Are the United States and Its Allies Winning the War in Afghanistan - Essay Example

Student Name: Tutor: Title: Are the United States and its allies winning the war in Afghanistan? Course: Are the United States and its allies winning the war in Afghanistan? Introduction The United States win in Afghanistan meant achieving the objectives that led to the invasion of Afghanistan. These objectives include disrupting, defeating, and dismantling Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan as well as Pakistan using military means in order to occasion circumstances for transition; lead to civil democratic rule; and ensure partnership with Pakistan. United States and its allies invaded Afghanistan in 2001 following September 11 terrorists’ attacks that ended many innocent lives. This was a devastating terror attack allegedly planned by al-Qaeda king-pin, Osama bin Laden. President Bush demanded the handover of Osama and expelling of al-Qaeda from Afghanistan. The Taliban asked bin Laden to leave but they did not expel him for absence of evidence of his engagement in 9/11 attacks. The United States could not hear any of this and declined to negotiate. Operation Enduring Freedom was launched by the U.S. on 7th November 2001 and the United Kingdom was the first ally to take part in the invasion. They were later joined by other forces and the Northern Alliance (Richard, 2005, p.19). On 10th November President Bush flew to New York and addresses the United Nations. He explained that the United States was not the only country in danger of other attacks but also other countries in the world. Bush sentiments had an impact of rallying the world to support the American course in Afghanistan. This support included material assistance from Italy, France, Japan, Germany, as well as other countries (Lansford, 2011, p.37). More than ten years since the invasion of Afghanistan down the line and the primary objectives of the action has not been achieved. This essay argues that the objectives set by United States have not been achieved and the country has been dragged into unending war with a resilient, unpredictable enemy. Discussion United States had to get allies to back its plan of invasion. Of all the allies who supported the United States invasion of Afghanistan, none was more eager or quicker to do so as compared to Australia. The Australian prime minister at that time, John Howard was present in Washington on September 11th as a witness to the America’s emotional devastation after the attacks. The anguish propelled a personal reaction that was changed into a policy within a moment. In a span of 24 hours Howard committed Australia to war which had not even been declared (Maloney, 2005, p.139). Special Air Service Regiment soldiers from Australia were some of the first foreigners to get into Afghanistan, just after the United States and British Special Forces. 1000 Australian soldiers were deployed and they needed a budget of $1.1 billion from 2001-2002. Like the United States, the Australian government insisted that it did not want to be engaged in long-term fighting, nation –building or reconstruction; it thought it was a quick surgical operation (Morelli, 2009, p.4). The Australian government and the Bush administration underestimated the task ahead of them. The Northern Alliance and U.S. objectives began to drift apart. The United States was obsessed with searching for bin Laden while the Northern Alliance was interested in demolishing the Taliban (Kalyvas, 2006, p.258). The United Nations on December 2001 convened the Bonn Conference. However, the Taliban were not involved. Four opposition groups from Afghanistan took part in the conference. Observers were representatives from neighboring countries and other major countries. The UN Security Council condemned the Taliban for making Afghanistan a safe haven for Al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, and supported the course to oust the Taliban regime. The situation in Afghanistan had painted grim picture. The World Food Programme resumed its activities in Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban. They had abandoned their supplies after the bombing began. Hardly a year had elapsed after deploying its forces in Afghanistan than Australia declared that it would withdraw its forces. The Human Rights Watch had described in details the precarious situation in Afghanistan. Australian personnel had been withdrawn from Afghanistan by the end of 2002 making it the first country to withdraw. Australia re-deployed its personnel in 2006. The United Forces invaded Afghanistan to force out of power the Taliban regime. On the 7th October 2001 the United States forces and its allies officially launched the invasion with the US and British forces carrying out the airstrike campaigns in the enemy territory (Sinno, 2008, p.254). By mid-November the city of Kabul was taken. The Taliban proved to be very resilient. The remnants of Taliban and al-Qaeda ran to the rugged terrain of eastern Afghanistan, largely in Tora Bora. By 2002 there were about seven thousand troops in Afghanistan supported by NATO countries including Australia and the United Kingdom among other allies. It is believed that it is during this time that Osama bin Laden, the terrorist mastermind, flew to Pakistan in the course of the battle. NATO and the U.S. launched Anaconda operation in March 2002 targeting to demolish any Taliban and al-Qaeda forces in the mountainous region (Borger, 2004, p.9).  