The Station Discotheque Fire Disaster and the Gothenburg Discotheque Disaster - Case Study Example

Case Study of The Station Discotheque Fire Disaster and the Gothenburg Discotheque Disaster Student’s name Course name Instructor’s name Date of submission Part A Introduction This report is intended to find establish lessons in fire disaster management that may be learned from the Gothenburg discothèque fire in Sweden and the The Station nightclub fire in the United States. The Gothenburg fire happened on the night of October, 29, 1998. The accident occurred in a building leased to the Macedonia community in the town which had arranged for a disco for the night. The premises had a capacity of 150 persons but it was hosting 375 people on the night of whom 63 died and 200 sustained injuries. The fire was caused by teenagers that had been denied entry into the discotheque (Schneider, 2008, pp, 89-103). The severity of the fire disaster was as a result of a lack of exits out of the building. While the building had two only the main exit was open while the other exit had been blocked by furniture taken out of the room in order to make space for the night’s event. Evacuation of the building proved very difficult since with the discovery of the fire there was a lot of panic inside the room resulting in all the revellers rushing to the main exit this reduced the effectiveness of the main exit leading to slower evacuation time. The disaster was further complicated by the large number of people outside the club and those who had been injured which made it hard to access the building. The Station night club fire occurred on February 20th 2003 at the Station which was a night club in West Warwick Rhode Island. This fire has lessons which are crucial in disaster management just like the Gothenburg discotheque fire. The fire in this instance was as a result of the setting off of pyrotechnics which ignited flammable sound proofing engulfing the night club in flames within five and a half minutes. The resulting fire resulted in 100 deaths and numerous others were seriously injured (National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2005, pp. 456-490). The Station nightclub fire’s severity was as a result of the highly flammable polyutherane material that had been used as finishing of the clubs interior. Fire alarm systems in the building wer also weak and were not effective for responding to an emergency situation such as occurred on that night. While the building had several exits the design did not take into account human behaviour. During the ensuing panic, most of the revellers rushed to the main exit clogging it even though there were several exits out of the building. Panic both inside and outside the building also increased the severity of the disaster by restricting access to fire fighters and rescue personnel. Gothenburg Disco fire (Schneider, 2008, pp, 76). The Station night club fire (Parker, 2007 pp.221) Sequence of Events of the Gothenburg Disco fire Time Sequence of events 9:00 Halloween party hosted by the Macedonia association starts at a leased discotheque 00:00 DJ opens the door to the southeast stairwell and fire and smoke pours into the hall. There is however no announcement of the fire and revellers are oblivious to the danger 00:35 Fire gets out of control and fire brigade is called in but is unable to access the building due to chaos and a large number of the injured on the ground 00:50 Chaos as the crowd surges forward in effort to rescue friends hampering efforts of rescue and fire fighting by the fire brigade 01:50 Fire is finally extinguished with heavy loss of life Sequence of events of the Station Night Club fire Time Sequence of events 09:00 Discotheque opens with the main act Great White taking to the stage 09:21 Pyrotechnic props used during the performance of desert moon set fire to flammable sound proofing of the building 09:30 Fire gets out of control leading to panic inside the club and revelers head for the main exit. 09:45 Fire brigade gets to the scene and extinguishes the fire within an hour with heavy loss of life reported Similarities of the two Incidents The two incidents have certain similarities which are glaring and which offer an option for avoiding such disasters in future. The two disasters are both classified in the manmade category of disasters. Both of these disasters were started by human action with the Gothenburg being the result of delinquent behavior while the Station fire was as a result of disregard for safety (Schneider, 2008, pp. 89-103). The most significant similarity of the two incidents is the chaotic nature of the rescue operations. Both the incidents did not have a working system of crowd control which resulted into stampedes. Even as both establishments had several exits out of the building the security did not have the necessary crowd control systems which would have ensured that people used all the exits thus eliminating the possibility of stampedes. The highly disastrous effect of the two disasters in both instances is a s result of panic which resulted in a stampede. Both the two building s had an excess number of occupants when the fire started which complicated evacuation and led to more loss of life. The Station night club fire (Parker, 2007 pp. 87) The Gothenburg night club fire (Schneider, 2008, pp, 109) Differences between the two incidents The two incidents also have similarities which could prove helpful in the prevention of future disasters. The Gothenburg fire was as a result of delinquent behavior while the Station night club fire was simply a matter of human error. The Gothenburg incident happened in a building which was not usually used for discotheques. The Station night club fire on the other hand ought to have had more safeguards in place since it was a night club that had been in operation for sometime and as such disasters were to be foreseen (Shields and Proulx, 2000, pp. 95-114). The Station night club fire resulted from the unforeseen circumstance of pyrotechnics in the act. The Gothenburg incident was a matter of a lapse in security arrangements. The implication of these differences in the cause of the two fires is with regard to future prevention. The most important implication of this is that more attention on human factors s human error and criminal behavior ought to be taken into account in disaster preparedness and prevention. Both fires were as a result of human factors of negligence and human criminal activity. Consequences of the Two