Problems of Military Action in Iraq - Essay Example

Sending More Troops Will Provide a Safer and More Secure Iraq Introduction: Almost four years ago on March 19, 2003 a coalition force from thirty-five countries led by America initiated military action in Iraq. The reasons behind this military action included the perceived threat that the Saddaam Hussein regime in Iraq posed to the region and the world at a whole, removal of tyrannical regime, and providing freedom and democracy to the people of Iraq. (Bush Announces Start of Iraq War, 2003). The defeat of Saddam Hussein was swift meeting the first two objectives of the military action in Iraq. However securing the ground in the whole of Iraq to ensure the third object has foundered, leading to continued requirement of military presence and military action by the coalition forces in Iraq. This situation has continued for the last four years. In an initiative to ensure the safety and security of the elected government, and the ordinary citizens of Iraq, President Bush has decided to send 21,500 additional American military forces to Iraq (Abramowitz & Wright, 2007). Overview of the Coalition Force Status in Iraq: More than thirty countries contributed to the coalition force that went into Iraq, but the bulk of the contribution was from the United States. Taking into consideration troop rotation there are approximately 133,000 coalition forces in Iraq. The strength of the American forces is 112,000 making the United States the largest single contributor to the coalition force in Iraq. The American forces also share the greatest responsibility in Iraq. All operations against insurgency and for security purposes are led by the American forces, except for the south-east of the country, where the British forces take up theses responsibilities (Coalition troops in Iraq). In addition to anti-insurgency operations and responsibility for security in the country, the American forces also are responsible of preventing infiltration through the extensive borders of the country with nations that are inimical to the coalition force efforts in Iraq, and hence support insurgency in Iraq. American forces are also responsible for the training of the nascent Iraqi security forces top make them an effective force to take over the responsibilities of the coalition force. Hence the American forces have large, and multiple roles to play in Iraq. In short what all this means is that the effectiveness of the coalition force in most of Iraq to meeting the current role of safety and security of the people of Iraq, is dependant on the strength and efficiency of the American forces that are part of the coalition forces present in Iraq (Williams, 2004). The military planners had requested 350,000 strong military force before the start of the war, for the objectives planned for it. It needs to be kept in mind that this force strength was planned, when the force of the insurgency with Saddam’s overthrow was underestimated. One of the earliest criticisms of the war planning lies in the decision to cut the force strength to less than half of what the military planners believed was the requirement to achieve their objectives. So at the outset there was a compromise in the size of the coalition force that was sent to Iraq. This has led to speculation as to whether a coalition force of the size, as planned by the military think tank would have led to a more safety and security in Iraq, than what the current coalition force are capable of proving in the face of all their responsibilities (Gordon & Trainor, 2006). The addition of 21,500 troops augments the current coalition force strength, and would contribute to the providing additional safety and security in Iraq. Security and Safety Threats in Iraq: To understand what is required to establish safety and security for the people of Iraq, it is essential to evaluate what the threats to security and safety are, and where they emanate from. The two essential factors that contribute to safety and security in Iraq are insurgency and sectarian strife. In June 2004 administration of Iraq was handed over to the Coalition Provisional Authority by the coalition forces that were in occupation of Iraq. The main threat to security and safety in Iraq at that time was insurgency. The insurgency was against the presence of occupation forces, and against the Coalition Provisional Authority. Containment of this threat to security, the elections for the Transitional Government, and the smooth takeover of the administration in December 2005 were the main concerns of the coalition force. (Iraq: political and security issues at handover). The coalition forces were hard pressed to contain insurgency, when another threat to the security and safety of the people of Iraq would emerge in the form of sectarian violence. Sectarian violence was marginal prior to the Coalition Provisional Authority. It started rearing its head with the political ambitions of the different sects coming to the forefront during the elections for the Transitional Government, and established itself after the Transitional Government took over the administration. Sectarian violence has become so rampant that it has become much more significant. Insurgency received support from a minority of the population, while sectarian violence threatens to engulf almost the whole population of Iraq with violence and bloodshed. Containing this challenge in preventing the country from collapsing into civil war is the major security challenge that the coalition forces in Iraq currently face, and this needs more American forces (Trejos, 2006). Insurgency in Iraq: The Sunnis in Iraq constitute a minority in Iraq, but were the ruling elite, and through Saddaam Hussein enjoyed an even greater dominance of Iraq. Saddam