What Is the Strategic Value of Taiwan - Case Study Example

What is the Strategic Value of Taiwan Introduction The province of Taiwan has been used as an impediment to the eastward ambitions of China from early history and in recent history too. Taiwan continues to remain a painful thorn on the eastern body of mainland China. Chinese attempts to remove this thorn since the ascendancy of Communist China in 1949 have been baulked by American strategic interests in the Western Pacific Rim. The island of Taiwan, the P’eng-hu Archipelago of sixty four small islands to the west of Taiwan and twenty-one smaller islands close to Taiwan, totalling 35,981 square kilometres make up the separate province of Taiwan, which is separated from mainland China by different political ideologies and leaderships and the Straits of Taiwan in the South China Seas. Not all the islands constituting the province of Taiwan are inhabited. Many are uninhabited and in several islands military garrisons for the protection of Taiwan make up the resident population (1) In spite of the proximity to mainland China, the military might and its small size, Taiwan has remained defiant to Chinese threats and overtures, essentially from the American support received. In normal circumstances such a small territory in comparison to the enormous size of mainland China should not give sleepless nights to the Chinese leadership. Yet, this is a continuing reality for China. This fact stems from the strategic value of Taiwan to China. In essence, the strategic value of Taiwan to China is based on the geographical position of Taiwan. Geography of Taiwan The main island of the province of Taiwan is Taiwan. It has a length of 394 kilometres and a breadth of 144 kilometres, and looks almost like a tobacco leaf in shape. (2). Taiwan can be seen off the southeast coast of China, in between Japan and the Philippines in the Western Pacific. It is separated from mainland China by the width of the Taiwan Strait, which ranges from 180 kilometres at the maximum to 131 kilometres at the minimum. Taiwan constitutes 98% of the total land mass of the province of Taiwan. The other areas of importance in the province of Taiwan are Penghu or Pescadores, Kinmen or Quemoy and Matsu. Penghu is made up of 64 small sparsely populated islands. The Penghu archipelago lies in the middle of the Taiwan Strait that separates mainland China and Taiwan. The Kinmen group of islands lying southeast of the Fujian province of China are even closer to mainland China. Just over two kilometres separates mainland China from the nearest island in the Kinmen group of islands. The Matsu islands constitute the northern defensive perimeter of Taiwan. It lies just off the mouth of the Min River on the coast of mainland China. Donghsa and Taiping islands in the South China Sea are in the hands of Taiwan. This occupation has effectively established further claims of Taiwan to islands in the South China Sea and enhanced the strategic importance of Taiwan in the South China Sea. (3). Strategic Importance of the Geographic Position of Taiwan Expansion of Chinese Influence into the Western Pacific and South China Sea From the map of Taiwan (see Appendix – 1), a hostile Taiwan and its group of islands effectively block the free access of China to the South China Sea and East of China Sea, putting paid to any Chinese ambitions towards the Western Pacific Rim and Southeast Asia. In essence this geographic positioning of Taiwan is the reason for Taiwan being a painful thorn in the side of China. (4) From the perspective of many Chinese strategists there is a close relationship between Taiwan and the security of mainland China and Chinese ambitions to ascend as a true global power. This close relationship is because of its geostrategic positioning just off the coastline of mainland China. The island chains of Taiwan almost enclose mainland China. Furthermore, the positioning of Taiwan and its islands is such that free access to the Pacific Ocean for the Chinese is obstructed hindering Chinese future plans. This aspect of the geostrategic positioning of Taiwan is highlighted by the willingness of China to even use military force to prevent the independence of Taiwan backed by the military might of America. China would dearly like to gain control over Taiwan, as it would open the closed gates to the Western Pacific and the South China Seas for any manoeuvre of the Chinese to exert influence over these waters. (5) The desire for control over Taiwan for strategic reasons is reflected in these words of the Chinese General Wen Zengren in 2005, quoted in Wachman, Alan, M. 2008, Why Taiwan? Geostrategic Rationales for China’s Territorial Integrity, p.118, (6), “…if Taiwan cannot return to the arms of the motherland, China will meet great obstacles on its way [to] enter the outside world, will not be able to fully develop and utilise marine resources, and will face restrictions in its efforts to further open itself to the outside world. Then China will become a sea-locked country”. Wachman 2008, p.118, (6), further quotes Jiefanguin Bao 2004, to reinforce the geostrategic importance of Taiwan to China through “with Taiwan in hand, the Pacific Ocean will become China’s open field to the east. …. The strategic importance of Taiwan cannot be over-stated. (6). China is a large country with a powerful army, air force and navy. It might seem at odds that much smaller Taiwan and its island chain can pose such an influence on the designs of China. This oddity is presented by the influence of the strategic geographical position of Taiwan on the effectiveness of the military might of China. Using the power requires air and naval supremacy over the waters to the east of China, namely the Pacific Ocean and South China Sea. The strategic geographic positioning of an independent and hostile Taiwan impedes the establishing this required air and naval supremacy. (7). The Peoples’s liberation army air force (PLAAF) capability for mid-air refuelling is very limited, making it difficult for PLAAF to conduct extended sorties over the surrounding waters. In addition, the Peoples liberation army navy (PLAN) does not have an aircraft carrier, which could have alleviated this difficulty to a certain extent. Thus the air supremacy efforts of China are limited to its coastal defence requirements and not capable of extending this sphere of influence. Taiwan and its chain of islands impede the free access of naval vessels to deep waters. Naval vessels cannot ply undetected or with hostile intent. More importantly, the submarines of PLAN face a logistic problem in remaining undetected to be effective. The South China Seas do not have sufficient depth for the submarines to seek depth for undetected operations from their ports on the eastern coastline of China. This lack of depth in effect prevents the submarines from using this South China Seas route for secret operations. This has forced the submarines to currently travel on the surface of the open seas as far as the Japanese controlled Ryuku islands before submerging in the deeper Pacific Ocean. All this would change were Taiwan be reunited with mainland China. PLAAF will be in a position to use the forward air bases of Taiwan to pose a threat in the South China Seas and the chain of Japanese islands harbouring the American naval bases. From a naval perspective the reach of the territorial waters of China would be enhanced greatly. More importantly PLAN would be able to utilise the naval bases of Taiwan for effective operations in the Western Pacific Ocean and South China Sea. Control of the strategically positioned Taiwan will negate the effectiveness of the American naval bases on Japanese islands, which in effect will allow the Chinese to exert more influence in the Western Pacific Ocean and the South China Sea. (7). The return of Taiwan to the Chinese mainland will mean that China will develop the potential to control the sea lanes in the South China Sea without impediments. This is significantly more important, as the presence of the powerful American fleet in the Western Pacific Rim will restrict Chinese ambitions in that direction. Control of the sea lanes of the South China Sea by China will pose a direct threat to Japan and the South East Asian countries. The sea lanes of the South China Sea are economically important for Japan as much of its trade and commerce, including the import of oil, travels along these sea lanes. Chinese control of these sea lanes could put an economic stranglehold on Japan, forcing it to turn to more circuitous sea routes for its trade and commerce. (8). Control of the South Asia Sea provides an avenue for China to spread it influence over the countries of South East Asia. Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and Brunei,which have no access to the seas, except through the South China Sea. Many of the Malaysian ports are on the side of the South China Sea. Controlling of the South China Sea in effect will allow China to exert a strong influence on these South Asian nations with only exits to the sea via the South China Sea. Fears have been expressed that control of Taiwan would see the Finlandization of these South East Asian nations expanding the power of China in Asia. (8). Security of China The geographical positioning of Taiwan has contributed to it being used a s a buffer to contain Chinese expansion ambitions and also as a bridgehead for access and control of the Chinese mainland. It is the possibility of Taiwan being used as a bridgehead that raises its strategic relevance to the security concerns of China (6). An evaluation of the early history of China shows that Taiwan was used as a bulwark and as a bridgehead against China and China has learned these lessons well. (9). In more recent times for about fifty years from 1894 to 1945 Taiwan was occupied by Japan. China had just received control of this coveted territory in 1887, when it was forced to part with it to Japan in humiliation, subsequent to its defeat Japan in the Korean War. The presence of Japanese troops so near to the mainland was a constant security threat to Chinese, which ended with the defeat of Japan in 1945. The Chinese Civil war, which followed shortly after resulted in the defeated Koumintang party retreat to Taiwan, conceding the mainland to the Communist