The paper "Woodrow Wilson Wouldn’t Yield" is an outstanding example of a history book review. Woodrow Wilson’s stubbornness and arrogance created a hostile Congress that would not allow his League of Nation to pass. Thomas Bailey presents Woodrow Wilson’s unwillingness to yield as the reason for the League of Nation’s failure. Before leaving to attend peace talks at the end of WWII, Wilson laid out a fourteen point plan on his ambitions for the peace talks. These fourteen points tried to bring an idealism of democracy toward the rest of the world. In order to “end all wars”, Wilson felt that a League of Nation would basically police the world toward ideals of democracy (Bailey 109). Wilson felt that out of the League of Nation’s point was the most important according to Bailey. However, Wilson’s arrogance turned off a Republican majority Senate. After falling ill, Democrats gave in and sided with the Republicans to kill the bill. Bailey did prove the thesis statement. Bailey’s thesis statement was biased against Woodrow Wilson. This bias took away from the article’s legitimacy. Bailey used phrases like “a stern moral code that would tolerate no compromise with wrong, as defined by Woodrow Wilson” or “contempt for ‘money-grubbing’ lawyers…in the Senate“ (Bailey 106). Wilson was inflexible on the League of Nation. Bailey could have pointed out this inflexibility without using inflammatory remarks about Wilson and even Lodge. Bailey did not know what Wilson or Lodge thought or felt.
WOODROW WILSON WOULDN’T YIELD
While Paris cheered “Voovro” the isolationist crowds back home cried Impeach him!” and in a clash of imperious wills his dream evaporated
By THOMAS A. BAILEY
Only a quarter century before the United States took a major part in forming the United Nations at San Francisco in 1945, the same nation sharply turned its back on the predecessor world organization, the League of Nations, and broke the heart of its stubborn, idealistic architect. The story of this great negative decision, still a matter of debate, is examined here by Thomas A. Bailey, Byrne Professor of American History at Stanford University, in the final article of the series, “Times of Trial in American Statecraft.”
The story of America’s rejection of the League of Nations revolves largely around the personality and character of Thomas Woodrow Wilson.
Born in Virginia and reared in Yankee-gutted Georgia and the Carolinas, Wilson early developed a burning hatred of war and a passionate attachment to the Confederate-embraced principle of self-determination for minority peoples. From the writings of Thomas Jefferson, he derived much of his democratic idealism and his invincible faith in the judgment of the masses, if properly informed. From his stiff-backed ScotchPresbyterian forebears, he inherited a high degree of inflexibility; from his father, a dedicated Presbyterian minister, he learned a stern moral code that would tolerate no compromise with wrong, as defined by Woodrow Wilson.
As a leading academician who had first failed at law, he betrayed a contempt for “money-grubbing” lawyers, many of whom sat in the Senate, and an arrogance toward lesser intellects, including those of the “pygmy-minded” senators. As a devout Christian keenly aware of the wickedness of this world, he emerged as a fighting reformer, whether as president of Princeton, governor of New Jersey, or President of the United States.
As a war leader, Wilson was superb. Holding aloft the torch of idealism in one hand and the flaming sword of righteousness in the other, he aroused the masses to a holy crusade. We would fight a war to end wars; we would make the world safe for democracy. The phrase was not a mockery then. The American people, with an amazing display of self-sacrifice, supported the war effort unswervingly.
The noblest expression of Wilson’s idealism was his Fourteen Points address to Congress in January 1918. It compressed his aims into punchy, placard-like paragraphs, expressly designed for propaganda purposes. It appealed tremendously to oppressed peoples everywhere by promising such goals as the end of secret treaties, freedom of the seas, the removal of economic barriers, a reduction of arms burdens, a fair adjustment of colonial claims, and self-determination for oppressed minorities. In Poland university, men would meet on the streets of Warsaw, clasp hands, and soulfully utter one word, “Wilson.” In remote regions of Italy, peasants burned candles before poster portraits of the mighty new prophet arisen in the West.
The fourteenth and capstone point was a league of nations, designed to avert future wars. The basic idea was not original with Wilson; numerous thinkers, including Frenchmen and Britons, had been working on the concept long before he embraced it. Even Henry Cabot Lodge, the Republican senator from Massachusetts, had already spoken publicly in favor of a league of nations. But the more he heard about the Wilsonian League of Nations, the more critical of it he became.
