Arms Control and Disarmament - Assignment Example

Arms control and disarmament “The process of evaluating the verifiability of arms control agreements and assessing other states compliance with them is inherently more political than technical and more subjective than objective”. Discuss. The process of evaluation and verifiability of arms control is a function of international security. According to GCSP Report (2007) and Findley (2004), failure of compliancei to arms control treaties amounts into threat of international security. A treaty, according to Vienna convention on laws of treaties (1969) is an international agreement that is arrived at between states and presented in a written form and is governed by international law. Similar observation are shared by Kurt and Campbell (2004) that a treaty is legally quantified and binding with regard to international lawii. Different factors characterize compliance or failure of compliance by a state to arms control treaties. Huntington (1996) and Daalder (1992:51-73) proposes existence of factors that determine compliance and non-compliance as political considerations at a given time, quantifiable technical observations, applicable technical resources and states’ allies within United Nation Security Council (UNSC). Flowrence (1992:3) suggests interrplay of these factors complicate evaluation and verifiability for compliance and non-compliance. Kokoski and Koulik (1990:7) and Schear (1985:141-182) have given examples of arms control agreements and treaties that include the 1968 treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), the 1993 Convention on Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (CWC) and 1996 Comprehesive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Meyer (1984:111-126) states that a greater percentage of arms control treatiesiii are multi-lateral while others have limited application to certain states- as outlined by Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) that was intergrated into the 1990 Convectional Armed Forces in Europe Agreement (CFE), the 1990 Open Skies Treaty (OST) or Nuclear Weapons Free Zones Treaty (NWFZT). Schear (1985:141-182) indicates existence of bilateral treaties like US-USSR 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and US-USSR 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM). Schear (1985) suggests besides agreements and treaties, states can make arms control arrangements although they may be lacking in treaty tools and instruments, they are legally binding like the OSCE’s vienna documents (VDocs) that were meant to pave way for confidence development. Daalder (1992:51-73) and Bohlen (2003:7-34) suggests arms control arrangements among states help in development of political commitment on arms control and stimulate political and nation statesiv compliance with the made arms control arrangements. Aust (2000:17-18), Department of state publication 11238 (Aug 2005) and IGGS report EUR 21077 (2004) all point out that breach of arms control treaties and agreements have occurred that have predisposed break down of international security. Examples of states that have breached arms control treaties include Iran, North Korea and libya. Succeess has been observed in some of arms control treaties like the 1987 US-USSR whose concern was to address Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), START and CFE treaties. Aust (2000:17-18) considers political factors as the primary threat to arm control process of verification protocols and procedures. IGGS report EUR 21077 (2004) indicates political influence affects degree of detection and eventual procedures taken following arms control violation of treaties and agreement and affects the level of denying any nation state advantage of violating or breaking the agreements. Similar opinion is shared by Mackby and Ifft (2007) and Schear (141-182) who have suggested that political factors have contributed significantly to violation of verification procedures with regard to International Atomic Energy Agency safequards. Meyer (1984:111-126), Shaker, (n.d:15-19) and Daalder (1992:51-73) agree that political factors play a great role in ensuring compliance with chemical weapons convention in order to maintain ban of production, use, stocking and transfer of chemical weapon. In the process, political factors play a great role in enforcing “Challenge inspection system” that favour political superpowers with objective of reducing international threat to security. Meyer (1984:111-126), Tower et al (1992:XV) agree that forces of political influence are at play during the voting process that make it possible for a state that is suspected to violate arms control protocols to get forced inspection. Tower et al (1992:XV) and Daalder (1992:51-73) proposed that this tendency is likely to translate into a quaranteed challenge inspection eventhough arms control executive council may seem errorneous or abusive in implementing or recommending the inspection. This implies political influence comes into play in the event of “prioritising protection of national securityv” and “effective management of a nation’s industrial secrets” by creating an envinroment for employing politically managed access techniques and creating potential inspectors without reviewing procedures for appointing inspection teams. Kokoski and Koulik (1990) argues that political factors affect direction of the verification process of arms control and are predisposed by prevailing difference between goals and objectives of different arms control bodies. For instance, chemical weapons convention and NPT objectives are very different with regard to arms control. NPT has no powers to eliminate nuclear weapons but understands existence of nuclear weapons and their possible effects with respect to international security and is concerned with nuclear weapons horizontal poliferation. As a result, verification process of arms is made a difficult task because the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) inspectors are mandated to investigate presence of controlled and prohibited weapony materials and also evaluate the state that owns them. Eland (2002) concludes that the inspection team prioritises on proving existence of the WMD or nucler weapons but dues not go into depth to analyse their future potential use. Garrison (2004) has argued that political superpowers like the United States would prefer to have an upper hand in international inspections of nuclear powered tools but owing to