These continued as the United States and allied forces planned to withdraw from the territory of Afghanistan by 2014. While the world fixed its attention on the impending war in Iraq in 2003, the resurgence of Taliban in Afghanistan was gaining ground. Osama had encouraged his followers to engage the enemies’ forces into a long and continuous battle that is equally exhaustive (Keppel, Jean-Pierre & Ghazaleh, 2008). Omar Mullah, the Taliban leader and his council moved to Quetta which is in south-west Pakistan and changed Pashtunabad suburb into a small Taliban state. The work in Afghanistan entailed a clear plan by the U.S. and allied forces. By 2006, the United States forces handed over the security of Afghanistan to NATO-deployed forces through integrating twelve thousand of their twenty thousand soldiers with 20,000 soldiers from NATO. The other US forces kept on with the task of searching for Al-Qaeda militants. The military of Canada assumed leadership and continued with offensive operation in parts that Taliban guerrillas has occupied. Despite the death of their soldiers, the American, the British and Canadian forces killed more than one thousand Taliban insurgents and compelled many more to retreat. Some of these insurgents have regrouped and caused more challenges to NATO and American troops on the ground (Saikal, 2010, p.67). The United States and allied forces in Afghanistan are in the last preparation of handing over the mandate of security to Afghan security forces. The president of the United States Barrack Obama has reiterated that the successes in the battlefield since 2009 have set the stage for the transition and the war has to come to an end that is responsible. However, the war will not end this year. The role of the United States may end in part or in whole but the war is likely to continue and its final outcome is not at all known (Armitage & Markey, 2010, p.3).The United States and its allies like Australia remain entangled in a conflict that is showing no signs of coming to an end. As western forces prepare to withdraw and handover to the Afghanistan security forces, the stalemate is becoming worse and the Afghanistan government is staring into the possibility of state collapse, chance of Taliban grabbing back power, or unprecedented civil strife. Felbab-Brown (2012, p.5) observes that this dictates a possibility of the war not coming to an end in anyway. There was not any war plan for Afghanistan following the September 9/11 attacks. There was no specified target identified by the American troops as they made their way to Afghanistan after the 9/11 attacks. If the prevailing circumstances persist, the United States combat troops are most likely to leave behind a huge stalemate pitting the Taliban and the Afghanistan government. The security forces in Afghanistan are able to counter the deadlock so long as the United States Congress provides the multibillion-dollar annual bills that are needed to sustain the fighting. The battle will be transformed into a contest between the Taliban and the Congress (Girardet, 2011, p.416). The Congress has to be patient as compared to the Taliban but if they despair and shrink funding, the country might slide back into anarchy. The war will then be lost and the aims of the United States in Afghanistan forfeited. The strategy to hand off the responsibility to security to the government of Afghanistan without funding will not bring the war to an end that is responsible. The Obama administration recognizes the setbacks like increase in attacks by security forces of Afghanistan on ISAF and U.S. troops, the collapse of United States negotiations with Taliban insurgents, and the apparent murder of 16 civilians in the province of Kandahar by Army sergeant (Biddle, 2008, p.23) White House has reiterated that the strategy being applied in Afghanistan is working. There has been a lot of skepticism with regard to the plan of U.S. in Afghanistan. Public opinion has demonstrated that the public is growing skeptical with regard to the war strategy being applied by the United States and its allies in Afghanistan and the imminence of success. Many Americans have the opinion that the U.S. is not closer to winning the war in Afghanistan. Many people have called for the withdrawal of international troops long before the 2014 deadline. There are two practical alternatives to the stalemate but none of them seem to be pleasant. Maley (2009, p.288) reiterates that there should be intensity with regard to negotiations with the Taliban insurgents. This is not easy, but it provides a way towards lasting peace in Afghanistan. The Obama administration has engaged in such peace negotiations for more than a year but they have not spent the political resources required for the final deal. An agreement the United States could cope with will need tricky and demanding political engagement both in New York and Kabul, yet this has not been followed by the administration. There is also the suggestion of training Afghan security forces and leaving them in charge, or resorting to a regional solution. A regional solution will involve neighboring countries and regional actors that can bring stability to Afghanistan. Involvement of its neighbors can assist in restoring order in the country as many observers have suggested. Pakistan has always offered a hideout for the Taliban leaders and its fear of India’s dominance in the region has led to this action. Offering training to Afghan forces will cost $12 Million in one year alone, and cannot be an assurance for future loyalty to the Afghanistan government. The U.S. had a clear a plan when it entered