Moral Judgment or Emotions versus Reason - Essay Example

Moral judgment; emotions vs. reason Student’s Name: Instructor’s Name: Course Code & Name: Date of Submission Moral judgment; emotions vs. reason Abstract The discourses on the concept and nature of moral judgment have been prevalent in the realms of moral philosophy. In this regard, diverse proponents have made profound attempts to justify the applicability of either reason or emotions in the efforts to make proper and sound moral judgments. But perhaps the most rudimentary question in this discourse is the extent to which either reason or emotions guide the process of making moral judgment. We tend to ask ourselves whether moral judgments are usually primarily founded on reason or are they a basically generated by emotions. Monin, Pizarro, and Beer (2007) cited that the argument about the competing roles of emotions and reason in moral judgment has a long historical background going back at least two centuries. Nado, Kelly and Stich (2006) analyzed this maze by forwarding two proponents of both schools of thought, for instance, in support of the utility of reason in moral judgment, Kant determined that all moral prerequisites to be obtained from a basic principle of rationality (the categorical imperative). On the contrary, Hume in support of emotions applicability in moral judgment claimed that reason is ‘the slave of the passions’ which infers that moral judgment are derived from moral emotions. In this regard, this paper is a profound effort to analyze the recent findings on how moral judgments are made and test the plausibility of reliance on our moral intuitions to rationalize a moral theory. Keywords: Moral judgment, Reason, Emotions, Moral intuition, Moral theory It is apparent that both of the antagonistic schools of thought stated in the preceding section often propose divergent opinion on which is the most ideal process in making moral judgment. Against this background, it is prudent to define the concept of morality before embarking on the analysis of the utility of either reason or emotions. Morality The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2002) perceived morality from two distinct angles. Descriptively, morality can be put into utility to refer to some codes of conduct that are put forward by a society, groups such as religion or an individual for his or her own behavior. On the other hand, morality can be viewed normatively to refer to a code of conduct that, given particular conditions, would be forwarded by all rational persons. In this regard, the application of either reason or emotion in making a moral judgment comes into question. These tenets of both ideologies are explored in the subsequent section. Reason in moral judgment This is an assertive viewpoint in law centers, philosophy and psychology which is embedded on the presumption that majority of the moral judgments are generated by conscious decisions in which collectives or individuals progress directly from reasoning which is conscious towards delivering a moral verdict (Kaplow & Shavell, 2002). This is also a widely accepted view among the developmental psychologists who infer that stages in moral development are presumed to track the ability to express sound rationale for moral judgment. This is supported by a scheme by Kohlberg (1981) which determined that individuals attain the ultimate stage of moral maturity when they are endowed with the capacity to justify their moral decisions on the foundation of a central Kantian principle: treat individuals as ends and never as the means (Hauser et. al, 2007). However, there have been antagonistic approaches in psychology in regard to the role of reason in moral judgment. This is evidenced by Haidt (2001) who argued that when morality is put into question, emotions play an integral causal role. On the hand, Hauser et. al (2007) cited that other proponents of reason in the same field have argued on the contrary, for instance, Pizarro and Bloom (2003) defended the role of elevated reasoning as an imperative causal determinant of moral judgment. Hauser et. al (2007) concluded that a consequential likelihood is that sources of variations among individuals in values and beliefs which are consciously held impact on the nature of moral judgments and rationalizations designing a framework of homogeneity in response patterns among individuals. This is contrary to the emotional perspective which is founded on heterogeneity in beliefs and values which tend to affect the moral judgment of groups in a cross-cultural set-up. Moral judgment and emotions Hauser et. al. (2007) cited that this theoretical viewpoint infers that some of the moral judgments that we make in different situations emanate from unconscious psychological processes, thus characterized by intuition. In this regard, a substantial element of this intuition based perspective puts a robust emphasis on the integral role played by emotions in the process of making moral judgment. It is worth noting that the application of emotions while making moral judgments stem from how we unconsciously judge a specific situation when the term moral in this phenomenon is utilized as ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ or ‘good’ and ‘bad’. Prinz (2006) inferred that the evidence from contemporary studies point to the inference that moral judgments that are ordinary in nature have an emotional connotation. Prinz (2006) forwarded three theses to prove the inter-relation between moral judgment and emotions. Firstly, the author defended the presumption that emotions tend to co-occur with moral judgment and cited that it is an obvious fact that based on experience, when we judge that there has been a violation of a moral rule, we predictably have an emotional response which is characterized by negativity. After an analysis of diverse brain scans by different proponents, Prinz (2006) inferred that there is substantial empirical support to the pre-theoretical intuition that emotions often surface when individuals or