Hussein’s defeat and his overthrow by the coalition forces left a segment of the Sunnis discontented. Saddaam Hussein and a major portion of his ruling elite were not captured initially by the coalition forces, and were able to start the initial insurgency against the coalition forces. The arrival of terrorist leader Abu Musab al Zarqawi and the terrorists from outside Iraq were to add to the insurgency woes for the coalition forces. These terrorists were able to make use of the elite discontent to fan the flames of insurgency among the Sunni elite. However insurgency took root and spread fast because of the tribe and clan structure of society among the Sunnis. The targets of the insurgency operations were the coalition forces, with particular emphasis on the American military component as leaders of the coalition force, the Coalition Provisional Authority, and the Transitional Government. The basic element of a tribe and clan structure of society is kinship. Therefore a hurt to one member is a hurt to all members of the tribe and clan. The overthrow of Saddaam Hussein was to stoke the tribe and clan emotions of the Sunnis, and make them ripe for insurgency. The lack of enough forces meant that policing of entire Iraq was just not possible for the coalition forces. This meant several Sunni areas were left bereft of law and order. Without a central authority tribes and clans tend to become more aggressive, as a protection device. Networking the various tribes and clans into an aggrieved and aggressive force became easy for the insurgency leading to the growth of insurgency. Gradually certain Sunni dominated regions became hotbeds for insurgency, called the Sunni Triangle, which posed a challenge for the coalition forces with their limited force strength to contain. One Sunni hotbed would be contained, when another would spring up. When attention was turned to the latter insurgency hot bed, the originally snuffed out insurgency hotbed would rejuvenate. Containing insurgency has never been easy, and it was worse challenge in Iraq. There are no formal enemy organizations to engage in action and there is no simple way to distinguish between the civilian population and insurgents, particularly so, when a majority of the local population are sympathetic to the insurgents, as was in the Sunni Triangle. Counterinsurgency operations require a wide range of actions, which include the defeating of the main, regional, and local fighters of the insurgency. The supportive underground and auxiliary system has also to be disrupted. The leaders of the insurgency need to be located and arrested. This is not all. The final blow to insurgency is delivered only when fresh recruitment is dislocated, and the indoctrination process that enables mobilization of fresh insurgents and resources to continue the insurgency operations is removed. (McCallister, 2005). Not a simple task, and requires appropriate force strength. The coalition forces counter insurgency operations became long drawn, as the adequate strength to root out insurgency was missing. This brings us back to the original requirement of a much larger coalition force. A larger coalition force could possibly have dealt with the challenges required for containing insurgency in a less amount of time, so that they would have been placed to face the newer and bigger threat to the security and safety of the people of Iraq in the form of sectarian violence. Sectarian Violence in Iraq: Sectarian compulsions of the Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds came to the fore at the time of the elections for the Transitional Government, and from then have dominated the political scene in Iraq. These compulsions resulted from the jockeying for power in the control of the nation and in particular the oil rich regions of the troubled nation. Violence against one another was but a natural extension with not enough coalition forces available to contain the spark, as they were tied up with the larger immediate problem issue of tackling insurgency. Sectarian compulsions were translated into sectarian violence. The hasty and ham handed sentencing, and execution of Saddaam Hussein aggravated the situation. Sectarian violence has grown to become the more pressing of the two challenges that the coalition forces face in Iraq (Sentence underscores sectarian divisions in Iraq). The intensity of the sectarian violence is such that even the holy sites and shrines of the Sunnis and Shiites are not spared from the violence. Holy days of either side become suitable for increasing the impact of violence through bombs and indiscriminate firing. Either side bomb the holy shrines and sites of the other, which is met with reprisals. In between this conflict the terrorists find it easy to ignite further conflagration between the Sunnis and the Shiites, such that the level of sectarian violence is high leading to injuries and loss of life to the civilian population (Sectarian violence stalks Iraq on holy day). The growing intensity of sectarian violence is such that there is speculation that if left uncontained, it could grow into a full scale civil war in Iraq. The former Defense Secretary had warned about this possibility (Intelligence Brief: Sectarian Violence Moves Iraq Closer to Civil War). It is against this background that the concern of the coalition forces turned to containment of sectarian strife in Iraq. The safety and security of the capital Baghdad, which has been witnessing increasing sectarian violence is the initial target of the coalition forces. A change of strategy is also a part of the offensive against sectarian violence in Baghdad. Formerly coalition forces would take an area concern briefly, but not hold it. The current strategy for Baghdad involves not only the taking of