Transnational Organised Crime and Conflict-Affected and Fragile States - Assignment Example

Vulnerability of conflict-affected and fragile states to Transnational Organised Crime (TOC) Name Course code Instructor Date Table of Contents Table of Contents 2 Introduction 3 Background of fragile/conflict-affected states and TOC 4 Theoretical Framework 6 Reasons for spread of TOC into fragile states 9 Fragmentation of institutions in fragile/conflict-affected states 10 Social fragmentation in fragile or conflict-affected states 13 Social and economic inequalities in fragile/conflict-affected states 14 Expansion of criminal activities globally 19 Conclusion 20 References 21 1. Question: It has been argued that conflict-affected and fragile states are especially vulnerable to the dynamics of Transnational Organised Crime (TOC)and may provide more favourable conditions for its development. Critically analyse the cogency of this affirmation. Introduction Miraglia et al. defines transnational organised crime (TOC) as an industry that is both unstable and diversified, and which takes part in unlawful activities that may range from sea piracy, money laundering, to human and drug trafficking1. While there is sufficient evidence to suggest that TOC does affect stable states, fragile states and conflict-affected states are particularly susceptible to this kind of organised crime, as they substantially present conditions that favour the development and prevalence of organised crimes2. During the last decade, TOC has been reported to have developed in a manner that makes curtailing it a priority in the international agenda3. In fact, a report released by the International Peace Institute in 2013 underscored the need to restrain TOC, by noting that TOC had transformed into a significant threat in fragile states, where the United Nations run peace-keeping missions. The report argued that TOC is a threat to UN’s efforts to restore peace and stability in the fragile or conflict-affected states where UN has missions although such missions have minimal references to crime. During the last two decades, organized crime has increased globally as a result reaching macro-economic proportions relative to the growth in drug, gun, and human trafficking4. Although organized crime was initially considered a problem that affects the developed nations, and mostly restricted to major cities, it has dramatically broadened its tentacles globally as a result finding new pathways to penetrate into fragile and conflict-ridden states5. Against this backdrop, this essay agrees with the reasoning that fragile and conflict-affected states are particularly exposed to the dynamics of Transnational Organised Crime (TOC) and have a greater propensity to provide highly favourable conditions for the development of organised crime. This paper provides a critical analysis to provide the validity of this assertion. Background of fragile/conflict-affected states and TOC According to Dordevic, fragile states refer to countries with national and local authorities with deficient or weakened capacity or have a “fragile capacity” to deliver vital public goods, including security, safety, as well as alternative basic services6. The term conflict-affected states refer to fragile states facing these reduced capacities as a result of socio-political conflicts like wars7. Still, Woolcock observes that two aspects of fragility are particularly significant. These include legitimacy and capacity8. In his view, the concept of capacity within the context of fragile state is the ability of the state to deliver the public goods and services that the citizens are entitled too. On the other hand, ‘legitimacy’ refers to the ability of the state to ensure that its authority experiences adequate recognition and acceptance. On the other hand, transnational organised crime (TOC) is generally described as a systematic criminal enterprise that operates with the logical objective of making profits from illegal activities, which are usually in huge demand from the public9. The term “organised” depicts the organisational dimension of activities where emphasis is placed on the hierarchical and logistical structure of criminal gangs10. They sell illicit goods and services. They also have organised structure that contain some types of hierarchy with the objective of benefitting from the sale of provision of these goods and services. Additionally, they perpetuate their existence using various forms of violence, as well as by corrupting public officials. Theoretical Framework Within the context of this paper, it is reasoned that TOC embodies security threat to a state due to a variety of underlying social, economic, and political factors. Therefore, Social constructivism theory is suggested to provide a suitable theoretical framework to critically analyse how fragile and conflict-affected states are particularly exposed to the dynamics of Transnational Organised Crime (TOC) and have a greater propensity to provide highly favourable conditions for the development of organised crime. The Social Constructivism Theory is anchored in two key assumptions. The first is that basic structures of global politics are essentially socially constructed by cognitive structures that give importance to a material world11. The social structures comprise material resources and shared knowledge. The second assumption is that by changing the ways in which international relations is interpreted may assist in sustaining international security12. Within the context of societal security, a prevailing opinion among Social Constructivism theorists is that TOC embodies security threat to a state due to various underlying factors. Theorists like Ole Waever have contended that the societal security is linked to the idea of political security. Ole Weaver proposed the Securitization Theory, which proposes that ‘‘security’’ should be treated as the product of certain social process rather than as an