Using Fire Safety Standards and Procedures in Buildings - Case Study Example

Name : Lecturer : Subject : Date : Fires Case Studies 1. Introduction Fire Safety Engineering is “the application of scientific and engineering principles to the protection of people, property and the environment from fire” (Christian 2003, p.20). Fires destroy properties and kill people thus; fire safety should be taken seriously at all times. There were countless fire incidents all over the world caused by ignorance in fire safety procedures and there be more if we do not employ them. Investigating and analysing previous fire incidents will help us understand the importance of fire safety engineering. We will become aware of the importance of every equipment, procedure, and techniques used in fire prevention and fire fighting. For this reason, our report will be about major fire and explosion incidents happened in England, Puerto Rico, Japan, and the United States during the last twenty-five years. It will talk about significant details of the incident, the occupants, and fire fighters and present an analysis of the incidents in relation to fire safety engineering. Finally, a brief conclusion of the report and recommendations on how these incidents can be prevented using fire safety standards and procedures. 2. Fire in King’s Cross Underground Station in 1987- England At around 7:30 pm on November 18, 1987, fire broke out in one of London’s busiest complex underground railway system. While rush hour was tapering off, a small fire was reported on one of the three wooden escalators of the King’s Cross underground station. The fire erupted up into the ticket hall resulting to serious condition similar to a ‘flashover’. There was thick black smoke rising from the station entrances at the street level. The blaze went on for a number of hours consequential to severe casualties. The fire left thirty-one people dead including a London fire fighter and more than fifty people were injured with most of them suffered sever burns (Cote 2003, p.3). Investigation revealed that most fatalities were situated around the perimeter of the ticket hall. The direct cause of the fire was lighted match dropped by a passenger on an escalator. Even though smoking was prohibited on the underground and the station, passengers frequently lit up as they ascended the escalators on the way out of the stations. The match fell through a gap between the threads and the skirting board. The sideways movement of the treads caused these gaps and most of the cleats that were supposed to prevent objects from falling through the gap were not there. The match set fire to an accumulation of grease and dust on the running tracks. The tracks were not frequently cleaned and had not been designed to reduce the build up of dust or to make maintenance easy. Non-flammable grease was not used. The fire rapidly spread to the wooden treads, skirting boards and railings. A passenger saw smoke two-thirds of the way up and a blaze below and instantly pushed the emergency stop button at the top and yelled to people to get off the escalator. At around 7:34, a British Transport police officer called upon the Fire Brigade but the blaze were already three to four inches high. Unexpectedly, before the firefighters had time to apply any water, the fire quickly spread into the ticket hall at the top of the escalators together with thick black smoke. In just a matter of one or two minutes, the whole area suddenly became a blazing inferno killing all people near the ticket hall (Kletz 2001, p.209). 3. Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire- San Juan, Puerto Rico On December 31, 1986, a fire at the Dupont Plaza Hotel in San Juan, Puerto Rico, injured more than one hundred guest, killed ninety seven others, and extensively damaged the hotel (Millette and Hays 1994, p. 135). A stack of plastic furniture was stored shortly in an open area of the hotel. On the day of the incident, angry employees, set fire this extremely flammable furniture and the fire grew to massive size almost immediately, and caused almost a hundred lives (Brannigan 1992, p.403). The fire was discovered at approximately 3:22 in the afternoon resulted in smoke that spread to seventeenth –story hotel. Many of those trapped on upper floors were able to get fresh air on balconies. However, three people died in elevators and one in fourth-floor guest room. The majority of fatalities occurred when fleeing guest were trapped inside the casino. The fire burned for almost five hours before fire authorities extinguished it (Craighead 2003, p.524). 4. Multifamily Dwelling Fire – Keokuk, Iowa, Japan At around 8.24 am on December 22, 1999, a fire was reported in a multifamily dwelling in Keokuk, Iowa, Japan. Several neighbours phoned 911 to report that smoke was coming from a residence and that a woman was outside screaming that there were children trapped inside. Upon arrival, fire fighters established water supply from a hydrant one-block southwest of the scene. As the two truck operators set up the apparatus, the assistant chief allegedly spoke to the female resident of the burning building that three of her children were still inside the apartment. The assistant chief slipped on his protective clothing and entered the apartment followed by the two apparatus operators who were asked by the chief to assist (Cote 2003, p.98). Shortly thereafter, fire fighters managed to save some of the occupants including a 22-month-old male, an infant, and another young female. They were given CPR and were taken to the hospital. In the meantime, fire fighter who had arrived later stretched a 1 ½-inch hose line to the front door but the hose line had burned. The first level of the building was engulfed in flames but the location and condition of the fire fighters and the remaining child was not known. As the fire was knocked back, fire fighters found the body of one fire fighter in the first floor room to the right of the main entrance corridor. They found the assistant chief’s body at the top of the stairs, not far from the body of the remaining child, a seven-year-old girl. They also found the body of the third fire fighter in the master bedroom. The remaining fire was extinguished at around 1:30 pm (Cote 2003, p.98). 