Construction Technology: Buncefield Accident - Case Study Example

Construction Technology: Buncefield Accident Name and ID Course Name & Code Instructor’s Name 15 January 2010 Table of Contents Table of Contents 2 Introduction 3 Incident Overview 3 Contaminated land and environment (Impact) 5 Step to redevelop the contaminated area 6 Hazard identification and assessment (Phase 1) 7 Risk Estimation and Evaluation (phase 2) 7 Remediation Strategy (phase 3) 7 Conclusion 11 Reference 12 Introduction Disasters are usually classified as either man made or natural. An example of natural disaster is the tsunami while manmade disaster is the London bombings. Such manmade disaster is the Buncefield accident. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to analyse Buncefield incident, impact of the incident on the environment, steps to be used in developing the area, and summary of key findings following investigation report. Incident Overview The incident occurred in the Buncefield oil storage and transfer deport that is used by three oil companies. These three oil companies are the West London Pipeline and Storage Limited, Hertfordshire Oil Storage Limited and United Kingdom Oil Pipelines Limited. These three sites are usually classified as ‘top tier’ based on the regulations under the Control of Major Accident Hazards (COMAH) 1996. The Buncefield fire that was caused by a series of explosion took place on 11 December 2005 at the Hertfordshire Oil Storage Terminal. It was the first largest depot and was owned by Texaco and Total UK Limited all located in UK. The first incident or explosion occurred near tank 912 at 06.01that lead to a series of explosions that overwhelmed 20 tanks (Buncefield Major Incident Investigation Board, 2008). The incident seemed an unconfined vapour cloud explosion that may be referred as a fuel-air explosion. Since vapour cloud explosion is associated with inversion layer, the explosion sound was heard more than 125 miles away. Moreover, the British Geological Survey estimated that the incident measured 2.4 on the Richter scale. Witnesses located many miles away claim that they saw flames hundreds of feet high while the smoke could be seen 70 miles away. The destruction caused by the incident was destructive; in fact, broken windows were reported in various buildings such as the Leverstock Green School, Holy Trinity, St. Albans Abbey, and Townsend School. It is assumed that the number of deaths could have been enormous, if the accident could have occurred when people were in the office (Great Britain: Hertfordshire Fire and Rescue Service, 2006). The explosion ripped through the buildings, shattering windows, cars in the nearby streets caught fire, a roof was blown off, and structural damage was likely. The incident resulted in forty three reported injuries, and two people were kept in hospital because of seriously, which include breathing difficulties. The incident was officially reported as a major emergency at 06:08 and fire fighting efforts were put in place. It is estimated that 20 support vehicles, 25 fire engines and 180 fire fighters were on site. The fire fighters put in place a containment measures before utilising foam to extinguish the fire. It was a large incident in which foam was supplied from many sites over the UK, and it may be termed as the largest fire extinguishing exercise. Because of the risk of population, the water reservoir was trained first, while thousand litres of foam were directed against the fire (Buncefield Major Incident Investigation Board, 2008). By 16:45, the tank fires were finally extinguished. An entire gold command operation was utilised and was stationed at Hertfordshire Constabulary – some distance from the fire. A small fire broke out on 14th December, but the fire fighters did not extinguish it and they left it to burn because it was a petroleum vapour that had escaped. The smoke that was caused by the fire was large and it is estimated that it reached heights of 2,700 meters. The smoke incident associated with hydrocarbons resulted in 244 people requiring medical assistance. 117 people symptoms were attributed to the accident in which 38 were members of the public while 63 were emergency workers who reported respiratory complaints (Buncefield Major Incident Investigation Board, 2008). Contaminated land and environment (Impact) The Buncefield incident produce the largest explosion since World War II and it released a plume of black smoke that was visible for many miles around, but the impact of the explosion to the environmental was minimal. Even though there was toxic fallout as rain drives particulate matter from the huge smoke back to the earth, the compound was be dispersed over a wide area and thus it did not cause any lasting problems. The large smoke that was evident in the vicinity of the incident and airborne particulate matter, it could have contributed or associated with aggravating existing respiratory problem such as asthma. However, the impact was minimal in that a large area had been evacuated, people were told to remain at homes, and others followed precautionary advice while the emergency workers wore protective clothing/equipment that ensured that no significant increase in cases. Moreover, the burning fuel plus the smoke may have emitted greenhouse carbon dioxide, through the