political interference factors, United States is forced not to balance non-proliferation security that could be achieved through adoption of intrusive verification regime. United States use of its political strength in arms control verification is stronger as opposed to its use of technical factors subject to failure of treaties that are obsolete for instance NPT that was a member party to Soviet Union which is no longer in existence and the succesor nations to Soviet Union have since failed to sign the NPT pact because of political orientation over arms control following death of cold war. According to Duffy (1988:4) there exists evidence that is suggestive of United States Upper hand in arms control following 1946 Truman’s administration need to seek Soviet Union’s co-operation after the launch of United Nations with object of structuring political arrangements (that turned out to be agreements and into treaties) prohibiting nuclear program efforts for either military gains or commercial purposes. Fukuyama (1992) argues that this aim witnessed transfer of powers and authority over arms control into an international body (UN) for looking into and evaluating nuclear based programs. Bailes (2005:1-27) and Coker (2003) agree that political authority was evident post 1948 cold war in which other states came to understand thematic object of the United States approach to arms control as a measure towards clipping nuclear weapons of rising major nation states. Dwan and Wiharta (2005:139-198) proposes that Soviet’s Union acquisition of nuclear weapons in 1949 fueled United States strategic stage for preventing and controlling nuclear weapons threat. Dwan and Wiharta (2005:139-198), Bailes (2005:1-27) and Coker (2003) all agree that United States upper hand in arms control gained momentum following the death of Stalin in mid 1950’s by adopting a vertical approach in order to create a United States –Soviet Union nuclear weapon balance and horizontal approach that was meant to create a proliferation. With adoption of technical influence, that was characterized by horizontal approaches, technical talks on arms control yielded verification procedures that finally were to end nuclear testing for biological and humanitarian reasons. Bailes (2005:1-27) and Coker (2003) have indicated that political influence prevailed again for United States as both superpowers (United States and Soviet Union) had expanded their nuclear profiles. Dwan and Wiharta (2005:139-198) suggests that United States was for the agenda of creating an enabling environment for creating nuclear weapon stability and managing the then perceived nuclear war-heads competition. Dwan and Wiharta (2005:139-198), Bailes (2005:1-27) and Coker (2003) all indicate that efforts by the United states, both political and technical, played a great role in bringing about equilibrium of East-West confrontation and this was fore-runner for establishment of limited Test ban Treaty (LTBT) during summer 1963. Fukuyama (1992) and Duffy (1988) have both indicated that this achievement was catalyzed by Cuban missile crisis and unexpected tests of China’s nuclear weapons whose magnitude could have negatively affected International stability. Flowrence (1992) and Kokoski and Koulik (1990) are suggestive that political factors came into play and traversed technical factors considerations when United States and Soviet Republic agreed to stop German’s access to nuclear weapons that created a benchmark for the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) that rolled into services in 1968. Kokoski and Koulik (1990) is suggestive that technical factors influence under the forces of political factors spearheaded 1969 strategic arms’ symposium and bought an end to cold war and opened doors to formal strategic arms control processes that was a political function of East–west diplomacy. Tower et al. (1992), Hassner (2002) and Bailes (2005) have shown that United States political authority in arms control witnessed successive agreements that led into formation of many arms control treaties. These treaties included SALT I Interim agreement, the ABM treaty, Nuclear Testing Agreements and SALT II, INF, START I and START II. Kokoski and Koulik (1990) and Hassner (2002) point out that United States political authority; enclosed in technical authority, played a significant role that eventually led into collapse of Soviet Union. The age-old cold war was over and United States technical strategy on arms control shifted to managing the arms control transition phase that viewed any Russian states nuclear arms acquisition as a threat to United States interests of international security. Huntington (1996), Eland (2002) and Coker (2003) are all suggestive that although technical factors are taken into account when determining approaches to arms control processes, policy makers are more guided by political influencevi rather than technical considerations as a function of United States preferences with regard to military, leadership, social and economical context, even though their processes and mechanism subscribe to four verification methodologies that are used. These verification methods are National Technical Means (NTM) via satellite surveillance, air sampling and communication interests; second cooperative means such as opening specific military systems to satellite surveillance; third, soft methodsvii like using verification agents who interview emigrants and analyze information leakages from the nation state in question or under investigation and finally use of onsite inspections. Tower et al. (1992) and Kokoski and Koulik (1990) agree that United States prefers to use on-site inspection methodology. Tower et al. (1992) indicates that onsite inspection of chemical weaponry plants is highly intruding and is enforced by political authority. Dwan and Wiharta (2005:139-198), Bailes (2005:1-27) and Coker (2003) have pointed out that the processes of arms control oversteps technical processesses because of existence of uncertainities in verification mechanism for arms control non-compliance practicesviii. There is likelihood that a state may require to test its own age old stockpiles of weapons. Garrison (2004) puts forward that political processes in arms control, are governed by political supremacy and United States influence has high probability of prohibiting technical organisations that are mandated to collect and analyse arms control data and influence conclusions that technical teams may arrive. This