presence of Australian military in the region. To protect its reputation, Australia will be required to support a free and fair referendum processes and to ensure that both parties accept the outcome of the referendum (Ray and Wheen, 2009). Australia will need to take the lead in bringing out the benefits of gaining autonomy in Bougainville. However, such active advocacy for autonomy may be counter-productive given the existing high levels of suspicions and may serve to push the undecided Bougainvilleans towards the different outcome, and this may prove to be more destabilizing. Thus, Australia needs to establish a transparent, flexible and creative approach capable of decreasing the heat in reaction to the inevitable clashes and to create a variety of potentially positive long-term outcomes. Thus, to avoid accumulations of tensions, it is critical for the ABG and the Port Moresby to come into an early agreement regarding the date for the referendum. An attempt by one party to delay the referendum would result in severe peace building consequences. It would also be helpful for Australia to empower community leaders and women. Reinforcing the roles of community leaders and the former commanders and chiefs can be very useful as women can serve as voices for peace. Women leaders were at the front line in leading the establishment of the Bougainville Transitional Government during early 1995. They also played a significant role in reuniting the communities. Thus, sponsoring women's conferences and outreach throughout Bougainville using women's groups within Port Moresby and globally can be a very significant investment. Moreover, such an approach is in line with the pre-election policy declaration on foreign affairs that listed involving female leaders in Bougainville as one of the best initiatives to solve the conflict in the region (May, 2009). Furthermore, the old genuine military leaders who were in operation during the crisis era can be very useful in the peace building process since they understand the language and intricacies of peacebuilding and would demonstrate to be only people capable of containing the fledgling hotheads (Jennings and Claxton, 2013). Conclusion The Bougainville referendum presents potential threats and rewards for Australia. The greatest risks stem from the inactivity of Canberra. There evidently exist a short-term opportunity for the Australian government to make significant changes to the present cautious policy strategy. Although there are no apparent signs that violent conflict will erupt in Bougainville, the costs of handling such a situation if it occurs can be very costly and potentially destructive to the stabilization operations headed by Australia. However, if Australia takes a more proactive strategy, the rewards can be potentially high. It is fundamental for Australia to show that it could do more than just deploy military in Bougainville. Australia will need to demonstrate that it has the needed intelligence and resources to avoid using military intervention through the intensive whole-of-government deed to develop the environment for long-term peace. Australia needs to take preventive diplomatic action right now to establish its credentials as a mediator in a period of diplomatic crisis when Bougainville is looking for calmness and wise leadership. References Australian Civil-Military Centre, 2012. Partnering for Peace, Australian Government: Canberra. Bob, B., 2001. Giving Peace a Chance: Operation Lagoon, Bougainville, 1994: a case study of military action and diplomacy, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defense No. 142, Strategic and Defense Studies Centre, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University (ANU): Canberra. Bowd, R.R.E. 2007. Doves over the Pacific: in pursuit of peace and stability in Bougainville, Australian Military History Publications: Canberra, p. 17. David, H., and Regan, R. 2006. ‘Peace building in the Pacific Islands: lessons from Bougainville, Solomon Islands and Fiji’, State, Society and Governance in Melanesia Program, ANU: Canberra, pp. 57-67. 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