objective condition. The social process lay grounds for the social construction of security issues, including the things that should be secured, through an analysis of ‘‘securitizing speech-acts’’ based on which threats are characterized and identified13 In Weaver’s view, political security consists of institutional stability in addition to the political systems within that state. Waever was convinced that a kind of duality exists between societal security and the state. In which case, unstable political systems bring about societal insecurity14. In view of the idea that TOC portends threat to a state as it is a source of societal security and comes about due to socio-political and socioeconomic factors, it can be reasoned that a fragile state, by nature, experience societal insecurity because of unstable political system15. TOC has been found to destabilize the norms and institutions based on which the social systems functions and are founded. It has also been found as capable of jeopardizing the internal stability of a country because of the effects of fundamental social and political actors that lead to an inability to efficiently face up to organized crime16. This results in significant levels of public distrust from the civil society. Ultimately, TOC dangers human security by creating a sense of insecurity. Additionally, it embodies a security threat for fragile states like Somalia, Bolivia, Columbia, Kazakhstan, and Afghanistan, as well as for the developing nations like Mexico, Germany, USA, and France. In 2006, for instance, former president of Mexico Felipe Calderon set up some 45,000 troops to fight against illicit drug trade. By 2009, some 10,000 people living in Mexico had lost their lives due to violence from organised crime groups17. Indeed, Lewis clarifies that any functioning state’s socio-political composition may be contextualised based on four groups, as showed in the table below. In his view, while the fragility of a state may indicate the limitations or inadequacies of state infrastructure, the social indicators may be equally significant18. Based on this model, Lewis further argues that state fragility may only start to overrun nations in situations with weak social cohesion, as well as in situations where fragmented societies exist19. The high competition for resources and services among communities, as well as among individuals that is created by state incapacity is potentially a major determinant factor for the situation, as a failure by the government to sustain the welfare of their citizens usually push them to conflicts with one other as well towards rejecting the state20. Based on these reasons, each has few examples of weak states with socially cohesive societies. a fragile state offers a unique operational context for theorists who work in the fields of security, justice, and crime control. Indeed, Woolcock21 states that in countries where governments are weak, there is a likelihood for criminal activities to thrive, which may be organised to appear like wars. He adds that in many cases, the neighbouring countries may make up one of the criminal gangs. According to Max Weber (1918), a state must be capable of retaining a “monopoly on violence” and application of force to facilitate respect for collective and individual rights, without which an environment for organised crime would be facilitated. Altogether, these show that the issue of fragility in general originates in the lack of administrative capacity that subsequently leads to incapacity of the state to ensure an efficient delivery of basic public services, like education and healthcare, equitably to the citizens. In these situations, fragile states may witness high levels of political and social violence, particularly when such come about due to conflicts that emanate over the scramble for resources. As a result, violence generates high levels of insecurity, and an environment for organised crime22. Reasons for spread of TOC into fragile states A review of literature on the causes, mobility, and prevalence of TOC show that several “push” and “pull” factors are responsible for the mobility, and prevalence of organised crime into newer regions, while simultaneously emphasising the effects of “pull” at the core of the absence of a functioning state or markets that are unregulated due to effects of conflicts. These factors include expansion of criminal activities globally, fragmentation of institutions, social fragmentation, social and economic inequalities and the rise of transit states. Fragmentation of institutions in fragile/conflict-affected states The issue of socio-political fragmentation is widely cited in TOC literature as being a key characteristic of a typical fragile state, as they provide opportunities for organised criminal networks to create partnership with other organisations in such environments. They also provide interest groups in the country justifiable reasons to search for opportunities to collude with TOC. Some features of fragile states stick out for the manner in which they assist to create such mutually reinforcing incentives, which facilitate the collaboration of local agencies or organisations and or TOCs23. The prevalence of institutional fragmentation, specifically in the security forces as well as among the local and central levels of the state, facilitate some sections of the officials to initiate long-term relationships with organised crime, as fragile states provide weak environments to closely monitor these officials or regulate their actions24. On the other hand, when these inadequately coordinated security and state agencies are corrupted or bribed, TOC gets to unlock certain services or even neutralize some security controls without a need to take part in expensive system-wide bribery25. For instance, the initiation of electoral democracy in parts of Central America, the devolution of municipal powers in Colombia, as well as the political enmity among elite and