A knowledge of the Wilson-Lodge feud is basic to an understanding of the tragedy that unfolded. Tall, slender, aristocratically bewhiskered, Dr. Henry Cabot Lodge (Ph.D., Harvard), had published a number of books and had been known as the scholar in politics before the appearance of Dr. Woodrow Wilson (Ph.D., Johns Hopkins). The Presbyterian professor had gone further in both scholarship and politics than the Boston Brahmin, whose mind was once described as resembling the soil of his native New England: “naturally barren but highly cultivated.” Wilson and Lodge, two icy men, developed a mutual antipathy, which soon turned into freezing hatred.
The German armies, reeling under the blows of the Allies, were ready to give in by November 1918. The formal armistice terms stipulated that Germany was to be guaranteed a peace based on the Fourteen Points, with two reservations concerning freedom of the seas and reparations.
Meanwhile, the American people had keyed themselves up to the long-awaited march on Berlin; eager voices clamored to hang the Kaiser. Thus the sudden end of the shooting left inflamed patriots with a sense of frustration and letdown that boded ill for Wilson’s policies. The red-faced Theodore Roosevelt, Lodge’s intimate of long standing, cried that peace should be dictated by the chatter of machine guns and not the clicking of typewriters.
Wilson now towered at the dizzy pinnacle of his popularity and power. He had emerged as the moral arbiter of the world and the hope of all peoples for a better tomorrow. But regrettably his wartime sureness of touch began to desert him, and he made a series of costly fumbles. He was so preoccupied with reordering the world, someone has said, that he reminded one of the baseball players who knocks the ball into the bleachers and then forgets to touch home plate.
First came his brutally direct appeal for a Democratic Congress in October 1918. The voters trooped to the polls the next month and, by a narrow margin, returned a Republican Congress. Wilson had not only goaded his partisan foes to fresh outbursts of fury, but he had unnecessarily staked his prestige on the outcome—and lost. When the Allied leaders met at the Paris peace table, he was the only one not entitled to be there, at least on the European basis of a parliamentary majority.
Wilson next announced that he was sailing for France, presumably to use his still enormous prestige to fashion an enduring peace. At that time no President had ever gone abroad, and Republicans condemned the decision as evidence of a dangerous Messiah complex—of a desire, as former President Taft put it, “to hog the whole show.”
The naming of the remaining five men to the peace delegation caused partisans further anguish. Only one, Henry White, was a Republican, and he was a minor figure at that. The Republicans, now the majority party, complained that they had been good enough to die on the battlefield; they ought to have at least an equal voice at the peace table. Nor were any United States senators included, even though they would have a final whack at the treaty. Wilson did not have much respect for the “bungalow-minded” senators, and if he took one, the logical choice would be Henry Cabot Lodge. There were already enough feuds brewing at Paris without taking one along.
Doubtless, some of the Big Business Republicans were out to “get” the President who had been responsible for the hated reformist legislation of 1913–14. If he managed to put over the League of Nations, his prestige would soar to new heights. He might even arrange—unspeakable thought!—to be elected again and again and again. Much of the partisan smog that finally suffocated the League would have been cleared away if Wilson had publicly declared, as he was urged to do, that in no circumstances would he run again. But he spurned such counsel, partly because he was actually receptive to the idea of a third term.
The American President, hysterically hailed by European crowds as “Voovro Veelson,” came to the Paris peace table in January 1919, to meet with Lloyd George of Britain, Clemenceau of France, and Orlando of Italy. To his dismay, he soon discovered that they were far more interested in imperialism than in idealism. When they sought to carve up the territorial booty without regard for the colonials, contrary to the Fourteen Points, the stern-jawed Presbyterian moralist interposed a ringing veto. The end result was the mandate system—a compromise between idealism and imperialism that turned out to be more imperialistic than idealistic.
Wilson’s overriding concern was the League of Nations. He feared that if he did not get it completed and embedded in the treaty, the imperialistic powers might sidetrack it. Working at an incredible pace after hours, Wilson headed the commission that drafted the League Covenant in ten meetings and some thirty hours. He then persuaded the conference not only to approve the hastily constructed Covenant but to incorporate it bodily in the peace treaty. In support of his adopted brainchild, he spoke so movingly on one occasion that even the hard-boiled reporters forgot to take notes.