Party. The American strategic interests in restricting a communist China has lead to economic and military support to for a independent and hostile Taiwan to China, which continues even to this day, raising a new security concern in terms of America. (10). American strategic interest in Taiwan is in essence is based on the need for it to offer protection to its allies with particular emphasis on Japan from any assertion of supremacy of China in the region. America has strong interests in supporting Japan, as it is its most reliable ally in these Pacific waters. The geographical positioning of Taiwan and American influence over it allows America to play a deterrent role on Chinese ambitions. (11). The importance of geographically strategic islands was clearly demonstrated during the Second World War by the Island of Malta. Malta was an important strategic base for Great Britain to hold sway in the Mediterranean. Naval and airbases provided support for the British naval vessels and aircraft. It was these facilities that were crucial for the extension of the power of the British navy and air force into the Mediterranean. In spite of the several attempts by Germany to take or destroy this strategically positioned island, offering Britain a large unsinkable aircraft carrier facilities, Malta remained in British hands. It was the strength offered by the possession of naval and air bases in Malta that enabled Great Britain to thwart Italian and German ambitions in the Mediterranean by cutting supply lines and later supporting the invasion of Italy (12) It was General MacArthur, who dubbed Taiwan as an unsinkable aircraft carrier for American Strategic interests in the Western Pacific Rim and South China Seas. This is a reflection of the offensive capabilities to which Taiwan could be used against China. The aircraft carrier plays a strike role with the aircraft it carries on enemies across the seas. Taiwan poses this very same threat to China. It can be used by America to launch effective strikes against China. In modern warfare the threat of Taiwan becomes even more salient in that it can act as the eyes and ears of any attack launched against China. This puts China at a disadvantage by making the attacking force aware of the defensive or offensive moves and countermoves of China. (13). The realness of the security concerns of China with regard to a hostile and independent Taiwan under American influence is a throwback on the security concerns of America with regards to Cuba during the Cold War Era. Cuba is the largest island in close proximity to America in its southern waters, with the exception of the Bahamas, and hostile to America. During the Cold War close ties between the Soviet Union and Cuba demonstrated the potential threat to security a hostile Cuba in close proximity could be. The attempt of the Soviet Union to place offensive missiles with nuclear capabilities triggered the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. The response of America to prevent the positioning of any offensive weapons in Cuba was swift and strong. At no time during the Cold War were America and the Soviet Union so close to coming in direct conflict than during the Cuban Missile Crisis. The Soviet Union backed down and the security threat was averted. A few decades later the Soviet Union collapsed and the security threat posed by Cuba ceased. (14). Though the Taiwan Strait confrontation in 1995-1996 between China and America was the turning in point in American support for the independence of Taiwan, there is no guarantee that America will continue to hold this one nation policy. The continued economic and military support of America still remains the security concerns for China, and these concerns will remain till the strategically positioned Taiwan is reunited with mainland China (15). Conclusion: Taiwan and its group of islands are strategically located in close proximity to the eastern coast of China. Taiwan is independent and hostile to China, spurning the overtures of China and remaining a strategic ally of America. From the perspective of China, Taiwan can be used as a bulwark to thwart Chinese ambitions to assert strong influence in the Pacific Ocean and the South China Sea, which would enable it to become the important player in the affairs of East Asia and South East Asia. A hostile Taiwan prevents China from effectively using the Chinese air force and navy to threaten American bases in Japan, thereby putting paid to its ambitions in the Pacific Ocean and South China Sea. Taiwan united to the mainland would not just remove the negative impact of a hostile Taiwan, but extend the range of the Chinese air force and navy to effectively challenge American bases in Japan and take control of the South China Sea. A hostile China can also act as a bridgehead for forces inimical to China to threaten the mainland. A hostile Taiwan thus raises severe security concerns for China. Taiwan united to the mainland removes these security concerns. It is the geographically strategic position of Taiwan off the east coast of China that makes it a threat and important in the eyes of China. Therefore, in essence, the strategic value of Taiwan to China is based on the geographical position of Taiwan. (2,600 words) Works Cited 1. Richard Louis Edmonds. “The Changing Geography of Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau”. The Changing Geography of Asia. Eds. Graham Chapman & Kathleen, M. Baker. Routledge: Oxford, 1992.160-194. 