Incidents The two incidents are a wake up call to disaster prevention and management particularly the management of fire disasters. The fire disasters led to the death of many people with over a hundred deaths in the Station night club fire and 63 in the Gothenburg disaster. Hundreds more were injured in these disasters which could have been avoided if proper measures had been undertaken. The Gothenburg disaster was blamed on two Immigrant Iranian students who set fire to the building. This brings into sharper focus the need to not only take elements of human error into fighting and deterring disasters but also the element of criminal behavior. The Station nightclub disaster was blamed on the cheap flammable sound proofing used by the club. It can also be blamed on negligence by management for not foreseeing such an eventuality particularly in approving the use of pyrotechnics in the club. Investigation of the Incidents Investigation into the Gothenburg incident was conducted by the Swedish police immediately after the fire. Initial speculation ranged from the fire being an instance of human error to arson. The investigation finally established that the fire was caused by four teenagers that were refused admission into the discotheque by security. The four delinquents then started a fire behind the emergency exit which reduced the options of the revelers as they were left with only one exit (Proulx, 2003, pp. 356-367). The investigation established that the room was not normally used as a discotheque. The room had some furniture most of which had been removed and stored in the southeast stairwell where it fanned the fire. While there was an exit at the two ends of the hallways only one was working as the other one was full of the furniture stored there for the night of dancing. The investigation also established that while there were lighted exit signs in the building, the building lacked any sprinkler or any other system of fire alert. The discotheque had not contacted the fire brigade as required by law in the gathering of such a large number of people. This resulted in a late response from the fire brigade leading to further loss of life. The building capacity was also exceeded since the premises were built to hold 150 persons yet it was holding 375 people at the time of the disaster. Investigation into the Station nightclub fire was conducted by the state police was conducted by the state police after the aftermath of the incident. Unlike the Gothenburg disaster, the Station night club fire was deemed to be as a result of human error and negligence. The fire was established to be as a result of the inadvertent setting of fire to the foam sound proofing by the tour manager during the performance of a stunt. While the building had three main exits but they were simply not enough for quick evacuation since the building had more occupants than its carrying capacity. Most of the occupants of the premises attempted to exit through the main door through which they entered. Staff assistance would have been instrumental in evacuation of these people through the exits offered (Grosshandler and Bryner, 2005, pp. 189-244). Station discotheque buiding (Parker, 2007 pp.54) The heat detection alarm system was activated after 41 seconds which was deemed to be too long an interval as it is one of the reasons for the late evacuation. The use of highly inflammable materials for the sound proofing was largely to blame for the fire. More vigilance on activities in the club would however have prevented this by guiding the participants on safety procedures. Lack of foresight and disaster preparedness played a large part in the large number of people that lost their lives. Part B Human Factors While structural and design issues play a major role in determining the severity of disasters, human factors also play a significant role as was evidenced in both the Gothenburg and the Station discotheque disasters. The most significant human factor in times of disaster is panic. Panic during times of disaster usually leads to irrational behavior that makes a bad situation even worse thus putting people at more danger (Quarantelli, 2001, pp. 345-376). While panic played a significant part in the severity of the two disasters it was not the only human factor. There are other factors such as human error and malice which came into play in the two disasters that led to the increased severity of the disasters. Panic is described as irrational behavior that people demonstrate when they are in difficult situations (Parker, 2007, pp. 89-95). In the two disasters, the element of panic was instrumental in the death and injury of more people than was necessary. In Gothenburg when it became clear that the building was on fire, all the patrons rushed to the main exit even as there was another extra exit. This resulted into a stampede as the main exit became a bottleneck and was not able to discharge people at its optimum rate. The Station discotheque people exhibited panic behavior similar to their Gothenburg counterparts. While the premises had several open exits most of the people rushed to the main exit in panic and resulted in a stampede. Studies have shown that exits with a capacity of discharging three people every second are reduced to only one a second during a stampede. Human error is evident in the Station discotheque disaster. There was an error of judgment on the part of the management in allowing the tour manager to make use of pyrotechnics in such an atmosphere. The decision to use highly flammable material for sound proofing was also human error that increased the likelihood of fire disaster and its severity. The Gothenburg disaster also had human error in blocking most of the emergency exits with highly flammable material. The fire at 40 seconds (Schneider, 2008 pp. 78) The two disasters whoever had a difference in how they were started? While the Gothenburg disaster was intentionally set, the Station discotheque disaster was inadvertently set. Errors in Design with Regard to Human Behavior Both the disasters were made more severe due to weaknesses in structural design that did not take into account or wrongly predicted human behavior in times of crisis. The Gothenburg discotheque had major flaws in its design which did not take into account human behavior during a panic situation. The management made an assumption of orderly exit in times of disaster. The capacity of the building was 150 people. While the building could definitely hold more, the designers