Wilson now had to return hurriedly to the United States to sign bills and take care of other pressing business. Shortly after his arrival, the mounting Republican opposition in the Senate flared up angrily. On March 4, 1919, 39 senators or senators-elect—more than enough to defeat the treaty—published a round robin to the effect that they would not approve the League in its existing form. This meant that Wilson had to return to Paris, hat in hand, and there weaken his position by having to seek modifications.
Stung to the quick, he struck back at his senatorial foes in an indiscreet speech in New York just before his departure. He boasted that when he brought the treaty back from Paris, the League Covenant would not only be tied in but so thoroughly tied in that it could not be cut out without killing the entire pact. The Senate, he assumed, would not dare to kill the treaty of peace outright.
At Paris, the battle was now joined in deadly earnest. Clemenceau, the French realist, had little use for Wilson, the American idealist. “God gave us the ten commandments and we broke them,” he reportedly sneered. “Wilson gave us the Fourteen Points —we shall see.” Clemenceau’s most disruptive demand was for the German Rhineland; but Wilson, the champion of self-determination, would never consent to hand several million Germans over to the tender mercies of the French. After a furious struggle, during which Wilson was stricken with influenza, Clemenceau was finally persuaded to yield the Rhineland and other demands in return for a security treaty. Under it, Britain and America agreed to come to the aid of France in the event of another unprovoked aggression. The United States Senate shortsightedly pigeonholed the pact, and France was left with neither the Rhineland nor security.
Two other deadlocks almost broke up the conference. Italy claimed the Adriatic port of Finnic, an area inhabited chiefly by Yugoslavs. In his battle for self-determination, Wilson dramatically appealed over the head of the Italian delegation to the Italian people, whereupon the delegates went home in a hull to receive a popular endorsement. The final adjustment was a hollow victory for self-determination.
The politely bowing Japanese now stepped forward Io press their economic claims to China’s Shantung, which they had captured from the Germans early in the war. But to submit 30,000,000 Chinese to the influence of the Japanese would be another glaring violation of self-determination. The Japanese threatened to bolt the conference, as the Italians had already done, with consequent jeopardy to the League. In the end, Wilson reluctantly consented to a compromise that left the Japanese temporarily in possession of Shantung.
The Treaty of Versailles, as finally signed in June 1919, included only about lour of the original Fourteen Points. The Germans, with considerable justification, gave vent to loud cries of betrayal. But the iron hand of circumstance had forced Wilson to compromise away many of his points in order to salvage his fourteenth point, the League of Nations, which he hoped would iron out the injustices that had crept into the treaty. He was like the mother who throws her younger children to the pursuing wolves in order to save her sturdy first-born son.
Bitter opposition to the completed treaty had already begun to form in America. Tens of thousands of homesick and disillusioned soldiers were pouring home, determined to let Europe “stew in its own juice.” The wartime idealism, inevitably doomed to slump, was now plunging to alarming depths. The beloved Allies had apparently turned out to be greedy imperialists. The war to make the world safe for democracy had obviously fallen dismally short of the goal. And at the end of the war to end wars there were about twenty conflicts of varying intensity being waged all over the globe.
The critic’s increased their clamor. Various foreign groups, including the Irish-Americans and the Italian-Americans, were complaining that the interests of the old country had been neglected. Professional liberals, for example, the editors of the New Republic, were denouncing the treaty as too harsh. The liberals, far more numerous, were denouncing it as not harsh enough. The Britain-haters, like the buzz-saw Senator, James Reed of Missouri and the acid-penned William R. Hearst, were proclaiming that England had emerged with undue influence. Such ultra-nationalists as the isolationist Senator William E. Borah of Idaho were insisting that the flag of no superstate should he hoisted above the glorious Stars and Stripes.
When the treaty came back from Paris, with the League firmly riveted in, Senator Lodge despaired of stopping it.
“What are you going to do? It’s hopeless,” he complained to Borah. “All the newspapers in my state are for it.” The best that he could hope for was to add a few reservations. The Republicans had been given little opportunity to help write the treaty in Paris; they now I’elt that they were entitled to do a little rewriting in “Washington.
Lodge deliberately adopted the technique to delay. As chairman of the powerful Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, he consumed two weeks by reading aloud the entire pact of 2(14 pages, even though it had already been printed. He then held time-consuming public hearings, during which persons with unpronounceable foreign names aired their grievances against the pact.