2. “Taiwan Geography”. 2010. Global Security.org. 8 June 2010. . 3. “Taiwan’s Geography and Climate”. 2000. Asian Info.org. 8 June 2010. . 4. Gregor, A. James. “East Asian Stability and the Defense of the Republic of China”. Comparative Strategy 16.4 (1997), 321-335. 5. Lasater, Martin, L., Kien-Hong Yu, Peter., Hsu, Kuan-ming & Lim, Robyn. Taiwan’s Security in the Post-Deng Xiaoping Era. Frank Cass Publishers: London, 2000. 6. Wachman, Alan, M.Why Taiwan? Geostrategic Rationales for China’s Territorial Integrity. National University of Singapore: Singapore. 7. Assmann, Lars. Theater Missile Defense (TMD) in East Asia: Implications for Beijing and Tokyo. Lit Verlag: Berlin, 2007. 8. Okazaki, Hisahiko. “The Strategic Value of Taiwan”. 2003. Paper Prepared for the U.S-Japan-Taiwan Trilateral Strategic Dialogue, Tokyo Round, March 2003. 8 June 2010. . 9. Emma, Jinhua, Teng. Taiwan’s Imagined Geography. Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2004. 10. Kelly, Robert & Brown, Joseph, Samuel. Taiwan. Lonely Planet: Victoria, Australia, 2007. 11. Ross, S. Robert. “Engagement in US China Policy”. Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power. Eds. Alastair Iain Johnston & Robert, S. Ross. Routledge: Oxford, 1999. 176-204. 12. Jackson, Ashley. The British Empire and the Second World War. Hambledon Continuum: London, 2006. 13. Green, Robert. “The Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier”. 2005. Taiwan Review. 8 June 2010. . 14. Valdes, P. Nelson. “The Revolutionary and Political Content of Fidel Castro’s Charismatic Authority”. Reinventing the Revolution: A Contemporary Cuba. Eds.Phillip Brenner, Marguerite Rose Jimenez, John M. Kirk & William M. LeoGrande. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc: Maryland, 2008. 25-40 15. Tucker, Nancy Bernkopf. “China-Taiwan: US Debates and Policy Choices”. Survival 40.4 (1999): 150-167. Appendix – 1 Map of Taiwan (www.fisher.k12.il.us/china/taimap.htm) What is the strategic value of Tibet and Xinjiang to China? Introduction Tibet and Xinjiang are two areas of China that were taken over by China in 1950 and 1949 respectively adding two large masses land masses to the expanding China. China has had its own difficulties in maintaining these two areas of China, where the local populations are not really happy about being under Chinese control. The costs to the Chinese have been in terms of loss of life, requirement for employing a large policing and armed force and the ire of the free world. Yet, these factors have not quenched the fires for China to retain its hold on these areas and to the contrary have spent large amounts of financial resources in the development of these areas and the relocation of Chinese population into these areas. These actions of China are not representative of the desire just to acquire and retain large adjacent land masses. There are very shrewd and strategic reasons for the Chinese to view their stranglehold on Tibet and Xingjian as important to them. The plateau of Tibet in the Himalayas to the southwest of China and Xinjiang to the northwest of China provide seemingly similar economic and strategic value for China. Tibet and Xinjiang are large storehouses of virtually untapped natural resources vital to the economic development of China and their desire to become an economic powerhouse. Control presents China with an opportunity to gain access to the Indian Ocean, which it has for long maintained an open desire. Xinjiang in a similar manner present China with access to the Central Asian countries and their mineral wealth. The strategic value of Tibet and Xinjiang to China lies in their vast natural resources and their position as outposts to access valuable trade and commerce routes. Geography of Tibet and Xinjiang Tibet is a very large plateau north of the highest mountain range the Himalayas. It also holds the distinction of being the largest plateau on earth in addition to it being the highest plateau. From its eastern extremities to its western extremities it measures 2,400 kilometres and from its northern extremities to its southern extremities it measures 1,448 kilometres. This large land measures can be taken to be as equal to the land mass of America east of the Mississippi river. The average height of Tibet is 3,350 kilometers above sea level. Owing to its massive size the borders of Tibet cross with the borders of many countries. To its south lies China’s large neighbour India, Bhutan, Nepal and Myanmar, to its east is China and it borders Turkistan to its northwest. (1). (See Annexure -1) Xinjiang like Tibet is a large landlocked land mass. The area of Xinjiang is 16,604 square kilometers. Xinjiang makes up one sixth all the land mass of China and is the largest of the several provinces and autonomous regions that constitute the large nation of China. Just like