clans in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (which are post-Soviet Central Asian Republics) are identified by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) as leading to significant institutional fragmentation, where politicians aspire to access to extra resources that criminal activities, like drug trafficking provide26. Sampaio also argues that organised crime prevails in unstable regions of the world, because of the fragmented and weakened judicial system and law-enforcement capacity27. In his commentary on drug trafficking in fragile and conflict-affected states of East Africa, Sampaio argued that there has existed heroin trafficking across East Africa during the decades in the region. In July, 2015, the United Nations disclosed the seizure of some 1.5 tonnes of heroin by patrolling boats on East African parts of the Indian Ocean, since May 201528. However, it should be noted that the most worrying idea is that TOC has infiltrated into countries in East Africa, including Somalia, Kenya and Tanzania. Sampaio clarifies that Kenya is of particular concerns, where political elites are intensely claimed to be complicit in corruption. In 2015 for instance, five cabinet ministers of the state and 13 governors were named in a report by the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC)29. According to Sampaio, the reason TOCs have managed to operate in Kenya since the early 1990s is because of the weakened judicial system and law-enforcement capacity. Indeed, in an earlier report by the US Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), it is believed that among the most powerful TOCs called Akasha Organisation engaged extensively in heroin supply chain, which stretched from East Africa, Afghanistan, Europe and the United States. There have been no convictions. Therefore, widespread corruption due to fragmented institutions may have significant effects on a country’s stability, by encouraging the growth of TOCs. This may have helped lay grounds for the growth of al-Shabaab terror group networks in Kenya, leading to Westgate Terror attacks and Garissa University terror attacks that lead to the death of nearly 147 students30. The same could be said of West Africa, where an established cocaine-smuggling network has been cited to assist in funding al-Qaeda terror group in the Islamic Maghreb. While the role that transnational criminal networks play in taking advantage of the weaknesses of fragile states is strongly emphasised in current literature, it cannot be denied that a domestic partner is often necessary to initiate the activities of TOC31. Indeed, According to Briscoe argues that incidents of where TOCs invade a territory without first liaising with a domestic partner are uncommon. For instance, in Guatemala, Briscoe explains that domestic criminal power was initially strengthened before transnational drug trafficking cartels like the Sinaloa cartel penetrated into the country in 2000. The same entry pattern was followed by Zetas along the Pacific coast in 2008. Characteristically, these partners include security forces and state officials32. Indeed, Briscoe opines that such domestic structure are essentially made up of networks that are rooted in the counterinsurgency wars that have strong links to security forces and state officials, in addition to a range of drug lords already established in these regions33. Hence, it can be reasoned that such structures and particularly the more roles that locally established criminal bosses play, take advantage of the weaknesses in the internal governance structures in fragile states. Social fragmentation in fragile or conflict-affected states Some regions where TOCs operate are also characterised by weakened social capital and interpersonal ties, which organised crime networks exploit to win social acceptance. Although ethnic groups that thrive in these regions may tend to benefit from strengthened internal bonds of trust that are facilitated by the nonexistence of state authorities in the fragile states, the link among separate groups may be distinctly weaker34. This can be explained by several reasons. According to Miraglia et al35, factors like frontier status, overdependence on migrant workers, creation of population centres, and economic hardships may imply that social capital becomes bridged. At the same time, the interpersonal bonds that link individuals from diverse social groups may be deficient. Overall, these would mean that the community control and supervision of the behaviours of the state officials or security forces is weakened36. A case in point is in the Petén region of Guatemala, which was initially exploited with state support during the 1960s, before it was sidelined by the central government. These opened up opportunities for the growth of TOC to engage in drug trafficking. Relationships that are rooted in shared ethnic background are largely cited as responsible for the formation of criminal organisations, largely because of the ways in which they offer bonds of trust as well as benefit from a shared means of communication or language. For instance, during the 1990s in Kosovo, the guerrilla Kosovo Liberation Army benefitted from ethnic support from ethnic Albanian Kosovars, and generated income through a partnership with human trafficking and heroin trade rings in Europe. In a different scenario, transnational networks also lead to the criminalisation of a country. Correspondingly, the instability in these countries is also largely attributed to drug trafficking in part of Europe and Latin America37. A case in point is that of Guinea Bissau and Kosovo, where the two countries were incorporated into international human, gun and drug trafficking networks mainly because of their large informal economies in addition to clans that were rooted in political networks. During the 1990s, European migrant diaspora that supported the Kosovo Albanian revolution and the extremely divided powerbrokers