Lodge finally adopted the strategy of taking reservations onto the treaty, and he was able to achieve his goal because of the peculiar composition of the Senate. There were 49 Republicans and 47 Democrats. The Republicans consisted of about twenty “strong reservationists” like Lodge, about twelve “mild reservationists” like future Secretary of State Kellogg, and about a dozen “irreconcilables.” This last group was headed by Senator Borah and the no less isolationist Senator Hiram Johnson of California, a fiery spellbinder.
The Lodge reservations finally broke the back of the treaty. They were all added by a simple majority vote, even though the entire pact would have to be approved by a two-thirds vote. The dozen or so Republican mild reservationists were not happy over the strong Lodge reservations, and if Wilson had deferred sufficiently to these men, he might have persuaded them to vote with the Democrats. Had they done so, the Lodge reservations could have all been voted down, and a milder version, perhaps acceptable to Wilson, could have been substituted.
As the hot summer of 1919 wore on, Wilson became increasingly impatient with the deadlock in the Senate. Finally, he decided to take his case to the country, as he had so often done in response to his ingrained “appeal habit.” He had never been robust, and his friends urged him not to risk breaking himself down in a strenuous barnstorming campaign. But Wilson, having made up his mind, was unyielding. He had sent American boys into battle in a war to end wars; why should he not risk his life in a battle for a League to end wars?
Wilson’s spectacular tour met with limited enthusiasm in the Middle West, the home of several million German-Americans. After him, like baying bloodhounds, trailed Senators Boruh and Johnson, sometimes speaking in the same halls a day or so later, to the accompaniment of cries of “Impeach him, impeach him!” But on the Pacific Coast and in the Rocky Mountain area the enthusiasm for Wilson and the League was overwhelming. The high point—and the breaking point—of the trip came at Pueblo, Colorado, where Wilson, with tears streaming down his cheeks, pleaded for his beloved League of Nations.
That night Wilson’s weary body rebelled. He was whisked back to Washington, where he suffered a stroke that paralyzed the left side of his body. For weeks he lay in bed, a desperately sick man. The Democrats, who had no first-rate leader in the Senate, were left rudderless. With the wisdom of hindsight, we may say that Wilson might better have stayed in Washington, providing the necessary leadership and compromising with the opposition, insofar as the compromise was possible. A good deal of compromise had already gone into the treaty, and a little more might have saved it.
Senator Lodge, cold and decisive, was now in the driver’s seat. His Fourteen Reservations, a sardonic parallel to Wilson’s Fourteen Points, had been whipped into shape. Most of them now seem either irrelevant, inconsequential, or unnecessary; some of them merely reaffirmed principles and policies, including the Monroe Doctrine, already guaranteed by the treaty or by the Constitution.
But Wilson, who hated the sound of Lodge’s name, would have no part of the Lodge reservations. They would, he insisted, emasculate the entire treaty. Yet the curious fact is that he had privately worked out his own set of reservations with the Democratic leader in the Senate, Gilbert M. Hitchcock, and these differed only in slight degree from those of Senator Lodge.
As the hour approached for the crucial vote in the Senate, it appeared that public opinion had veered a little. Although confused by the angry debate, it still favored the treaty—but with some safeguarding reservations. A stubborn Wilson was unwilling to accept this disheartening fact, or perhaps he was not made aware of it. Mrs. Wilson, backed by the President’s personal physician, Dr. Gary Grayson, kept vigil at his bedside to warn the few visitors that disagreeable news might shock the invalid into a relapse.
In this highly unfavorable atmosphere, Senator Hitchcock had two conferences with Wilson on the eve of the Senate voting. He suggested the compromise on a certain point, but Wilson shot back, “Let Lodge compromise!” Hitchcock conceded that the Senator would have to give ground but suggested that the White House might also hold out the olive branch. “Let Lodge hold out the olive branch,” came the stern reply. On this inflexible note, and with Mrs. Wilson’s anxiety mounting, the interview ended.
The Senate was ready for final action on November 19, 1919. At the critical moment, Wilson sent a fateful letter to the Democratic minority in the Senate, urging them to vote down the treaty with the hated Lodge reservations so that a true ratification could be achieved. The Democrats, with more than the necessary one-third veto, heeded the voice of their crippled leader and rejected the treaty with reservations. The Republicans, with more than the necessary one-third veto, rejected the treaty without reservations.