Tibet, Xinjiang shares its borders with many countries. To its north lie the Russian Federation and Mongolia. On its western side it shares borders with the central Asian countries of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Among its many neighbours to the south are Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. Within China it borders Tibet to the south and Qinghai, Ghansu and other provinces to the east (2). Natural Resources of Tibet and its Value to China The natural mineral resources of Tibet are vast and not fully determined. Though there are seventy mineral types available in Tibet, the total reserves of only 26 have been evaluated. Twelve of these mineral reserves fall among the top five mineral reserves from the perspective of the provincial level of China. Tibet has the largest chromite deposits in China. In addition the lithium deposits in Tibet are not just the largest in China, but in the whole world. Exploitable copper reserves are also available in Tibet. Among the non-metallic minerals Tibet provides China with large reserves of boron. Magnetite employed widely in the metallurgical industry is available in abundance in Tibet. Much in demand minerals of the chemical industry like barite and arsenic reserves are present in Tibet, and so too with gypsum and pottery clay used in the building industry. Importantly, muscovite with applications in the defense and electronic industries are also available in large quantities in Tibet. A recent addition to the mineral wealth in Tibet has been the finding of the energy resource peat, with established resources of eight million tons. (3) Though poor in coal, oil and natural gas energy resources, Tibet offers high potential for non-polluting energy resources like geo-thermal, solar and wind energy. Tibet presents the best potential for geothermal energy in China. Many geothermal energy fields have been uncovered in China, with water temperature close to the boiling point water. It is estimated that nearly the geothermal heat discharge in Tibet is to the extent of 550,000 kilo calories per, which is comparable to the heat discharged by burning 2.4 million tones of coal annually. While these natural mineral resources by themselves make Tibet valuable to China, there is an even more significant natural resource that Tibet presents China with and that is its water resources. (3). Tibet presents a landscape of massive glaciers, large lakes and a bountiful storehouse of water. The storehouse is so large that it is found to be the headwater for the many large rivers in Asia that include the Yangtze in China, Mekong in South East Asia, Brahmaputra and Sutlej in India and the Salween in Pakistan. Studies conducted by the United Nations demonstrate that about half the population of the world lives along the courses of rivers that find their origins in the waters of Tibet. (1). This bountiful storehouse of water makes Tibet well endowed with energy resources. China already exploits nearly 200 million kilowatts of this natural energy every to contribute to 30% of its hydroelectric energy generation. The hydro-electric value of Tibet for China does not end there. The potential value is even higher. Estimates conducted on the exploitable energy capacity of the Yarlung Zangbo river points to the availability of 80 million kilowatts. In addition, its tributaries are found to be capable of delivering another 90 million kilowatts of energy. More importantly, by incorporating changes to Yarlung Zangbo river it would be possible to build the largest hydraulic power station with a delivery of 40 million kilowatts of energy. (3). It is not just the energy potential of the waters originating from Tibet that place value on Tibet for China, it is the other uses that this water can be put to, as water us essential for human life and the activities of human life. All round the world over exploitation of ground water has led to its receding availability. The growing human population and industrial activity associated with human development have contributed to pollution of rivers and water sources. The impact of global warming is expected to have a negative effect of on the availability of water. The essential need for water for human life and development on one side and the receding availability of clean water raises the spectre of conflicts over water resources. (4). It is against this background that the boon of the waters of Tibet needs to be perceived. This is particularly significant, when we take into consideration the large population of China and the dryness of vast regions of the country. In excess of 25% of the land mass is desert land, contributing to China being considered as the driest land area on the planet. This makes the storehouse of water in Tibet a valuable asset. The true nature of this asset becomes transparent, when the view of experts that many of the rivers in China are polluted or have become silt filled to be of use in meeting the freshwater needs of the 1.3 billion people of China. (1). There is extreme scarcity of unpolluted water in the north of the country and unless something is done about it unpolluted water will become a rare