designated the number 150 in order to cater for exit in emergency situations through the two exits. The blocking of one exit and the panic situation therefore meant that the place was unable to discharge people fast enough hence the high number of casualties (Bryner, 2004, pp. 223-231). View down the main stair of Gothenburg blocked stairwell (Schneider, 2008 pp.112) The Station discotheque premises also had serious flaws in the design and planning process that did not take into account human behavior. While the premises had three exits whose direction was marked on the floor this was an error since human behavior in panic situation would more likely be to search for exit and little attention would be paid to the floor. Exit signs ought to have been painted on the walls rather than on the floor. The design of some of the exit doors was also erroneous in that they opened to the inside. This is ineffective in emergency and panic situations since people tend to push people towards the exit and thus it would be impossible to open the exit door since people would be pressed against the door (Fahy, 2009, pp. 297-323.). There was an error in predicting human behavior in the assumption that people would look for alternative exits in emergency situations. Studies have established that people in panic situations would normally tend to look for the familiar. In this instance the revelers would most likely head to the door through which they had entered rather than look for other doors that they knew nothing about (Cocking, 2009, pp. 126-154). The design of the main door should thus be in a manner that makes it the widest door which opens both to the outside and the inside. Analysis of the Likelihood of these Events happening again of the Same Scale While the two disasters both happened in discotheques it is disturbing to see that there are many aspects of similarity between the two incidents. While the Gothenburg discotheque disaster happened in 1998 the Station discotheque disaster happened five years later with similar circumstances. The Gothenburg disaster made an error in wrongly predicting human behavior and in the design of the exits in times of emergency. While the Station discotheque disaster happened five years later it is evident that the discotheque learnt little in emergency preparedness and premises design. What is even more glaring is that the Station discotheque was an established discotheque as opposed to the Gothenburg discotheque which had only been leased. The Station discotheque had vaguely painted exit signs and most of the exit doors opened to the inside. The exit doors were also not wide enough to cater for emergency situations. The Gothenburg disaster however seems to have offered some lessons since the number of exits in the Station discotheque was increased. While there have not been any major discotheque fire incidents in the recent past the likelihood of such disasters reoccurring still remains great. Many establishments have not learnt from major fire incidents and their disaster preparedness is wanting. Inspectorate divisions that would enforce adherence to safety standards are also not effective enough as the Station disaster evidenced (Schneider, 2008, pp. 89-103). Conclusions and Recommendations This report has analyzed the incidence of fire disaster management focusing on issues of design and how they relate to human behavior. This paper has thus shown this relationship and how it is to be used in coming up with systems that would take into account these factors in order to come up with safer premises. This paper thus came up with the following recommendations: All nightclubs with a capacity of 100 or more should be required to install automatic fire sprinklers in their premises. Premises which regularly host a large number of people ought to be forbidden from the use of highly flammable materials such as polyutherane for finishing. The factor of safety for premises hosting a large number of people should have limits set on them. This will include the determination of the capacity of the exits for evacuation taking into account other circumstances such as inaccessibility of some exit routes. Staff and security of such premises ought to receive better training on crowd control and evacuation procedures in emergencies. Design of buildings ought to take into account human behavior and this should be enforced in conjunction with city inspectorates. Signage ought to be made more visible for instance through flashing lights during emergencies or special announcements regarding exit routes There should be provided multiple entries into discotheques in order to increase awareness of the available exits for the revelers. Revelers ought to be made aware of emergency procedures and exits through regular brochures to the regular party goers who normally frequent the same discotheques. Bibliography Bryner, N. (2004). Fire spread through a room with polyutherane foam covered walls. Interscience communicns Ltd , 223-231. Cocking, C. (2009). The psychological of crowd behavior in emergency situations: Results from two interview studies and implications for Fire and Rescue Services. Irish Journal of Psychology , 126-154. Fahy, R. (2009). Occupant response and evacuation at the Station Nightclub Fire - An analysis of witness statements. International Symposium on Human Behavior in Fire, (pp. 297-323). Grosshandler, W., & Bryner, N. (2005). Reconstructing the Station Nightclub Fire - Materials testing and small scale experiments. Interflam , 189-244. National Institute of Standards and Technology. (2005). Report of the Technical Investigation of The Station Nightclub Fire. Washington, DC:: Government Printing Office. Parker, P. (2007). Tally of a Tragedy: 462 were in The Station on night off fire. The Providence Journal , 89-95. Proulx, B. (2003). A stress model for people facing a fire. Journal of Environmental Psychology , 356-367. Quarantelli, E. (2001). The sociology of panic. New York, NY: Pergamon Press. Schneider, B. (2008). The reference model SimPan - Agent-based modeling of human behavior in panic situations. Tenth International Conference on Computer Modeling and Simulation (pp. 89-103). New York: IEEE Computer Society. Shields, T., & Proulx, G. (2000). The science of human behavior: Past research endevors, current developments and fashioning a research agenda. Fire Safety Science - Proceedings of the Sixth International Symposium (pp. 95-114). Boston, MA: International Association for Fire Safety Science. Read More