The paper “ Risk аnd Sаfеty Еnginееring, Hazard and Operability Technique, FMECA Approach in the Identification Hazards” is a cogent example of a case study on engineering and construction. The involvement of the checklist in performing hazard analysis is very significant in addressing safety implications associated with the operation and maintenance of the steer-by-wire system in vehicles. The reliability of the steer-by-wire system is concerned with making sure that the performance of the system achieves the required mission or task while at the same time upholding safety requirements. Hazard analysis based on the checklist for the steer-by-wire system ensures that mishaps or accidents that may take place in the course of operation or maintenance do not take place.
Their identification is made early for purposes of taking the necessary precautions. There are usual failures encountered that can only cause interruptions that are benign to the system and its users. However, some failures may lead to catastrophic interruptions. Hazards in the steer-by-wire system are not desirable and could range from negligible hazards to catastrophic hazards. The kind of hazards resulting in system failure is very common in both electronic and mechanical systems.
It is thus important to perform the relevant and effective checklist hazard analysis for the operation and use of a steer-by-wire system in vehicles. This analysis is concerned with the identification and elimination of hazards whose inherent existence in the system may be brought about with other failures (Kelly, 2006). General operation environmentAre all the components of the system arranged in an orderly manner? Are all the requirements necessary for the smooth functioning of the system in place and functional? Are there any foreign objects that could interfere with the smooth functioning of the steer-by-wire system? User safetyIs the user conversant with the control and operation of the steer-by-wire system? Is the controller or the user of the system under any physical threat in the event of a mishap coming from the system? Is the user or operator equipped with the necessary safety equipment while operating or controlling the system? Are there any health safety threats associated with the use or control of the system? HAZOP techniqueIn the system of steer-by-wire, the HAZOP Hazard and Operability technique of analysis offers a systematic and structured way of risk identification, evaluation, and management.
In particular, the use of HAZOP techniques is often involved in the identification of potential hazards in the steer-by-wire system. This technique is also involved in the identification of the problems and risks that are associated with the functionality and operability of the steer-by-wire system. The hazard and operability technique of analysis is based on a theoretical assumption that risk occurrences are brought about by deviation from the operating or design intention of the system. In this approach, the identification of design and operability hazards involves the use of a systematic table that contains the deviation perspectives.
The technique is unique in that it assists in the stimulation of the thinking that explores potential deviations by the system (Crawley, Preston, and Tyler, 2008). The identification of casual events and hazards in the steer-by-wire system largely uses the HAZOP approach. This is because the technique is most appropriate for the assessment of hazards and casual events in the design of systems, functionality as well as maintenance.
The approach is also capable of performing an assessment of the system from various perspectives.
Crawley, F., Preston, M., & Tyler, B. (2008). HAZOP: a guide to best practice: guidelines to best practice for the process and chemical industries. Rugby, Institution of Chemical Engineers.
Grimvall, G. (2010). Risks in technological systems. London, Springer.
Kelly, A. (2006). Strategic maintenance planning. Oxford, Elsevier/Butterworth-Heinemann.
Safety-critical systems symposium, Dale, C., & Anderson, T. (2012). Achieving systems safety proceedings of the twentieth Safety-Critical Systems Symposium, Bristol, UK, 7-9th February 2012. London, Springer.