Afghanistan. The United States has known for a long time that is has no hope of grinding the Taliban, and it will be forced to go for a compromise political agreement with an indigenous insurgency that persistently remain relevant for having survived one of the longest United States military assault in history. The United States had wished by 2009 to dictate the terms to compel and compromise the Taliban insurgents to look for a place in the constitutional order in the aftermath of NATO invasion and acknowledge Karzai government that it has long termed as puppets (Bowman, 2010, p.66). This was the reasoning behind the United States sending additional troops of 30,000 forces into the heartland of Taliban. The action was aimed at forcing the Taliban to accept peace on terms of the Washington. The surge subsided when the Taliban seemed less smitten to agree with the United States terms as the departure of international forces in 2014 nears. Tomsen (2011, p.565) forecasts that aid to Afghanistan will get even challenging and hard to defend following cases of corruption in Afghanistan, Afghan protests following accidental burning of Koran, and Afghan president insulting American sensibilities in order to play local politics reported in Afghan newspapers. Congressional support which is very crucial will wane owing to this sporadic occurrence. It was not be easy to sustain the military support to Afghanistan security forces with such events being reported from time to time. The Afghan government has a very challenging task ahead of it. The United States and allied forces in the battlefield in Afghanistan are on the verge of handing over the mandate to the Afghan security forces. However, the original plan was to use a troop surge to clear the insurgent from crucial terrain and as well as the Taliban so that they will be devastated when the Afghan took charge. This did not occur. Boon and Huq (2011, p.212) explain that the troops surge only made significant progress, but the strict deadlines for withdrawal of U.S. troops as well as other international forces has made insurgent to remain in control of substantial territory that they would not relinquish even after 2014. Consequently, the Afghan security forces will inherit a very demanding security challenge posed by the Taliban insurgents. The management of U.S. congressional politics surrounding the sustenance of Afghan security forces after the transition was deemed feasible back then when the U.S. had the assumption that a troop surge prior to the transition would force the Taliban to glide into oblivion (Bergen, 2011, p.174). The U.S. had to still support the security forces of Afghanistan heavily financially for the war to have come to a responsible end. There are a number of options that the U.S. has considered in its policy in Afghanistan. If the United States adheres to it 2014 deadline of withdrawing combat troops then it will leave Afghanistan embroiled in an increasing civil war. The United States and its allies have not won the war in Afghanistan since they had hoped to destroy the Taliban completely (Lustick, 2006, p.83).   The best option is to leave the Afghan combat troops to get a political solution. The insurgency rise in Afghanistan is no longer a consideration to the departure of United States and its allies. They have to pull out and offer support through financial means and limited air bases in the area. Osama predicted that the U.S. will not stomach casualties and was unwilling to deploy its full military strength. Kotkin (2009, p.13) states that the basic plan and objectives after the fall of the Taliban in Afghanistan was rapid and transformational national building. Such an accomplishment is not possible and many people are skeptical that the feasibility of the original plan and if it will ever come to pass. A stable outcome has not been realized more than a decade after United States and its allies invaded Afghanistan. Nevertheless, democracy has been established and Afghans can now elect their leaders through the ballot. Insecurity is still a problem and the threat of Taliban insurgency is alive. Conclusion The United States and its allies have done everything they could to stabilize Afghanistan by destroying Taliban insurgency and ensuring peaceful transition to civilian government. A sustainable resolution will be support Kabul government financially and military support from nearby bases. The original objectives of the United States and its allies seem to be a mirage and a political solution that will involve opposing parties in Afghanistan has to be considered. It is accurate to say that the United States has not won the war in Afghanistan since the set objectives have not been accomplished. Safe for a democratic election process there are still many cases of insecurity and attacks from Taliban insurgents. Many American soldiers and soldiers from its allies have lost their lives in the line of duty. Americans are angry at the continued loss of lives of their beloved ones in a foreign country. Millions are still being poured into Afghanistan by the United States and its allies whereas the primary objectives of the invasion have not been accomplished. Lasting peace may be through a political engagement by the warring parties. As they United States keeps to its plan of pulling out its forces from Afghanistan by the end of 2014, lasting peace is not an obstacle and the danger of Taliban and al-Qaeda regrouping and arming themselves in order to cause more havoc is imminent. 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