Fire and the Build Environment to Wales, Northern Ireland, England and Scotland - Case Study Example

Name : xxxxxx Tutor : xxxxxxx Title : Fire and the Build Environment Institution : xxxxxxx @2009 Fire and the Build Environment Introduction Fire tragedies are among the most devastating accidents in the way they are hard to curtail and in the manner in which they cause property annihilation and loss of human life. Major building fires world over have been responsible for loss of life and millions of dollars in property destruction. The greatest challenge is that most of these building fires occur without warning in most cases their depiction and control is usually very hard. This in turn makes investigation efforts even harder in their attempts of ascertaining the causes of such fires. To curb this carnage, Fire expert agencies have been set up (in different countries) fully equipped with relevant equipment and experts with the responsibility of establishing the causes of fire accidents and subsequently formulating safety measures that will help prevent re-occurrence of such fire accidents in times to come. Fire expert agencies and professionals detail various safety measures to be put in place during construction of buildings aimed at reducing and protecting buildings from fire catastrophes. To many, the one single determinant of the damage caused by fire catastrophes on buildings squarely lies on the presence (or absence) of these safety measures on such buildings. This paper examines and details building fires in the last 25 years with specific reference to Wales, Northern Ireland, England and Scotland. Building Fires in Scotland There was a huge fire in Peckham in south East London on 26th November 2009 which forced over 150 people to vacate their homes as it engulfed a number of adjoining flats in the vicinity (See appendix 1). Report by the London Brigade indicated that the inferno begun at around 0430 and quickly spread to the nearby flats covering an area approximated to be the size of a pitch. Evacuation efforts for the residents in the flats nearby were doubled given the threat the nature of contents on some of these flats posed. One witness said that one of the buildings within the Carisbrooke Gardens was packed with lots of gas cylinders which were thought to have aided the fast spread of the fire (Wardrop 2009). Given the involvement of explosive gas cylinders, efforts by the firefighters to contain the fire and eventually put it out appeared futile for the better part of the incident. It required the efforts of over a hundred and fifty firefighters who were called from various regions to come lend a hand in the putting out of this inferno. The intensity of the raging fire necessitated efforts from the Metropolitan police to come and help reinforce firefighting efforts by erecting over thirty different fire pumps around the building. These rescue efforts led to closing of some roads in the region since the police used these areas for offering first aid for minor injuries and also to evacuate residents to safer grounds. This incident terribly shocked the residents according to the local Member of Parliament who reiterated that the there was great danger in having so many gas cylinders in one place without elaborate measures to curb against fire tragedies (Wardrop 2009). This notwithstanding however, not even the scorching intense heat from the inferno caused any major injuries to the residents. There was not a single casualty who succumbed during the incident and the precision and effectiveness of the rescue efforts made it possible to restore calm among the residents (Stothart 2009). Residents clouded the streets as they stared at the firefighters waging war with the furious fire. Regional roads were further congested with fire engines that were erected along the way. The local authority moved in to provide alternative accommodation for most of the evacuees whose houses had gone up in flames. The bursting flames from the top of the building hosting the gas cylinders attributed the incident to a gas leakage. This pointed to the need to install safety measures in gas distribution centers to guard against such incidences in the future. The cause of the fire was not categorically stated although the gas cylinders were a very likely source of the fire which still further fanned it to unmanageable levels. The lesson learnt from this incident was that there is need to separate residential premises from fire hazards like gas distribution centers if such devastations are to be avoided. In this Peckham fire catastrophe was very difficult to smoother and eventually contain due to the gas cylinders that were in the area where the fire ravaged. In the event that gas distribution centres are within the vicinity of residential premises, there should be adequate safety measures in place to deal with any fire accidents. This should include having a range in variety of fire extinguishers preferably carbon dioxide fire extinguishers. Building fire in Northern Ireland A section of the Union Theological College in Southern Belfast on 14th of November 2009 was ravaged by a fierce fire to almost complete annihilation (See appendix 2). The cause of the inferno was not ascertained with police officers at the scene treating it suspiciously. A number of rescue teams had been called to aid in putting out the fire at this college which was said to have erupted from the principal’s House; a section within the college. This section was currently under very costly renovation (estimated to cost £2.2 million at its completion in January 2010 where it was to be used as a resource centre) before the inferno. Given the windy weather condition during the time of the inferno, the fire spread rapidly reducing the better part of the building to ashes within a very short time. The cause of the fire has not yet been established with the police officers handling the case still continuing with their investigation to date. Two firefighters from the fire service were critically injured by molten metal which is said to have fallen on them from the building’s roof. This prompted the Group Commander, Chris Kerr, to remove firefighters from the building because of the fragile state of the roof. The fire is said to have erupted at about half past two in the morning. The building ravaged in the fire was scheduled to have been opened ready for use as from the start of January 2010. Rescue officers managed to evacuate a total of twenty three students who were on the college premises