5. Powell Duffryn Fire and Spill- Savannah, Georgia, U.S.A At approximately 11:15 pm on April 10, 1995, as series of explosions occurred at the Powell Duffryn chemical storage facility in Savannah, Georgia. The explosions results into a massive fire and chemical release on the facility’ grounds and into the adjacent marsh that endangered the environment and the nearby population. The Savannah Fire Department received a 911 call at 11:31 pm. Minutes later, firefighters found six liquid chemical storage tanks on fire within a berm area. The berm, or stone embankment, was intended to keep any spilled material but it contributed to the possible disaster because it provided a vessel in which the leaking chemicals could react with each other in addition to the water applied to the tanks to cool them. No injuries or fatalities were reported from the initial explosion. (Farazmand 2001, p.444). However, flames and thick black smoke from the fire forced the residents of the neighbouring townhouse development to evacuate immediately. During the fire, part of the enclosure wall was breached releasing contaminated firewater that threatens to contaminate the Savannah River. It took the fire fighters almost 3 days to extinguish the fire completely (Mannan and Lees 2005, p.65). 6. Analysis of the Incidents The fire in King’s Cross Underground Station was a matter of neglect and lack of concern in fire safety. For instance, the practice in London Underground was to call the Fire Brigade only when a fire seemed to be getting out of hand. There were no smoke detectors installed and the escalator running tracks were fitted with a water spray system that is not automatic and had to be activated manually. More importantly, during the time elapsed between calling the Fire Brigade and their arrival, unaware of the location of the valves, the inspector on duty walked beside the unlabelled water valves many times. The official report says, “His lack of training and unfamiliarity with water fog equipment meant that his preoccupation with the fire and smoke led him to forget about the system or the merits of it use” (Kletz 2001, p.209). Fire detectors are widely regarded as the most effective fire safety innovation since can “cut the risk of fire death by half” (USDA, 2000, p.18). The lost of life in the underground station’s fire could have been avoided if appropriate fire safety equipments have been installed and fire fighters were called earlier. Passengers and employees of the station could have been saved if an alarm was set off and proper evacuation was implemented. The design of the complex apparently ignored essential fire safety procedures as fire safety engineering in any building includes “fire prevention, fire detection and alarm, fire growth control, means of escape, smoke control, and structural stability” (Rasbash 2004, p.22). Moreover, the lack of training of the staff and the strange view of the management about risk may be regarded as ignorance of fire safety. Since most of the staff working in the station lacks the training and ability, their response were chaotic and awkward. Thus, between the time the fire was noticed and the time it broke out into the ticket hall, a span of roughly 15 minutes, people were allowed to go through the ticket hall and up and down other escalators. This lack of action was due to the belief, shared by all concerned, that fires on escalators were not a serious problem. Apparently, the major primary cause was the idea held at all levels, a notion that was assertively encouraged by the management. Thus, it is explicable that the substitute inspector that day, when notified of the fire, did not report it to the stationmaster or the line controller (Kletz 2001, p.209). According Craighead (2003, p.524), the major contributing factors to the loss of life in the Dupont Plaza Hotel based on the NFPA’s analysis of the fire, is the lack of automatic sprinklers in the South Ballroom where the fire originates. The rapid growth and spread of fire, probably the building was not ‘compartmentalise’. In fire safety engineering, ‘compartmentation’ limits the spread of fire to the whole structure (Purkiss p.9). There were no automatic fire detection systems to alert occupants of the fire in its initial stage. Fire detection systems provide “property protection and life safety” (Forsyth 2007, p.213) thus should not be ignored by building designers and management. The vertical opening between the ballroom and casino levels created by the ballroom foyer allowed smoke and fire to move to the casino level and then into the casino itself. Consequently, smoke and fire spread to the hotel lobby, successfully blocking the exit corridors for the casino visitors and high-rise residents. Smoke travels to the high-rise tower by way of vertical penetrations. Vertical and horizontal spread of fire can at times according data from fire safety engineering can be traced back to the penetration of floors and walls by plastic drain, waste, and vent pipes, and telephones or electric cables. Thus, it is a good practice to surround these pipes and cables with non-combustible packing housed in a thin steel sleeve extending away from the surface of the floor or wall (Smith 1978, p.264). Based on fire investigation and analysis, the NFPA determined the factors that contributed to the deaths of three fire fighters in the Multifamily Dwelling fire was due to the lack of proper ‘risk versus benefit analysis’. There was lack of an established incident and accountability management system, insufficient