of the Guinea-Bissau army were vital vehicles for the penetration of TOC into the political systems of the two countries. Consequently, ethnic Albanians transformed into major players who traded in heroin in parts of Western Europe during the time of the Kosovo insurgency. There are claims that they used the proceeds from the human, gun, and drug trafficking to fund the insurgent Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) during the revolution. Social and economic inequalities in fragile/conflict-affected states An additional critical source of mutual reinforcing incentives refers to the manner in which transnational organised crime organisations attach themselves to the existent economic and social inequalities within a fragile context to sub-contract operation, as well as to put up support networks for their operations. Peterke also agrees that social and economic inequality can make organised crime to be viewed as being socially acceptable. In his view, this may happen when the TOC infiltrates into communities that are economically weak and provide jobs and services38. Cayli also agrees that the social and income inequalities in fragile and conflict-affected states provide favourable conditions for the growth and prevalence of TOC. In his review of global justice movements targeted at curtailing TOC, Cayli argued that TOC had taken advantage of the economically weak states with profound social inequalities, where they provide alternative services to the public to gain acceptance. Afterwards, they spread propaganda against the current regimes, and in turn rebel against the governments to make the regions more fragile and favourable for TOC to prevail39. For instance, tremendous social and economic inequalities that characterised Central America during the 1990s were exploited to build extensive communal consent organised criminal operations. Recently, a study of Nicaragua showed that public sentiment towards drug trafficking due to the nonexistence of gainful economic activities created situations where the public supported organised criminal gangs that operated drug trafficking. In each of these incidents, TOC is likely to win public legitimacy as it is seen to be taking a role of a substitute state by providing employment and protection40. For instance, in Chiapas, Mexico, Cayli explains how the Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN) was funded by TOC to lead rebellions against the government in 199441. Afterwards, some 2,000 poor indigenous peasants were recruited to occupy the towns in Chiapas due to the huge social and economic inequalities between the poorer and the rich in the region. The EZLN used the propaganda that they were directly in opposition to the social inequalities brought about by the neoliberal policies and NAFTA42. The tendency of fragile states to serves as transit centres A fundamental feature of the logistical operations of transnational organised crime is a tendency to exploit fragile states as the entry points in a supply chain for drug, gun and human trafficking43. Put differently, transnational organised crime’s ability to penetrate into a country may have little to do with the local market. Instead, it is more concerned with securing passages or trade routes for illicit goods to target countries. An additional feature of TOC operations within this model is the manner in which transnational criminal market are bound to experience insulation from the adjoining social context44. Some commentators like Miraglia et al. have also argued that an illicit trafficking or transit route, in addition to its allied entourage of illegal investors, facilitators, actors, and or passive security and state officials tends to exist in cases where it links the points of supply and demand profitably, for the complicit organisations45. It could, therefore, be reasoned that this is actually the key factor that makes most of the fragile states to become part of these networks. The economies of these fragile states may have depended on foreign financers of armed violence. In addition, their structures of governance after the war may include some individuals from the political-criminal networks46. Cases in point include Bosnia-Herzegovina and Burundi. Still, the two countries do not actually provide significant competitive advantages to transnational cartels47. Indeed, it may appear that the instability of the conflict-affected and fragile states does not necessarily mean that a country portend a significant threat of transmitting security risks of organised crime internationally. In order for such a threat to happen, Levi48 argues that such a country must have geographical proximity to the target big markets or to have trafficking routes that provide ‘secure’ passages to the target markets. Still, apart from the geographical proximity, there has to be some form of access to certain facilities that are crucial for facilitating international criminal activities. These may include transport and communication and links, and in some cases cash transfer or money laundering facilities. Miraglia et al49 suggest that such needs are likely to be waived in cases where a country is likely to offer secure passages. Still, it is crucial to note that modern information technologies have made it possible to transact these trades from remote locations. In addition, security conditions are also vital determinant factors for whether the fragile states become complicit in illicit drug, human or gun trafficking is. While the law enforcement attempts would, in rare occasions, manage to put out transnational markets for the illicit drugs completely, such illicit markets are likely to become redundant50. It is based on these background, in combination with the growth of market power of the Mexican mafia, after the collapse of the demise of the Colombian cartels that made some fragile states in Central America to rise to eminence as complex criminal supply route during the