collectives respond to widespread events that has some moral significance which includes but not limited to law-breaking, unfairness and rudeness. Nonetheless, there is no considerable establishment at this stage by the neuroscientists about the particular role played by emotions in these instances, whether they are mere impacts of moral judgment or they entail a more intimate involvement. This requires more evidence. The second thesis is that there is a wide range of emotional influence on moral judgment. In this regard, negative emotions can guide persons in making a more negative moral appraisal than they would have done otherwise. Subsequently, an individual’s negative feeling towards a certain phenomenon can lead to a negative moral appraisal regardless of any particular belief about some virtual embedment in which something is wrong (Prinz, 2006). This is best exemplified by a study on whether consensual incest between siblings is wrong. There was a consensus among all the respondents that this act is wrong based on the fact that it can result in the birth of children with birth defects. However, with the instigation of the potential use of birth control, some of the subjects inferred that this act can be okay under the special circumstances but majority of the subjects still maintained that the act is still wrong under any circumstances, simply because it is repulsing. In this study, it is evident that the moral judgment passed by majority of the subjects is founded on their negative feelings towards incest resulting to a negative moral appraisal. This pointed to the fact that emotions are sufficient for moral appraisal (Prinz, 2006). In addition, Pritz (2006) inferred there is robust evidence which points to the fact that emotions are necessary for moral development, mostly emanating from research on psychopaths. The final thesis is that emotions are essential for morals, a debate which emanates from anthropological records. In this case, Prinz (2006) suggested that if moral judgment were founded on something else rather than emotions, for instance observation or reason, then there is a high probability of cross-cultural moral convergence. This is because both observation and reason often result in convergence overtime. Nonetheless, there is widespread divergence of moral values in a cross-cultural analysis based on regional and ideological differences. However, the extensive divergence in morals across different cultures does not directly validate that emotions are an essential element of morality, but it provides indirect substantial evidence. This is based on the presumption that if moral values are not primarily propelled by observation and reason, then it is plausible to assume that they pivot on passions which are culturally instilled passions. Is the reliance on our moral intuition in justifying moral theory still plausible? This is a question that is bound to prompt a heated debate between the schools of thought analyzed in the preceding section. However, it is apparent that however hard we may try to ignore and discredit the role of emotions in moral judgment, there is in-depth evidence that points to the reliance on moral intuition in diverse situations. This phenomenon is manifest in diverse scenarios ranging from contemporary politics and religion. For instance, the raging debate between the conservatives and the democrats on issues like abortion are bound to be more inclined on emotions as opposed to reason when different individuals or groups are giving a moral verdict. Still in the same realm of politics, the popularity of a certain candidate in an election is bound to be influenced by emotions as opposed to reason among the electorates. This is whereby some section of the population may portray negative feelings towards a particular candidate based on their inherent perceptions, for instance, race, social background etc. In this regard, their response when confronted by the election ballot will not be purely based on reason but rather on emotions. Lastly, religion plays an imperative role in embedding the level of emotional inclination in moral judgment. This is based on what is categorized as right or wrong by a particular religious group. For instance, despite the diverse justifications that can be proposed by the pro-abortion wing towards its legalization in certain states, citing the mother’s health and the freedom of individual decision, this will fall on deaf ears among the religious groups because according to them, killing an innocent life is wrong despite any rationale that is proposed supporting it. In this regard, the moral judgments in the religious realms are primarily based on emotions as opposed to reason. Conclusion It is apparent that the reliance moral intuition is still plausible in justifying a moral theory in different life situations. However, one ought to be cautious about where the utility of emotions in moral judgment ends prompting the use of reason in order to avoid compromising some fundamentals in certain fields like legal justice. References Haidt, J., (2001). The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral Judgment. Psychological Review, 108, 814 – 834. Hauser, M., Cushman, F., Young, L., Jin RK., &Mikhail, J. 2007, A Dissociation Between Moral Judgments and Justifications, Cambridge: Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Kaplow, L., & Shavell, S.,(2002). Fairness versus Welfare. Harvard University Press: Cambridge. Monin, B., Pizarro, D.A., & BeerJ.S., (2007). Deciding Versus Reacting: Conceptions of Moral Judgment and the Reason-Affect Debate. Review of General Psychology, 11(2), 99-111. Nado, J., Kelly D,. & Stich, S., (2006). Moral Judgment.New Jersey: Rutgers University. Prinz, J. (2006).The Emotional Basis of Moral Judgments. Philosophical Explorations, 9(1), 29- 43. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2002). The Definition of Morality, Retrieved April 21, 2012, fromhttp://plato.stanford.edu/cgi-bin/encyclopedia/archinfo.cgi?entry=morality-definition. Read More