The Tragedy of the Commons: Land Tenure in Papua New Guinea - Case Study Example

Tragedy of the Commons Tragedy of the commons is a concept explained as a dilemma that arises from the situation where multiple individuals acting solely, independently and rationally and with a consultation of their own self-interest ultimately deplete a limited resource, which is shared among them (Garrett 2003). This happens even when it is clear to the people sharing the resource that it is not in wise to deplete the resource in an effort for long-term interest (Anderson 2006, p. 23 - 28). This dilemma has been applied in many cases and was preliminary described in an article by Garrett Hardin titled "The Tragedy of the Commons." The common theory has also featured commonly within the works of outstanding scholars who apply the concept of sustainable development, environmental protection and meshing economic growth (Armitage 2001, p. 12 – 20). This paper applies this concept within the context of the customary land in Papua New Guinea delivering explanations as to the arguments related to this debate. The concept of Tragedy of the commons applies effectively in Papua Guinea, but before understanding how it does, it is better to understand the customary land across the same community (Garrett 2003). The term “Customary Land " which has been evident and mostly common across Papua Guinea refers to Land, which is not owned by the state but owned by the Indigenous People of the community residing in Papua New Guinea (Van 2001, p. 1440 - 1449). The interest and ownership rights of this land are regulated mainly by a central body and the customs within this community. In Papua New Guinea particularly in relation to the vast community, the Customary Land holding Unit is termed as the Clan and Clan members have ownership rights, which they acquire through inheritance (Armitage 2001, p. 12 – 20). Precisely, there are two Customary Land tenure practice within the community in Papua New Guinea through which individuals of the clan acquire rights of ownership to land through family inheritance (Armitage, Bannerman and Ogisi 1998, p. 194 – 204). The practices include Patrilineal and Matrilineal. Through inheritance, this gives all members of that clan the right to use land the way they wish, and this is where the concept of tragedy of the commons come in (Anderson 2006, p. 23 - 28). For Patrilineal inheritance, the rights of ownership are bestowed on the male ancestor and are enjoyed by the male lineage (Garrett 2003). Out of this, every male within that clan works towards using the land and it draws some form of competition (Van 2001, p. 1440 - 1449). Same case applies within the matrilineal inheritance where the rights of ownership are bestowed on the female ancestor and passes down to the entire female lineage (Van 2009, p. 40 - 43). It is worth noting that Customary Land in Papua New Guinea, comprises of 97% of the land mass, and it is the one which continues to sustain the subsistence economy (Angus 2008). However, it is essential to notice that a vast of this land is either unutilized or inaccessible (Lakau 1995, p. 2). Most of this land is used partly for logging and timber activities, petroleum and mines purposes. From this, it means that the little land available is what is used by the many people within the community (Armitage, Bannerman and Ogisi 1998, p. 194 – 204). This creates heavy competition within the community where individuals fight for the little resources with each having the urge to exploit what is available (Van 2009, p. 40 - 43). The result of this is having the resources over exploited and leading to a poorly practiced sustainable development within the community (John 2000, p. 917 – 927). Currently, within the Papua Guinea system of land, there is no established or written law which governs or even regulates land use (Hardin 1994, p. 199 - 204). It therefore, opens up the use of customary land in any way people within the system wish, and this has been drawing down the resources as a result of mismanagement and misuse for personal gains (Foddy, Smithson, Schneider and Hogg 1999, p. 354 - 367). It is a situation which has created a commons dilemma (Armitage 2001, p. 12 – 20). Basing on the arguments from this concept, this is described as a particular class of social dilemma where the short-term selfish interests of individuals are at odds and at logger heads with long-term interests of a, particular group. The case of customary land in Papua New Guinea is on point to develop this argument of commons dilemma (Armitage, Bannerman and Ogisi 1998, p. 194 – 204). This is because land within this community has been reported as depleting of resources and because people have misused the land for unfriendly uses including deforestation, burning of bushes and other clearance methods in efforts to create space for residential purposes (Van 2009, p. 40 - 43). It is noted that when an interest for development is clear within this system particularly for a piece of land, the system does not have a Land Act which would come into play and ensure a legal