resources such as personnel and equipment to raise interior fire control and rescue activities. More importantly, the lack of efficient smoke detectors within the apartment to provide early warning of a fire may have contributed to the deaths of the three children (Cote 2003, p.99). According to Smith et. al. (1978, p.187), many governments have enacted legislation, which requires the installation of smoke detectors as a life safety device in residential occupancies consisting mostly of single-family dwellings and apartment houses. This is because fire safety engineering dictates that fire or the presence of heat should be detected automatically to enhance both life and building safety (Furness and Muckett 2007, p.225). It also requires the knowledge in evaluating the life safety consequences of specified fire and the use and application of appropriate knowledge, training, and experience to carry out manual fire fighting (DOH, 2006, p.8). Apparently, fire fighters in Iowa lack this essential ability to handle fire and evacuation effectively. The explosion, fire, and chemic spill that occurred in Powell Duffryn Chemical Storage facility, demonstrated the danger caused by industrial facilities near populated areas. Moreover, fire department was not prepared and got no knowledge of the particular hazardous materials on fire. If the fire department had identified soon after their arrival, what they were dealing with, most of the difficulties encountered and the serious threats to the community that occurred afterwards would never have developed. According to Farazmand (2001, p.443), up to date information regarding storage of hazardous material products, their quantities, and their exact wherebouts within storage facilities can enhance the management of an emergency response. Moreover, as a matter of fire safety engineering, the existence of hazardous materials in close distance to non-compatible hazardous chemicals also represents possible hazard if they should ever interact. The berm area intended for spilled material retention should be designed to avoid mixing of spilled product from nearby storage containers. Separate berms or retention walls for each tank would significantly lessen the potential for the formation of new products when leaking chemicals mix and interact. More importantly, for heat, smoke, and toxic products, the time of exposure is an important aspect of safety and the extent of harm done (Rasbah 2004, et. al., p. 20) thus fire fighters responding to industrial disasters must stop these elements from spreading in the earliest time possible. 7. Conclusion and Recommendation The fire incidents in England, Puerto Rico, Japan, and United States we discussed earlier seems to demonstrate that fire safety engineering is extremely helpful in preventing loss of life and damage to property. All of these incidents apparently ignored the significance of fire prevention through fire detection systems and fire safe building designs. Even fire fighters were unacquainted with the various principles of incident management and ill equipped to prevent fires from spreading further. This paper therefore recommends strict compliance of all fire safety regulations. Building designs must always include fire safety standards, zoning particularly in industrial complex or buildings, and other relevant regulations. Building Control Authorities should have regulatory interest with an emphasis on life safety for occupants and fire fighters. They must ensure that building designs they approve provides equivalent or better level of fire safety in a building or infrastructure. Fire fighters should also undergo regular training for their advancement and should be very familiar with incident management. 8. Reference List Brannigan Francis L., 2002, Building Construction for the Fire Service, Published by Jones & Bartlett Publishers, U.S. Christian S. D., 2003, A Guide to Fire Safety Engineering: BIP2007, British Standards Institution, Published by BSI British Standards Institution, U.K. Cote Arthur, 2003, Organizing for Fire And Rescue Services: A Special Edition of the Fire Protection Handbook, Published by Jones & Bartlett Publishers, UK Craighead Geoff, 2003, High-rise Security and Fire Life Safety, Published by Butterworth-Heinemann, U.S. DOH, 2006, Dept. of Health Managing Healthcare Fire Safety, Great Britain: Department of Health: Estates and Facilities Division, Published by The Stationery Office, U.K. Farazmand Ali, 2001, Handbook of Crisis and Emergency Management, Published by CRC Press, U.S. Forsyth Michael, 2007, Structures & Construction in Historic Building Conservation, Published by Wiley, Singapore Furness Andrew and Muckett Martin, 2007, Introduction to Fire Safety Management: The Handbook for Students on NEBOSH and Other Fire Safety Courses, Published by Butterworth-Heinemann, UK Kletz Trevor A., 2001, Learning from Accidents, Published by Gulf Professional Publishing, U.K. Mannan Sam and Lees Frank, 2005, Lee's Loss Prevention in the Process Industries: Hazard Identification, Assessment, and Control, Published by Butterworth-Heinemann, U.S. Millette, James R. Hays Steve M., 1994, Settled Asbestos Dust Sampling and Analysis, Published by CRC Press, U.S Purkiss John, 2007, Fire Safety Engineering: Design of Structures, Published by Butterworth-Heinemann, UK Rasbash, D., Ramachandran, G. Kandola B., Watts J. and Law M., 2004, Evaluation of Fire Safety, Published by John Wiley and Sons, U.K. Smith H., Smith Edwin Earle, and Harmathy T. Z., 1978, Design of Buildings for Fire Safety: A Symposium, ASTM Committee E-5 on Fire Standards, American Society for Testing and Materials Committee E05 on Fire Standards, Published by ASTM International, U.S. USDA, 2000, Selecting and Renovating an Old House: A Complete Guide, U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, Published by Courier Dover Publications, U.S. Read More