The country was shocked by this exhibition of legislative paralysis. About four-fifths of the senators professed to favor the treaty in some form, yet they were unable to agree on anything. An aroused public opinion forced the Senate to reconsider, and Lodge secretly entered into negotiations with the Democrats in an effort to work out acceptable reservations. He was making promising progress when Senator Borah got wind of his maneuvers through an anonymous telephone call. The leading irreconcilables hastily summoned a council of war, hauled Lodge before them, and bluntly accused him of treachery. Deeply disturbed, the Massachusetts Senator said: “Well, I suppose I’ll have to resign as majority leader.”
“No, by God!” burst out Borah. “You won’t have a chance to resign! On Monday, I’ll move for the election of a new majority leader and give the reasons for my action.” Faced with an upheaval within his party such as had insured Wilson’s election in 1912, Lodge agreed to drop his backstage negotiations.
The second-chance vote in the Senate came on March 19, 1920. Wilson again directed his loyal Democratic following to reject the treaty, disfigured as it was by the hateful Lodge reservations. But by this time there was no other form in which the pact could possibly be ratified. Twenty-one realistic Democrats turned their backs on Wilson and voted Yea; 23 loyal Democrats, mostly from the rock-ribbed South, joined with the irreconcilables to do the bidding of the White House. The treaty, though commanding a simple majority this time of 49 Yeas to 35 Nays, failed of the necessary two-thirds vote.
Wilson, struggling desperately against the Lodge reservation trap, had already summoned the nation in “solemn referendum” to give him a vote in favor of the League in the forthcoming presidential election of 1920. His hope was that he could then get the treaty approved without reservations. But this course was plainly futile. Even if all the anti-League senators up for re-election in 1920 had been replaced by the proLeague senators, Wilson would still have lacked the necessary two-thirds majority for an unreserved treaty.
The American people were never given a chance to express their views directly on the League of Nations. All they could do was vote either for the weak Democratic candidate, Cox, who stood for the League, and the stuffed-shirt Republican candidate, Harding, who wobbled all over the map of the League arguments. If the electorate had been given an opportunity to express itself, a powerful majority probably would have favored the world organization, with at least some reservations. But wearied of Wilsonism, idealism, and self-denial, and confused by the wordy fight over the treaty, the voters rose up and swept Harding into the White House on a tidal wave of votes. The winner had been more anti-League than pro-League, and his prodigious plurality of 7,000,000 votes condemned the League to death in America.
What caused this costly failure of American statesmanship?
Wilson’s physical collapse intensified his native stubbornness. A judicious compromise here and there no doubt would have secured Senate approval of the treaty, though of course with modifications. Wilson believed that in any event, the Allies would reject the Lodge reservations. The probabilities are that the Allies would have worked out some kind of acceptance, so dire was their need for America’s economic support, but Wilson never gave them a chance to act.
Senator Lodge was also inflexible, but prior to the second rejection, he was evidently trying to get the treaty through—on his own terms. As majority leader of the Republicans, his primary task was to avoid another fatal split in his party. Wilson’s primary task was to get the pact approved. From a purely political point of view, the Republicans had little to gain by engineering ratification of a Democratic treaty.
The two-thirds rule in the Senate, often singled out as the culprit, is of little relevance. Wilson almost certainly would have pigeonholed the treaty if it had passed with the Lodge reservations appended.
Wilson’s insistence that the League is wedded to the treaty actually contributed to the final defeat of both. Either would have had a better chance if it had not been burdened by the enemies of the other. The United Nations, one should note, was set up in 1945 independently of any peace treaty.
Finally, American public opinion in 1919–20 was not yet ready for the onerous new world responsibilities that had suddenly been forced upon it. The isolationist tradition was still potent, and it was fortified by postwar disillusionment. If the sovereign voters had spoken out for the League with one voice, they almost certainly would have had their way. A treaty without reservations, or with a few reservations acceptable to Wilson, doubtless would have slipped through the Senate. But the American people were one war short of accepting leadership in a world organization for peace.
Professor Bailey has written such books as Woodrow Wilson and the Lost Peace, Woodrow Wilson, and the Great Betrayal, A Diplomatic History of the American People, and the recently published The American Pageant.