Theories of Peace and Conflict: Nuclear Deterrence Theory - Coursework Example

Theories of peace and conflict: Nuclear Deterrence Theory Introduction Deterrence is a strategic concept that is based on international relations and on realism. Precisely, an act of deterrence aims at preventing an enemy from acting in a given way and convincing them to retreat, failure to which they will face undesirable and severe consequences. Deterrence theory tries to give an explanation of two or more nations that threaten to retaliate if attacked (Riet, 2011). Deriving from this is the concept of nuclear deterrence theory which explains a situation whereby a state possessing nuclear weapons sufficient to severely decimate or destroy the military or the civilian population of an enemy state will deter the enemy from attacking, (Riet, 2011). In the past, nuclear weapon was seen as a last weapon due to its ability to bring decisive defeat against a military opponent during warfare. This was proven during the Second World War when United States dropped atomic bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki rendering Japanese army unable to proceed with the war. After the end the Second World War in 1945, it was viewed that it would be too dangerous to use nuclear weapons in battle and they needed to be avoided later. But as Ilenda, (2009) explains, the application of the nuclear weapons during Second World War led to a situation in which United States was free to threaten other nations from attacking or threatening them. By then, United States was enjoying monopoly over the possession of nuclear weapons until 1949 when the USSR made their first nuclear weapon. This was followed by a period of “cold war” in which USA and the USSR were involved in a complex game of nuclear deterrence. Possession of nuclear weapons signified that the two states had capability of inflicting “unacceptable damage” to each other or to another nation. According to Ilenda, (2009), this formed the basis of “a stable world order” since no country would wish to spark a nuclear warfare that would result into complete annihilation of their politically significant regions. But the cold war associated with deterrence strategies was criticized worldwide and eventually concluded by 1991 and an era based on diplomatic relations was born. As such, it was marked as the end of application of the nuclear deterrence theory. However as Ilenda, (2009) points out, nuclear power may not be the cornerstone behind the current great power diplomacy, but it remains an important consideration for policy makers owing to its applicability in the contemporary world. As such, this paper suggests that, though a cold warfare nuclear standoff that is symmetric in nature may no longer be applicable, nuclear deterrence strategies which are rooted in cold war assumptions are still applicable. Precisely, this paper suggests that the theory of nuclear deterrence is still applicable in the contemporary society as it shall be explained. Discussion Kotarski, (not dated, p. 4) opines that, it would quite naive to make an assumption that twenty-first century actors especially those classified as “rogue states” such as North Korea and Iran will act consistently with the assumptions of the cold war deterrence theory. The term “rogue states” was established by United States referring to regimes that seem to be dangerous to the interests of Americans and also the interests of “free world.” But as Baylis (2007, p 214) argues, the countries that are singled out as rogue states have recognizable leadership structure, and thus they are bound by the same rules that bind other nations. According to Baylis, such nations have “territory rife with potential targets and goals that relate to their position in international political system.” Josiane Gabel (as cited in Kotarski, not dated, p. 21), further explains that “the threat of nuclear retribution by the United States even with its existing force structure, can always deter another state because the costs are too high for even the most reckless regimes to risk an attack or transfer weapons of mass destruction to terrorist groups.” In addition, Jasen Castilo (as cited in Kotarski, not dated, p. 21) agrees with this argument and suggests further that state actors’ posses widely known addresses unlike non-state actors who may lack any. Also, Jasen explains further that states usually posses a lot of valuable assets, including the lives of the ruling elite, unlike non-state actors who posses few if any assets in foreign countries. In view of this, is would be difficult for a leader of a stable regime to spark war requiring the use of nuclear weapons as compared to non-state actors. According to Kotarski, (not dated, p. 22) one of the recent concerns for policy makers is that “rogue states” are likely to provide terrorist groups with weapons of mass destruction so as to avoid retaliation themselves. For example, Castillo (as cited in Kotarski, not dated, p. 22) claims that, “the current regime in Tehran maintains a close relationship with both the Lebanese Hezbollah group and Palestinian Hamas. These associations have aroused fears in Washington that once Iran acquires nuclear weapons it might also share them with its terrorist clients”. In such a scenario, a state may give assistant to non-state actors hoping that it will be impossible for the targeted state to trace the original owner of the weapons. But as Anders Corr (as cited in Kotarski, not dated, p. 23) notes, such a problem can be solved as both nuclear terror and the sponsoring state can be deterred through international tagging and registration of fissile