security threatened areas of Baghdad, but also holding it. Such a strategy requires increased strength of the coalition forces. It is against this background that the decision was taken to send in 21,500 more ground forces to beef up the strength of the coalition forces in tackling sectarian strife without hampering the counter insurgency operations in place already. Denying this extra force to Iraq would lead to the coalition forces being stretched thin on the ground in Iraq. This could lead to three consequences. The first is that the drive to contain sectarian strife would flounder. The second is that insurgency would become more rampant. Finally the coalition forces with their stretched resources would start taking heavier casualties. Thus denying the extra forces for the containment of sectarian strife would lead to increased security and safety risks for the people of Iraq (Loyn, 2007). More Troops Increases the Safety and Security in Iraq: The responsibility of rebuilding a failed state is a challenging one, and more so when the challenges arise from insurgency and sectarian violence. The determinant of success for the coalition forces in meeting the responsibility for safety and security of the people of Iraq is the commitment that is shown towards them. The measure of this effort will be impacted on by three factors. These three factors are the extent of time given to them for completing the onerous task, the availability of ample military forces, and the financial resources required. The coalition forces went into Iraq with insufficient manpower for the undertaking the responsibilities of safety and security of the nation. Now they require support in the form of additional troops. Without his support it would not be surprising if the security and situation in Iraq cannot be maintained by the coalition forces (Diamond, 2005). The responsibility of the coalition forces is not focused just on safety and security of the nation. They have a multiple functions in ensuring the success for the transformation and reconstruction of Iraq. These additional functions include performing military police duties, contribution to civilian affairs, engineering support, and transport and logistic support. These duties mean diversion of manpower from the coalition forces towards these functions. This depletion of manpower would only make the coalition forces less effective in their role of providing safety and security. Hence additional troops are required for the coalition forces to effectively provide safety and security to the people of Iraq (Crane & Terrill, 2003). Conclusion: The coalition forces went into Iraq with less than the manpower that was required. The effect of this shortage was the stretching of the anti-insurgency efforts. Now they face an additional challenge in containing sectarian violence, which is threatening to tear the country apart. In the given circumstances in Iraq, more troops need to be dispatched, as it is only the dispatch of additional troops that can help in [providing safety and security to the people of Iraq. Literary References Abramowitz, M. & Wright, R. (2007). Bush to Add 21,500 Troops In an Effort to Stabilize Iraq. Retrieved March 1, 2007, from, washingtonpost.com. Web site: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/10/AR2007011002437.html Bush Announces Start of Iraq War. (2003). Retrieved March 1, 2007, from, australianpolitics.com. Web site: http://www.australianpolitics.com/news/2003/03/03-03-19.shtml Coalition troops in Iraq. (2004). Retrieved March 1, 2007, from, BBC NEWS, Web site: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3873359.stm Crane, C. C., & Terrill, W. A. (2003). RCONSTRUCTION IRAQ: INSIGHTS AND CHALLENGES, AND MISSIONS FOR MILITARY FORCES IN A POST-CONFLICT SCENARIO. Retrieved March 1, 2007, from, The Strategic Studies Institute. Web site: https://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB182.pdf Diamond, L. (2005). Building Democracy After Conflict: LESSONS FROM IRAQ. Journal of Democracy, 16(1), 9-23. Gordon, M. & Trainor, B. (2006). Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq. New York: Pantheon. Intelligence Brief: Sectarian Violence Moves Iraq Closer to Civil War. 2006. Retrieved March 1, 2007, from, POWER and INTERNET NEWS REPORT. Web site: http://www.pinr.com/report.php?ac=view_report&report_id=458&language_id=1 Iraq: political and security issues at handover. (2004). Retrieved March 1, 2007, from, HOUSE OF COMMONS LIBRARY. Web site: http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp2004/rp04-058.pdf Loyn, D. (2007). How the US plans to ’retake’ Baghdad’. Retrieved March 1, 2007, from, BBC NEWS. Web site: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6370109.stm McCallister, S. W. (2005). The Iraqi insurgency: Anatomy of a tribal rebellion. Retrieved March 1, 2007, from, first Monday. Web site: http://www.firstmonday.dk/issues/issue10_3/mac/index.html Sectarian violence stalks Iraq on holy day. (2006). Retrieved March 1, 2007, from, CNN.com. Web site: http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/02/23/iraq.main/index.html Sentence underscores sectarian divisions in Iraq. (2006). Retrieved March 1, 2007, from, CBC News. Web site: http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2006/11/05/saddam-reaction.html Trejos, N. (2006). U.S. Military Predicts Rising Violence In Iraq. Retrieved March 1, 2007, from, washingtonpost.com. Web site: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/11/28/AR2006112800319.html Williams, R. (2004). Sanchez Says Security Improving, But More Work Needed. Retrieved March 1, 2007, from, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE. Web site: http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2004/n03112004_200403113.html Read More