commodity. China plans to address this water by using the vast water storehouse in Tibet by diverting these waters to the water starved areas of China. (5). These facts make it clear that the freshwater storehouse of Tibet is not just an asset, but a necessity for China with growing importance. The Natural Resources of Xinjiang Xinjiang abounds in biological resources, with many types rare and precious flora. Xinjiang also offers China vast tracts of grasslands. These grasslands extend over an area of 57.26 million hectares of land and are the second largest extent of grasslands. Large water resources are also present in Xinjiang, with the number of big and small rivers totaling more than 570. The availability of fresh water is such that it far exceeds the national average of China. Even more valuable to China are the mineral resources and energy reserves present in Xinjiang. Xinjiang is the most mineral rich area in China. More than 122 different kinds of minerals are available in Xinjiang and they constitute almost 80% of the mineral wealth of China. Several of these proven mineral deposits are so large that they male up more than 50% of the presence of those minerals in China. The energy reserves present in Xinjiang are mostly in the form of coal and oil. (2). China has made extensive to develop Xinjiang in an attempt to exploit these resources. A key aspect of this development is the focus on the mineral wealth and the energy reserves of Xinjiang, which has raised protests of exploitation from the locale population. The demand for oil in China is surging with the dramatic economic growth. China produces 4.5% of the world’s oil production, but consumes even more at 8.2% of the oil produced in the world. This places a very large onus on the import of oil. In 2004 the oil import of China was to the extent of 117 million metric tons. Based on forward consumption calculations, it is estimated that this import will show a large rise becoming two to three times this import of oil by the year 2020, highlighting the role of oil in the economy of China. The largest hydrocarbon reserves of China are present in the Xinjiang region, which also presents a very large agricultural area. Exploiting these hydrocarbon reserves to meet the energy hunger of China, may be at the cost of reduced food production (6). China’s need for hydrocarbon energy is such that exploitation of Xinjiang oil and gas reserves are already being exploited and slated for exploitation in the developmental plans of China, such that it will not be long before Xinjiang overtakes the northeast of China as the largest producer of oil and gas in China. (7). It is in the making available oil and gas energy and exploiting of mineral reserves for the development of China that there is a great focus on the developmental activity in Xinjiang and value in Xinjiang for China. (8).This aspect is easily seen in the words expressed by the member of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee Zhou Yongkang on the strategic value of Xinjiang to China in that “the development and stability of Xinjiang is important to the development and stability of China”. (9). Tibet as a Significant Trade and Commerce Outpost It was the British during their occupation of India from the eighteenth century to the twentieth century that demonstrated the potential of Tibet to be used as a strategic outpost. The British used the high plateau of Tibet to look into China. The Americans realizing the values of the Tibetan plateau, during the Cold War Era, attempted to coax India to use its close ties with people of Tibet to use Tibet for observing China. However, a non-aligned India in spite of its antagonism to China after the Sino-Indian War in 1962 was disinclined to cooperate in this effort. With the accession of Tibet by China the tables have been turned. It now acts as a strategic outpost for China to look out to the world, with particular emphasis on India. The presence of numerous airbases highlights the strategic importance of Tibet to China. Though the strategic of Tibet has diminished with thing becoming quiet between China and India for nearly five decades, possessing Tibet to China is important as it locks the back door of China, to be opened and used by China form its designs. (10). In these changed times of lowered levels of hostility between China and her southern neighbours, with particular emphasis on India, Tibet opens a more compelling option for China. This is the potential for Tibet to provide greater access to trade and commerce routes to the southern waters of the Indian Ocean. With China striving to be a super power stemming from her economic growth the southern doorway becomes more and more attractive. Tibet in this new scenario presents not a barrier to access from the south, but the means to trade and commerce by the extension of rail and freight traffic present in India and Pakistan to reach the large ports in these countries and the seas beyond. China has spent a lot of financial resources in the development of Tibet, which can now be put to use to meet its economic ambitions. (11). Increased trade between India and Tibet are no longer