interest creation and proper registration of the same (Anderson 2006, p. 23 - 28). Therefore, the situation has been worsening by day across Papua Guinea and land is becoming a threatened resource (Manji 2006, p. 76 – 89). Commons dilemma researchers facilitated principal studies to establish the conditions under which particular communities or even groups are likely to under- use or over-harvest particular resources in the field (Angus 2008). These researchers came up with Research programs strategic, motivational, and structural factors, which are valued as contributing to the management or mismanagement of the commons (Ostrom 1990, p. 47 – 59). The application of these factors has been apparent in the case of customary land, in Papua New Guinea. Looking at the case in point, Papua Guinea faces a monumental challenge resulting from the commons in land ownership, and this might in future develop into a disaster if not controlled. The inevitable within Papua Guinea is fast approaching (Anderson 2006, p. 23 - 28). Currently, as per the Department of Physical Planning, and Lands in the country, land is already marked as fully utilized and this is because of urban expansion (Van 2001, p. 1440 - 1449). The country’s urban areas are expanding at an alarming rates and this are threatening the little land left for subsistence and which individuals within the community depend on for survival (Angus 2008). Therefore, recently, the government is being forced to reconcile the established but conflicting policies used to protect indigenous interests and in efforts to facilitate economic development (Armitage 2001, p. 12 – 20). With the advancing flagging national economy, the best thing that the state can do is to shift this balance that would foster the development through the implementation of a land mobilization strategy that in design would capitalize on customary land and making it a valuable economic asset (Anderson 2006, p. 23 - 28). This way, it would be the best strategy to enhance controls over the land and prevent the challenges accompanying the tragedy of the commons (Armitage, Bannerman and Ogisi 1998, p. 194 – 204). Opening customary land up to alienation is the best solution for the government in handling the situation in guinea and promoting sustainable development (Ghimire 2001, p. 56 – 65). It is the only way that the government in Papua Guinea would necessitate the creation of a market for land that, given the diversity and quantity of resources that the particular lands represent, this will drive development of the country’s economy forward (Garrett 2003). Customary land tenure in Papua New Guinea is currently seen being viewed as a significant obstacle that challenges the development of a comprehensive land development program in the country (Angus 2008). This is because the concept of the tragedy of the commons applies within each individual clan that govern their own land according to their own laws (Foddy, Smithson, Schneider and Hogg 1999, p. 354 - 367). The customary land policies have made the developments a failure because it is quite complex in nature (Armitage 2001, p. 12 – 20). The complexity of the system is attributed solely to the fact that customary land in New Guinea is governed by national law as well as the customary law and this creates a contrast. With over eight hundred tribes within Papua New Guinea, certainly one would expect a complex system and one that is quite a task to control or manage (Armitage, Bannerman and Ogisi 1998, p. 194 – 204). The tribes have their own languages and operate on their own set of customary laws, which are a set of unwritten rules that govern any social activity within a particular tribe. With such a system, the tribes work on their own and respect no one’s laws but their own which makes it a complex system (Anderson 2006, p. 23 - 28). The tragedy of the commons, therefore, keeps persisting within these tribes and their customary land and with the informal principles governing land; the management practices vary widely (Hardin 1994, p. 199 - 204). References Anderson, T 2006, on the economic value of customary land in Papua New Guinea, Pacific Economic Bulletin, Volume 21(1) 23 - 28 online: http://peb.anu.edu.au/pdf/PEB21-1Anderson-focus.pdf Angus, I 2008, the Myth of the Tragedy of the Commons, Climate and Capitalism, August 25, http://climateandcapitalism.com/?p=513 Armitage, L 2001, Customary Land Tenure in Papua New Guinea: Status and Prospects, Proceedings of the International Association for the Study of Common Property Rights 2001 Pacific Regional Conference, QUT/Australian Property Institute, Brisbane, September 2001; p. 12 – 20 Armitage, L., Bannerman, S. and Ogisi, F 1998, Land resource management and customary title in Papua New Guinea: issues and prospects, in Al-Dabbagh M and Buschenhofen P (eds.), Proceedings of the 2 Huon Seminar – Resources for Science and Technology in Development, PNG University of Technology, p. 194 – 204 Foddy, M., Smithson, M., Schneider, S., and Hogg, M 1999, Resolving social dilemmas. 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