creates an environment where the technical arms control processes may be biased as evident in Irag that formed backbone of the gulf war. Garrison (2004), Duffy (1998), Findley (2002) and Bailes (2005) all agree that based on political supremacy, arms control protocols and procedures have had more powers and authority vested on United States. Eland (2002) agrees that arm control verification processes, backed by United States stable political climate, ensures arms control efforts are directed to limit nuclear weapon development and materials in Europe and Russia. The white house (2002) points out that United states has an upper hand in arms control since it houses a workable preventive threat reduction approaches and policies that include treaties, executive agreements Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBM) consultative mechanisms, transgovernmental arrangements like Co-operative Threat Reduction (CTR), Material Protection Control and Accounting Programs (MPC&AP) and Parrallel Unilateral Actions (PUA). The main bodies in United States that are concerned with arms control include bureau of arms control, bureau of non-poliferation and bureau of political-military affairs. Eland (2002) and Duff (1998) share similar observation that following political influence of United States, the Soviet’s MIRVED heavy ICBMs that were percieved as posing a threat of strike were eliminated. Hart, J. and Kile, S. N. (2005:629-648), Dwan and Wiharta (2005), Bailes (2005) and Coker (2003) recommend this measure by United States was geared to enhance and improve international stability, international relations and international security and was acomplished by United States association with other nations, a move that was backed by bringing together techinical resources to ensure 1972’s ABM treaty sailed through and achieved its ultimate goal of preserving international strategic stability and creating an enabling environment for fostering and nurturing peace efforts. Tower et al. (1992), Garrison (2004) and Findley (2002) propose that United States overall control of arms is backed up by technical processes that are aimed at preserving United States millitary sufficiecy in combating development of nuclear programs that do not meet or satify the United States agenda. In this regard, technical resources,backed by adequate technical communication facilities have been adopted by the United States as a measure of increasing the level of transparency, minimizing uncertainty and risks of miscalculations. Findley (2002) is of the opinion that this strategic technical-political process, was technically meant to achieve a better control of United States-Russia arms control relationship. Findley (2002;2004) agrees this milestone objective has been made possible and achieved technically through development of mutual trust between United States and other nations that have potential for developing nuclear programs. in the post cold war assurance, good willix has been established and United States enjoys Global vote and advantage for her political stability and being associated with efforts meant to sustain international security and relations. Coker (2003) recomends that building of trust between superpowers is a politically oriented mechanism that is characterized by a reciprical political reassurance that either of the parties involved secures co-operative relationship and subscribes to efforts for sustainable arms contro processes in the west and abides by co-operative relationship in the west and vice versa regarding use and production of nuclear arms. Dwan and Wiharta (2005) proposes that these technical mechanisms are United States adaptability and flexibility, United States timeliness, responsiveness and negotiability efforts to arms control, United States verifiability efforts to arms control, United States abundant support for compliance, United States political insulation even from UN security council, United States institunalized cooperation efforts and strategies to arms control, United states alignment for easier implementation of arms control, United States political powers backed by good international political good will to implement legislative action and United States technical cost effectiveness strategy to arms control. Kurt and Campbell (2003), Findley (2004), Bailes (2005) and Coker (2003) all argues that with respect to traditional arms control, technical factors have more preference to political factors because on the technical fronts, arms control mechanisms outlast political system. At the same time political influence is determined by the need to achieve a given objective. Meyer (1984) proposes that politically a treaty cannot be terminated but technically it can be ended. However political interference forge for irreversibility of treaties in order to favour political superpowers namely United States and Russia. Meyer (1984) and Aust (2000) both argue that political factors don’t favour transparency in arms control although treaties may have factored inspection. Findley (2004), Dwan and Wiharta (2005), Bailes (2005) and Coker (2003) all indicate that this reluctance was restored by confidence and security building measures (CSBMs) that included Helsinki final act, the stockholm document and the Vienna Document (VDoc) and the convectional Armed forces treaty (CFE). Hassner (2002) has indicated that a state that fails to define its own arms control antithesis in traditional geo-strategic terms exposes itself to operate on procedures and protocols that are generic, abstract or functional and is likely to subscribe to cold war era policies. United States has weathered and risen past Hessner’s opinion and has sustained its grip in ensuring interantional security and relations, is not exposed to threat of nuclear weapons. In this aspect, the processes employed in evaluating verifiability of arms control agreements and assessing other states compliance is political than technical and subjective than objective. Bibliography Aust, Anthony. (2000). modern treaty law and practice. Cambridge university press. Chapter 3, 17-8. Bailes, A. J. K. (2005). Global security gorvenance:A world of change and challenge;SIPRI yearbook 2005: Armaments, Disarmaments and international security. Oxford University press. Pp. 1-27. Bohlen, A. (Autumn 2003). 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The National security strategy of the United States of America, Washington, DC, SEP.2002,URL:http://www.whitehouse.gou/risc/nss.html. Read More