last decade, which today accounts for some 90 percent of the cocaine that makes it way to North America. For instance, while Central America leads in the production of illicit drugs, it has low consumption of drugs compared to many countries. Miraglia et al. suggested that countries that are caught up in this type of t TOC nay be referred as victims of circumstance, where the end-user market becomes evenly well served using alternative routes, as seen in the case of Mexico51. A case in point is the United States, which is at the core of Mexico’s drug problem, even as Mexico is subsidiary to that of the U.S. Still, it is apparent that TOC is contingent significantly on the collaboration of security forces and local officials, and may therefore operate based on the consent of the public. However, a review of different cases shows that the emergence of TOC within a fragile state is hardly ever hostile takeover. According to Kemp et al., increased trafficking of contraband from one region of the globe to other regions, usually shifting through many transit nations and regions have shifted the problem to neighbouring and potentially more fragile states52. Kemp et al. further concede that while the UN is better equipped to address the challenges brought about TOC, organized crime still threatens the stability and undermines peacekeeping missions. Alemika agrees that TOC amounts to a severe threat to national stability and globalisation of the economy. In his view, the problem goes as far back as the mid-1980s when the rise and escalation of money laundering, human trafficking, drug trafficking, piracy and trafficking in arms gradually attracted the interest of many international agencies and countries53. Expansion of criminal activities globally The global economy infrastructure is heavily criticised for facilitating transnational crime by opening up demands for contrabands or illicit goods. This is particularly so in fragile states with weakened border security, leading to high mobility of contrabands and diversified trade routes. At the same time, the advancements in information and communication technology are widely cited as an obstacle to attempts to toughen border security for these fragile states. Miraglia et al. argued that the technological advancements and the growth of a globalised political economy have facilitated considerable transformation in the ways in which TOC patterns out is behaviours and operations54. Consistent with this reasoning, Miraglia et al. argued that innovations like shipping container and the emergence of easy online international cash transfer companies play a vital role in facilitating the growth of illegal economy globally55. For some fragile states like Somalia for instance, which has installed measures to put off cross-border trafficking, including systematically scanning and tracking of shipping containers by customs officials, they are still challenged with resource limitations because of the state of political instability in the country56. These have facilitated the flow of illicit goods, including heroine, charcoal, ivory, and other contrabands from Asia through Somalia, and into Kenya, and Uganda57. As a matter of fact, recent media reports have indicated that trade in illegal wildlife estimated at US$213 billion annually funds organised crime in Somalia, including global terror groups like al-Shabaab58. This is apart from the ivory trade of nearly US$400 million annually that trickle into the neighbouring countries like Kenya and Uganda. The yearly trade in illicit goods of approximately US$100 billion in illegal logging and charcoal trade have also been cited to help fund Somalia's Al-Qaeda linked terror group called al-Shabaab59. To this end, the issue of TOC is acute in fragile states in the case of transnational shipping, particularly in fragile states with international ports as they provide an entry point for contrabands, which are used to finance organised crimes. Despite attempts to control these goods, they are circumvented easily because of advanced communication technologies and bribing of the custom officials. Conclusion Transnational organised crime (TOC) embodies security threat to a state because of a complex variety of social, economic, and political factors. This makes the Social constructivism theory particularly relevant a theoretical framework for critical analysis of how fragile and conflict-affected states are particularly exposed to the dynamics of Transnational Organised Crime (TOC), as well as how they have a greater propensity to provide highly favourable conditions for the development of organised crime. Indeed, the issue of socio-political fragmentation is widely cited in TOC literature as being a key characteristic of a typical fragile state, as they provide opportunities for organised criminal networks to create partnership with other organisations in such environments. Consequently, as established, as TOC portends threat to a state as it is a source of societal security and comes about due to socio-political and socioeconomic factors, fragile states, by nature, experience societal insecurity because of unstable political system. Some regions where TOCs operate are also characterised by weakened social capital and interpersonal ties, which organised crime networks exploit to win social acceptance. A fundamental feature of the logistical operations of transnational organised crime is a tendency to exploit fragile states as the entry points in a supply chain for drug, gun, and human trafficking. The global economy infrastructure is heavily criticised for facilitating transnational crime by opening up demands for contrabands or illicit goods. This is particularly so in fragile states with weakened border security, leading to high mobility of contrabands and diversified trade routes. The fragile states also serve as transit centres for human, drug and gun trafficking. 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