at the time of the inferno alongside various residents in adjacent apartments. This incident was very devastating to the entire college fraternity and its close associates according to the college’s deputy clerk. It was reported that after having temporarily put the out the fire at around 0230 hours, another fire erupted at around 0700 hours which found the rescue team’s firefighting appliances already removed from the scene (The Irish Times 2009). The second fire was thought probably to have been as a result the previous fire in the premise which was not completely put out. The firefighters managed to put out the second wave of fire before it could spread to other sections of the college although it still caused substantial damage to the college property. The lesson learnt in this fire incidence is the necessity to ensure that safety measures are adhered to completely to alleviate some of the devastation that is caused by such fire catastrophes. Inappropriate safety measures greatly contributed to the spread of the fire that completely destroyed this multi-million dollar college premise. The firefighters should also be very keen in their work to ensure that the fire is completely put out before they leave the site. In this incidence, the fire brigade wrongly thought that the fire had been tamed and successfully put out and so removed their fire engines and appliances only to realize that in fact, the fire was anything but contained when it erupted the second time causing more devastation and destruction compared to the first break. Building fire in Wales Chester school was destroyed by a raging fire on that fateful Monday afternoon (19th May 2008). The extent of the fire required six fire engines to contain it and eventually put it out. The fire is reported to have began from higher sections of the Victoria building roof and steadily spread to other parts of the building systematically reducing every section to ashes (See appendix 3). Rescue efforts were able to evacuate all the residents at risk to safer grounds across the mason street (Britton et al 2007). The commotion coupled with rescue efforts rendered sections of Liverpool road impassable with so many rescue vehicles packed all over the road. The heavy traffic that resulted thereafter caused the rush hour train services to be suspended as a result of the instability in the gable. There were reports that the building was in the process of being brought down which had caused it to be greatly unstable and owing to this instability, the rescue team was not allowed to enter it during the inferno (Holmes 2008) The exact cause of the fire was not immediately established although the speculation was that it may have been caused by homeless people who occasionally sought refuge in the building. It was thought so since most of such people usually start fires to keep warm during cold times and it was speculated that this particular one went out of hand. To further support this surmise, vagrants were spotted leaving the building with the arrival of firefighters. Rescue efforts were greatly impeded by the unstable condition of the building which led to the firefighters being discouraged from entering the building for the fear of their own safety. Given that there were plans to demolish the building, it had been left unattended to for sometime weakening it further and when the inferno caught it up, it greatly became unstable thereby making all attempts to put out the fire to be entirely done from outside. This limited the effectiveness of the efforts of putting out the fire. The lesson learnt from this incident is to discourage irresponsible setting up of fires. In the culture of this town, vagrants who go about lighting fires almost everywhere they camp to keep warm is a common practice. The local authority should therefore seriously consider taming such kinds of irresponsible fires that pose great threat to the city’s safety and the safety of thousands of residents in the Wales. The Bradford City Stadium Fire in England Terrible fire on 11th May 1985 burnt down the Bradford city stadium which was so devastating since the fire broke down when the home bound football team was meeting the Lincoln city football team in a clash that was the climax of the celebration of the victory of the Bradford football team in the League division trophy (See appendix 4). The fire was reported to have begun about forty minutes after the first half kicked off where a blinding glowing light was seen at the rear of the stadium in block G. It was though that one of the spectators probably dropped a burning cigarette on a heap of rubbish in the lower section of the stadium. The spectators seated in the upper sections of the stadium felt a surge of heat beneath them prompting a number of them to start scrambling for emergency exit and for fire extinguishers albeit unsuccessfully (Firth 2005). The tragedy did not leave without distraught as fifty six spectators were reported to have succumbed to the fire on the spot. The fire spread so fast due to the wooden structures that were used to make most of the stands in the lower section of the stadium. On the arrival of the police, they raised alarm of the spreading of the fire intended to warn and contain the spectators who were running all over but unfortunately this alarm was misinterpreted by these spectators who further panicked and broke into a scrimmage. This stampede for safety was responsible for the death of at least five people. The raging fire forced the police and firefighters to halt their efforts of putting out the fire and embark on evacuation of the spectators. The game had to be ended prematurely three minutes before the end of the first half as the thick choking smoke that had engulfed the stadium was causing difficulties in breathing and visibility. The tarpaulin covered roof sealed with both asphalt and bitumen made it easier for the fire to spread fast all over the roof of the stadium. The windy conditions on that particular day also aided the spread of the fire even further (Firth 2005). Panic that swept the entire stadium greatly contributed to the confusion that ensued few minutes after the fire begun making rescue efforts desperately futile. The emergency exits were all engulfed in thick smoke and the roofs of the stand in which the spectators were standing were covered in raging flames within four minutes after the fire begun. The situation was worsened by having most of the doors in the rear of the stadium where most of the spectators sought refuge, were