view of humans; it had minimal impact on global scale. Most of the water that was used in the extinguishing process was pumped from the Grand Union Canal. Even though large quantities of water were pumped, it did not likely have a significant impact on the reserves especially those located on the South East. Generally, the major environmental disaster was posed by pollutants reaching the aquifer and thus contaminating water supply, and also damaging the land quality. This could only have been possible if some petrochemicals had escaped from the site, but since there was no evidence, hence the water was not contaminated. The fire-waters, petrol and oil could have enormous impact on ground and surface water quality and it could have contributed to aquatic life disaster. This disaster was prevented by collection of all run-offs in bunds around the site before the run off was analysed and then pumped to safe storage areas. Moreover, some boreholes and water companies had been closed to avoid contamination (Buncefield Major Incident Investigation Board, 2008). Step to redevelop the contaminated area The responsibility of any developer is to safeguard land and other property that may include land against any risk that is associated with contamination. This means that it is the responsibility of the developer to provide guarantees that the development is ‘suitable for use’ and safe for the purchase that it is intended to be used. Hence, the developer should determine if the proposed development will be affected by the contamination or whether the development may increase contamination. Thus, it is the role of the developer to satisfy the local authorities and other environmental agencies that remediation strategies could be fruitful and that it can be achieved with minimum environmental effect, and ensure that the development will be secure for occupancy or any activity that involves the community (Buncefield Major Incident Investigation Board, 2008). To understand and achieve the requirements on site, a developer should provide an Environmental Risk Assessment, which usually is composed of three phases. It is paramount to ensure that each phase is completed effective before progressing to the next. These phases include: Hazard identification and assessment (Phase 1) This step usually involves collection of data that could enable ‘conceptual site model’ establishment. His conceptual site model tries to define what may be referred to as pollutant linkage in that it considers potential contaminant sources, receptors and pathways (Great Britain: Hertfordshire Fire and Rescue Service, 2006). Moreover, the report contains information such as the history of the site, identification of all potential contaminative land uses, and determination of all contaminants that might be present on the development site. This results in the possibility of carry out a preliminary hazard assessment, and to determine if further investigation is required (Great Britain: Hertfordshire Fire and Rescue Service, 2006). Risk Estimation and Evaluation (phase 2) This step is usually associated with formulation and implementation of a Site Specific Survey. Strategies such as chemical analysis and intrusive investigation provides information and data, and with the help of specific risk estimation methodologies that has been undertaken against generic assessment criteria. Nevertheless, in those cases that unacceptable risks are pinpointed, detailed and site specific risk evaluation should be commenced (Great Britain: Department for Work and Pensions, 2008). Remediation Strategy (phase 3) The remediation strategy is usually introduced in those circumstances in which unacceptable risks are identified in risk estimation and evaluation stage (phase 2). This part of the developmental stage details the steps that should be taken to manage or remove all the risks that have been identified. Moreover, the remediation strategy that details all woks to be done should be submitted to the Council for approval before the developer can commence (Great Britain: Hertfordshire Fire and Rescue Service, 2006). Generally, the developer should develop the property in a manner that has been approved, and specifically approved method statement; this means that unforeseen contamination is corrected through the most appropriate manner. Moreover, the developer is supposed to provide a validation report that demonstrates that the work has been carried out effectively and that all the remedial targets have been achieved. Additionally, satisfactory arrangements should be in place for any ongoing maintenance or monitoring of any remedial strategies/measures that is required. Hence, it is beneficial for a developer to ensure that all phases requirement have been achieved and followed (Great Britain: Hertfordshire Fire and Rescue Service, 2006). Recommendations Some of recommendations that may streamline or prevent such incidents (Buncefield Major Incident Investigation Board, 2006): HSE should adopt a policy that ensures consistent application of specific risk assessment of land usage within sites of hazardous and are responsive to levels of risk. Important consideration should be improved on frequency data and source terms that are relevant to QRA at major hazard sites. A cross-government should adopt wide ranging review of planning the rise