in the realm of possibility, but reality. Cross border trade between India and China through Yadong in Tibet has already started with plans to for rail connection between Lhasa and Yadong on the Chinese side and Yadong and Calcutta on the Indian side. Thus Tibet provides access to valuable ports in the Indian subcontinent and the trade routes beyond. (12). Xinjiang as a Significant Trade and Commerce Outpost In the earlier times the value of Xinjiang for China was in its strategic position vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. The subsequent finding of mineral wealth and hydrocarbon energy reserves shifted the focus of value of Xinjiang to these mineral deposits. The development of Xinjiang and its proximity to the Central Asian republics have in this modern era presented another window of value in Xinjiang for China and this window is the door to enhanced trade and commerce through Xinjiang, with particular emphasis on the oil and gas energy requirements of China. (13). The use of Xinjiang as the means to feed the hunger for oil and gas energy began in 2005, with the laying of the pipeline to import oil between Kazakhstan and to the petrochemical refineries and plants in Western China via the Alatza Pass in Xinjiang. There are plans to extend this pipeline highway to provide a link to the other Central Asian countries and even further to the Caspian Sea. In addition work on another oil pipeline that is 2,000 kilometres long linking Turkmenistan to these refineries via Xinjiang has already begun. The value of Xinjiang as a significant outpost in the increased trade and commerce plans of China are reflected in these words of the chairman of the Central Asian-Caucasus Institute, at the John Hopkins University, Washington “this is the key to their land bridge to Europe, links with the roads that the TRACEA (Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia) program of the EU (European Union) is trying to support, and that too is very important, not to mention new railroad lines. … So all in all, this becomes a strategic bridge for contemporary China. (14). Conclusion Tibet and Xinjiang present two land masses that have been taken over by China in the middle of the twentieth century. The initial benefit that China derived at that time were in essence as buffers to prevent access to China from the south in the case of Tibet and from the East in the case of Xinjiang. That picture has changed with China’s showing strong economic growth and aspirations to be an economic super power. The discovery of vast natural resources in both Tibet and Xinjiang and the presence of large water resources in Tibet and oil and gas deposits in Xinjiang have altered their value to China in the modern era. The mineral wealth, water resources and energy resources from water, oil and gas promise to be of immense value in the growth and developmental plans of China aiding its economic growth. In addition Tibet lies on the southern border of China and Xinjiang on its eastern border. The infrastructure developmental work undertaken by China in these two provinces makes them ripe to be tapped for use in transnational trade and commerce. Tibet has demonstrated that it can be the doorway to the ports in the Indian subcontinent and to the seas beyond these ports. Xinjiang has also demonstrated that it can be the doorway for links to the Central Asian countries and then further on to Europe. Thus the strategic value of Tibet and Xinjiang to China lies in their vast natural resources and their position as outposts to access valuable trade and commerce routes. (Word Count 2,831) .” Works Cited 1. Schneider, K. & Pope, C. T. “China, Tibet, and the strategic power of water’. 2008. Circle of Blue WaterNews. June 10 2010. . 2. “Xinjiang”. 2001. UNESCAP. June 10 2010. . 3. “China’s Tibet: Facts and Figures 2002”. June 10 2010. . 4. Altman Nathaniel. Sacred Water. Hidden Spring: New Jersey, 2002. 5. Buckley, Michael. Tibet. Second Edition. Bradt Travel Guides: Bucks, England, 2006. 6. Kambara, Tatsu & Howe, Christopher. China and the Global Energy Crisis: Development and Prospects for China’s Oil and Natural Gas. Edward Elgar Publishing Limited: Cheltenham, UK, 2007. 7. Ice Research Team. “Ethnic Conflict and Natural Resources’. 2006. ICE Case Studies. June 10 2010. . 8. Hsiao, Russell. “Implications of Kyrgyzstan Revolt on China's Xinjiang Policy”. 2010. The Jamestown Foundation. June 10 2010. 9. .“Senior Party Official: Xinjiang’s stability has national strategic value”. 2008. Uyghur News. June 10 2010. . 10. Norbu, Dawa. China’s Tibet Policy. Curzon Press: Surrey, UK, 2001. 11. Yeo, George. “Between China and India: Tibet the Wedge or Link?” 2009. YaleGlobal. June 10 2010. . 12. Rajan, D. S. “CHINA: TIBET- INDIAN OCEAN TRADE ROUTE –MIXING STRATEGY, SECURITY AND COMMERCE. 2005. South Asia Analysis Group. June 10 2010. . 13. Rudelson, Jon, Justin. Oasis Identities: Uyghur Nationalism Along Chinas Silk Road. Columbia University Press: New York, 1997. 14. Lelyveld, Michael. “China Worries Over Xinjiang Energy”. 2008. Radio Free Asia. June 10 2010. . Annexure – 1 Map of Tibet (1) Annexure – 2 Map of Xinjiang (7) Read More