closed without any steward assigned to them. The fleeing desperate spectators only managed to force seven of the doors open during the scramble through which they hoped to escape the tragedy. Absence of fire extinguishers in the stadium was the other factor that fanned the spread of the fire. It was said that installation of fire extinguishers had been halted for fear of their vandalism and theft. The rescue efforts necessitated the smashing down of several exits by the rescuers and groups of men from the inside of the stadium. The people who got injured mainly were hurt through the scrimmage for the exit and the chocking of the smoke that had heavily engulfed the entire stadium making it impossible to see properly. There were heroism acts by a number of men who went out of their way to rescue the lives of children who had been caught up in the inferno. A number of them had to save these children by throwing them over the wall of the stadium where they were caught by the police and rescuers who were waiting outside. The human loss in this inferno was devastating. Of the fifty six people who perished in the blaze, two of them were supporters of the Lincoln football team while the rest were of Bradford football team. Among these were three victims who had unsuccessfully tried to escape through the toilets. They were found there completely burnt beyond recognition. Most of the victims who perished were found at exit K which was closed at the time of the inferno and these people were burnt to death struggling to force the door open. Elderly spectators who either could not manage to run for safety or were caught up in the stampede were found dead in the stadium. Some were found dead in their seats while others were found terribly crashed as they struggled to crawl below the turnstiles (Phil 2005). By the time the fire brigade arrived, the stadium had been badly destroyed to warrant any efforts of rescue fruitful. In fact, several stands were completely destroyed beyond recognition with it destroying property worth millions of dollars (Phil 2005). Preliminary investigation into this inferno incident recommended that the fire safety in football stadiums and preparedness of the managements of such facilities desperately needed to be amended to meet the required standards. The use of wooden stands in all foot ball stadiums across the United Kingdom was prohibited. It was revealed in the inquiry that the management of the Bradford stadium had severally been warned regarding the heap of rubbish beneath the stand but had taken no action. The inquiry further indicated that Bradford stadium management was reluctant to make adequate changes in renovation of the extant stands on the ground citing lack of funds as the reason that deterred them from doing the repairs. The wooden structures that posed as stands were thought to be great fire hazards and in this incident the fire catastrophe would have been reduced to manageable levels were it not for the wooden stands especially since the fire brigade’s response to the fire alarm was spontaneous. To adequately contain future fire incidents of this caliber, football stadiums should be installed with fire extinguishers in good working conditions and these stadiums should be made with materials that do not pose fire hazards such as bricks and certainly not wood. Conclusion In summary, building fires have been among the leading threats to human life and property in many countries world over. The frequency with which they repeat occurring all over is worrying. The reverberating cause blamed for these fire catastrophes usually is poor preparedness and inappropriate equipment. Most buildings are not installed with fire extinguishers and the few which have them installed are not usually in good working conditions. Most fire fighting agencies in these countries have stipulated safety directives that should be followed in construction of buildings but the unfortunate thing is that most private and corporate developers ignore these safety measures while building these buildings thereby suscepting residents of these buildings to great fire hazards. Governments in the same breathe, appear not to be very keen in checking and approving the safety of such buildings and only appear to come in the limelight in the event of fire tragedies. As indicated in the above case studies analyzed herein, it is clear that these fire catastrophes can be remarkably reduced to manageable levels should private developers and engineers who design and build these buildings and facilities strictly adhere to outlined safety measures given to alleviate fire accidents. It is however appreciably admissible that it may not be entirely possible to completely curtail and bring to an end all fire incidents but adhering to outlined safety measures such as ensuring that there are fire extinguishers installed in all buildings in places that can be clearly seen can go a long way in reducing these devastating fire catastrophes. References BBC News 2009, Two Fire Fighters Injured at Belfast College, Viewed on 3rd December 2009 . Britton, J, et al 2007, The Beauties of England and Wales, Or, Delineations, Topographical, Historical, And Descriptive, Of Each County, Thomas Maiden, Michigan. Firth, P 2005, Four Minutes to Hell: The Story of the Bradford City Fire, Parrs Wood, Manchester. Holmes, D 2008, Ancient Chester School Building Brought Down by a Fire. Viewed on 3rd December 2009< http://www.chesterchronicle.co.uk/chester-news/local-chester-news/2008> Phil, S 2005, Bradford City: After the Fire, The Independent. Stothart, C 2009, 200 Driven from Their Houses by A Peckham Fire, Housing Inside, Viewed on 3rd December 2009 . The Irish Times.com 2009, Fire Destroys Most of Belfast College, Viewed on 3rd December 2009.< http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/>. Wardrop, M 2009,150 People Vacate Their Homes As A Fire Rages Through Peckham. The Telegraph. Viewed on 3rd December 2009 . Appendix 1 Peckham fire near Sumner road courtesy of BBC retrieved from http://news.bbc.co.uk/local/london/hi/people_and_places/newsid_8380000/8380151.stm Appendix 2 Union Theological College ravaged in flames courtesy of BBC retrieved from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/northern_ireland/8360228.stm Appendix 3 Chester School fire courtesy of New South Wales Fire Brigade retrieved from http://www.nswfb.nsw.gov.au/page.php?id=726 Appendix 4 Bradford City Stadium fire retrieved from http://www.sukip.com/Others/Bradford_City_stadium_fire Read More