of land especially within non-nuclear sites. The review progress should incorporate integrity levels of major hazard, mitigation of incident on installations and populations, preparedness for emergencies, land use planning and specified regulatory system that is based on COMAH. Economic and financial consideration should be placed into consideration especially costs and benefits of restricted development, that may include regional economies, local business, relevant industry sector, and t use of land for public ad business amenity. It could be prudent to utilise market based mechanisms as per the recommendations of HSEs. Moreover, the HSE is supposed to communicate and coordinate such information with the economic community that have interest in the planning system. Guidance should clearly be provided and easily accessed by the public. The guidance should incorporate government stakeholders and devolved administration. It could be important for individual risk of fatality that could help expressing consequences of events and mitigate dangerous dose or worse. Any methodology that is important in such environments especially land use planning process should align with risk assessment based on COMAH regime. Other factors may include reliability of the engineered systems and vulnerability of physical assets (Fire Brigade Society, 2007). Engineering systems and operations should formulate and implement effectively maintenance of equipment and systems to guarantee their continuing integrity in operation. Sites should champion appropriate integrity levels (SILs) through guidance for determining SILs and development of appropriate standards. For each applicable site, the OMAH safety report should clearly define methodology when it is submitted to the Competent Authority. All ministries and governmental bodies such as BERR and HSE should introduce reforms to the hazardous substances consent system, ensuring simplifying and streamlining the withdrawal of consents, ensuring inventories are applicable to specific circumstances (Great Britain: Department for Work and Pensions, 2008). When implementation of risk-based system, the planning system should include co-ordination and receiving views from stakeholders, size and nature of population on site, environmental protection measures and safety integrity levels, mitigatory measures, strategic national/economic interest and future reductions of such incidents. HSE should bring together experts and stakeholders in the planning system agreeing on societal risk analysis, data source, societal risk values, and suitable weighing factor for services issues. The Pipeline Safety Regulations should be amended through the help of HSE ensuring that stringent measures are included. HSE should update, review, and publish documentation on means for handling land use planning and other major hazardous sites. Administrations and planning authorities should make sure appropriate expertise and other resources are available and should be incorporated in the revised planning system. The Competent Authority is supposed to ensure a framework is in place and planning authorities for assessing societal risks. Conclusion Disasters and accidents are inherent in a society that embraces technological development. Such disaster is the Buncefield incident in which series of explosions within the Hertfordshire Oil Storage Limited occurred. The incident that occurred on 11 December 2005 resulted in an explosion that overwhelmed 20 tanks. The smoke was seen 70 miles away, the sound was heard 125 miles away, while the energy was estimated at 2.4 on the Richter scale. The incident was destructive, ripping windows and roofs. The extent of environmental contamination was minimal because the government and community took appropriate measures and steps. The smoke and pollutants caused minimal respiratory problems, but were easily solved. Even though, ground and surface water was at risk, the measures and steps that were taken ensured the environment was protected. In developing a contaminated area, three phases are usually embraced by the developer. The three phases includes hazard identification and assessment, risk estimation and evaluation, and remediation strategy. Moreover, the investigation that was carried out provided numerous recommendations including collaboration between government, communities, and other stakeholders in ensuring that the society is safe and secure. Reference Buncefield Major Incident Investigation Board. 2006. Recommendations on Land use planning and the control of societal risk around major hazard areas. Available at: http://www.buncefieldinvestigation.gov.uk/reports/comahreport3.pdf [Accessed 15 January 2010] Buncefield Major Incident Investigation Board. 2008. Buncefield Investigation. Available at: http://www.buncefieldinvestigation.gov.uk/press/news.htm [Accessed 15 January 2010] Fire Brigade Society. 2007. Buncefield: The Incident and the Operation to Contain It. London: Fire Brigade Society. Great Britain: Hertfordshire Fire and Rescue Service. 2006. Buncefield: Hertfordshire Fire and Rescue Service's review of the fire response. London: The Stationery Office. Great Britain: Department for Work and Pensions. 2008. The Buncefield Investigation: The Government and Competent Authority's Response. London: The Stationery Office. Read More