materials. According to Corr, such a move would ensure that states that fear the possibility of being blamed falsely to have been involved in sponsoring a terrorist attack register their fissile materials. Having done so, it would be easy to prove that fissile materials of a suspected state did not or was used in an attack. According to Durr, C. W., (2002 p. 6), other than established regimes, it is possible to apply nuclear deterrence strategies in preventing non-state actors such as the Al Qaeda group from perpetrating terrorism attacks. It is vital to note that deterrence can be achieved through denial or punishment. Denial is always applicable when dealing with a non-state actor while punishment is applied when the target is a state or a regime power sponsoring a terrorist group. By visiting statements that were made by Osama Bin Laden and the major conditions for a deterrence relationship, it will be easy to understand that a nuclear deterrence relationship between a state and a non-state actor could emerge under certain circumstances (Whitmore,1998). This can be illustrated using the perspective of United States fight against the Al Qaeda group. A statement taken from December 22 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction stated that “the United States will continue to make clear that it reserves the right to respond with overwhelming force-including through resort to all of our options- to the use of weapons of Mass Destruction against the United States, Our forces abroad, and friends and allies” (Malhotra, 2010) This implies that the United States has the willingness and means of using all weapons against all kinds of attacks including nuclear attacks. In dealing with such a group, a state may enhance deterrence strategy threatening to punish states that are found to be involved in assisting non-state actors by harbouring, sponsoring or tolerating the terror groups. Though such a form of deterrence is not direct to a specific at non-state group, its impact will be felt since such groups will have minimal safe opportunities to thrive, (Whitmore,1998). From the earlier statement by the United States administration and the invasion of shows in Afghanistan, it is clear that this is already a US policy. Taking from the perspective of the Al Qaeda group, the formation of a deterrence relationship with United States seems to be more likely to happen. When we give consideration to a statement made by the Al Qaeda that “we have chemical and nuclear weapons and if America used them against us, we reserve the right to use them”, we can realise that there is a basis for the formation of asymmetric deterrence relationship as initiated by the non-state group (Durr, 2002, p. 6). The above statement clearly shows an intention of entering into a deterrence relationship. We can also give a similar verdict to the earlier mentioned statement made by the United States. In short, we can argue that United States and the Al Qaeda group are constantly involved in a deterrence relationship. Conclusion Though nuclear deterrence strategies were marked to have ended by early in 1990’s, it is remarkable that the underlying concepts behind the nuclear deterrence theory remain in application. As it has been demonstrated, the emerging challenges and threats faced by policy makers can still be tackled using nuclear deterrence strategy among other available means. This discussion demonstrates that, though a cold war nuclear standoff that is symmetric in nature may no longer be applicable, nuclear deterrence strategies which are rooted in cold war assumptions are still applicable. As it has been demonstrated, it is possible that for a leader who places very high value to the lives of his people is unlikely to make an attack using nuclear weapons if retaliation of the same kind is expected. This is because the fear of punishment from such an act may outweigh the expected benefits in the mind of a leader. In summary, the current great power diplomacy may not be attributed to nuclear deterrence as it was during the cold war but it is certainly applicable during the post-cold war world. In this regard, I think that it would be excessive to argue that nuclear deterrence totally has no place in the twenty-first century. References Baylis, J., (2007), Strategy in the contemporary world: an introduction to strategic studies, Oxford University Press, NY. New York Bock, T., (2008), Is there a role for nuclear weapons in the post-cold war error? Retrieved from, http://www.atlantic-community.org/app/webroot/files/articlepdf/Tobias%20Bock%20-%20Is%20There%20a%20Role%20for%20Nuclear%20Weapons%20in%20the%20Post-Cold%20War%20Era.pdf Durr, C. W., (2002), Nuclear deterrence in the third millennium Retrieved from http://www.iwar.org.uk/military/resources/nuclear/Durr_C_W_02.pdf Ilenda, R. K., (2009), What are the challenges to Nuclear Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age? Retrieved from http://www.e-ir.info/?p=2183 Kotarski, K., (not dated), Deterring the undeterrable? Proliferation concerns in a world of “Rogue States” and Non- State Actors, retrieved from http://centreforforeignpolicystudies.dal.ca/pdf/gradsymp06/Kotarski.pdf Malhotra, A., (2010), Peace conflict:Re-examining the Nuclear Deterrence Theory, Retrieved from http://www.monitor.upeace.org/innerpg.cfm?id_article=752 Riet, R. V., (2011), Nuclear Deterrence Theory: still alive and kicking retrieved from http://wagingpeacetoday.blogspot.com/2011/06/nuclear-deterrence-theory-still-alive.html Whitmore, D. C., (1998), Revisiting nuclear deterrence theory Retrieved from http://abolishnukes.com/short_essays/deterrence_theory_whitmore.html Read More